I VIV 



Jbl8 






THE CONFLICT 







OF THE EAST AND WEST 



IN 



H 



GYPT 



"DISSERT A. TIOK IN PART FULFILLMENT OF THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY 

FOE THE ATTAINMENT OF THE DEGREE OF 

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY," IN 

THE SCHOOL OF POLiTICAL SCIENCE, 

COLUMBIA COLLEGE. 



— BY 



JOHN ELIOT BOWEN, B. A., Ph. B. 



NEW YORK: 
THE INDEPENDENT PRESS, 21 & 23 ROSE STREET. 

1S3S. 



W\ 



09 



•p. 



4> p5 Ov^i^v-c^n^xr'^-'t: 



CONTENTS 



^r/ 



•Chapter. 

I. Feobi Mehemet Ali to Ismail, 



Page. 
1 



II. Ismail's Ambitious Designs, . . . . 15 

III. The Eoad to Kuin, 23 

IV. Mehemet Tewtik, Khedive, ..... 42 
V. Egypt fok the Egyptians, ...... 54 

VI. AsABi's Eebellion, and the Eefobms that Followed, 65 

VII. The Sudan and the Mahdi, ..... 77 

VIII. The Mission of Gordon. Operations in the Eastern 

Sudan, ......... 86 

IX. Gordon at Khartum and the Government in London, 91 

X. "Wolseley's Expedition. Conclusion, .... 99 



THE 

CONFLICT OF THE EAST AND WEST 

IN 



EGYPT. 



CHAPTEE I. 

From Mehemet Ali to Ismail. 



It was not until tlie purchase of the Suez Canal shares by 
Great Britain, in 1875, that the conflict to be described was waged 
"with spirit. The influences and interests of the East and West, 
however, had clashed for many years. Long before the dawn of 
the nineteenth century the attention of England had been directed 
through Egypt to the far-away Indian Empire, that El-Dorado 
that lured the British merchantmen to brave the storms of the 
southern seas. But the voyage 'round the Horn was a hazardous 
one and a long one ; and the growth of commerce demanded that 
the Eastern Empire should be made more accessible. England 
knew, and the world knew, that the du'ect route to India lay 
through the land of the ancient Pharaohs. England thought 
the way through Egypt should be overland ; but France thought 
it should be by a canal that would one day connect the Medi- 
terranean and the Red Seas. 

France was interested in the valley of the Nile. She had 
put her foot there before England. The great Napoleon knew 
the value of Egypt. " By seizing and holding Egypt," he said, 
"I retain and command the destinies of the civilized world." 
And so, in 1798, he seized Egypt ; but he did not hold it. The 
English, under Abercrombie, compelled the French to retire by 
the Battle of Alexandria, in 1801. And now, for a short time, the 



— 6 — 

influence of England was felt in Egypt. But it did not last long ; 
for, after the accession of Mehemet Ali, in 1805, Egypt was able 
to stand by herself. This event marks the starting-point, from 
which it will be necessary to trace in brief the history and de- 
velopment of Egypt in order to appreciate the government and 
condition of the country a decade ago, when England purchased 
the canal shares. ■ 

When the firman of the Sublime Porte made Mehemet Ali the 
Governor of Egypt, in 1805, the country was in a state of feudal- 
ism. The pacha appointed by the Porte had been only the nomi- 
nal ruler, the real government of the country being in the hands 
of the petty lords, or beys, known as the Memluks. They had 
deference neither for pasha nor for Sultan. It is true that a 
small tribute was promised the Porte every time a new pacha was 
appointed; but it was almost never paid. The governors had been 
m.any since the beginning of the century. "Indeed," says Mr. 
Patton, in his history of the Egyptian Revolution, "all the pachas 
that intervene between the French rule and that of Mehemet Ali 
are a will-o'-the-wisp to the historian. A pacha of some sort 
flies before the eyes ; but when we attempt to grasp him he is 
gone. . . . Thus successively rose and fell Mehemet Khusuff 
Pasha, Tahir Pasha, Ali Pasha Gezairli, and Khurshid Pasha. 
Mehemet Ali alone stands out the distinct historical figure in the 
foreground." * 

The obscure Albanian owed his elevation to the pashalic to 
his success, while a Turkish commander, in quelling the dissen- 
sions among the Mamluk beys. Once at the head of the govern- 
ment he set to work in earnest to deprive them of their power, 
Isnowing full well that his position as the Sultan's pasha would be 
at best both insignificant and insecure, so long as these feudal 
lords played fast and loose with the resources of the land. Until 
1811, therefore, Mehemet Ali devoted himself to the suj)pression 
of the Memluks. Against this grasping for power England en- 
tered a feeble protest ; not indeed because she sympathized with 
Egyptian feudalism, but because she happened, at that time, to 
fall out with the Porte, and desired, therefore, to help the Sultan's 
enemies. She even sent troops to Egypt and took possession of 
Alexandria. But the occupation was brief ; for Mehemet Ali de- 

* Vol. II, p. 14. 



— 7 — 

scended from Upper Egypt, where he had been administering 
such correction to the Memluks as few absokite monarchs ever 
dared employ, and, proclaiming himself the champion of Islamism, 
he forced the infidels to retire to Sicily. It now remained for 
the vigorous pasha to perform the two acts that consolidated his 
power throughout the valley of the Nile : the first was the revo- 
lutionary transfer to his own possession of the landed property of 
the entire country, and the second was the total extinction of the 
Memluks by massacre in the Citadel of Cairo. The period of 
destruction was succeeded by one of development. The absolute 
ruler introduced modern mihtary tactics and established a naval 
-arsenal in Alexandria ; he built canals ; he introduced the culture 
of cotton, a product that was destined one day to become the 
source of enormous revenues; he imported, also, indigo, forest 
trees, fruits, spices, etc., for reproduction; he founded medical 
and educational institutions ; he improved the police and rendered 
travel safe, so that now, for the first time, passengers and letters 
bound for India were conveyed with perfect safety through Egypt 
overland to Suez. 

But Mehemet Ali was not content with these undertakings and 
improvements, important and difficult as they were ; he longed 
for greater power. He made war against the Wahabees of Arabia 
and he conquered the peoples of the Sudan. And all the time he 
chafed under his subjection to the Porte. Finally he sent his 
warlike son, Ibrahim, to pick a quarrel in Syria; and Ibrahim 
captured Aci'e and was soon fighting against the troops of his 
father's suzerain and carrying all before him. It seemed as if 
Mehemet AK was about to become the Sultan of Egypt and Syria. 

This was in 1832, a time when England was keeping a very 
watchful and a very jealous eye on Russia, ready at any moment 
to claim a foothold in Turkey. England thought that Egypt, 
being against Turkey, must be for Russia. From self-interest 
England could not allow her " ancient ally " to remain be- 
tween two such fires; this Syrian flame must be quenched. 
England hesitated, however, to act, and in 1833 the Porte 
recognized the feudal sovereignty of Mehemet Ali over Egypt, 
Crete, Syria, and Adana, exacting only a small tribute. The 
peace did not last long, and in 1839 the Turks were again flee- 
ing before the victorious Ibrahim. It seemed as if Asia Minor 



— 8 — 

and Constantinople must soon succumb to him. But now England 
intervened with an energy that was wanting in 1832. Her fleet 
joined those of Turkey and Austria off the coast of Syria, and with 
British commanders on land and sea the troops of Ibrahim were 
forced to yield. The hopes of Mehemet Ali were blasted. His 
son had been overcome by England and he had been duped by 
France. Thiers promised an assistance that was never rendered. 

The war at an end, the Powers endeavored to negotiate a 
treaty. After the usual diplomatic formalities and delays it was 
finally agreed that Mehemet Ali should evacviate Syria, Arabia, 
and Candia, and shotdd receive the hereditary government of 
Egypt, acknowledging the Sultan as his suzerain. The terms of 
this agreement were embodied in a firman issued by the Sublime 
Porte in 1841. 

Mehemet Ali was now an old man, and during the remainder of 
his life the influences of his youth and early manhood, as is 
usually the case with those who have witnessed and participated 
in great governmental and social revolutions, predominated over 
the progressive spirit of his most vigorous and potent years. He 
became more of a despot than ever ; and his severity had few of its 
former excuses. He did, however, permit an association of British 
merchants to organize a transportation service to India, through 
Egypt via Cairo and Suez, by means of which communication with 
India was made in weeks instead of months.* 

In 1847 Mehemfet All's intellect began to weaken, and within a 
year his dotage had so increased that his son Ibrahim was installed 
Pasha of Egypt in his place. But Ibrahim's rule was cut short by 
death two months later, and in December of 1848 Abbas was in- 
vested with the pashalic. In the summer of 1849 Mehemet Ali 
died, spent in mind and body. A good idea of the character and 
work of this " Napoleon of Egypt," as he has so often been called, 
may be gathered from the following quotation from Mr. Patton's 
history : 

" Ttere is mucli to be said in abatement of his merits. Although superior to a thirst 
for blood, from mere vengeance and resentment, and an easy pardoner of those who were 
no longer able to injure him, no compunction ever deterred him from removing the 
obstacles to his lawless ambition by fraud or force— most frequently by a compound of 
both. Nor was he able, with all his perseverance, to conquer his aboriginal want 

*"The Modern History and Condition of Egypt, from 1801 to 1846," by Wm. Holt 
Yates, M.D. 



— 9 — 

of education. Anxious to introduce European civilization into Egypt, he remained 
to the end of his life in utter ignorance of the economical principles upon which 
the prosperity of a state reposes. Greedy of the praise of Europeans, and, in the latter 
part of his career, anxious to count for something in the balance of military pow- 
er, his allusions on this head showed to himself and to others the wide interval that 
separates the scientific organization of European military and political establishments 
from the Egyptian imitations which cost him efforts so lengthened and persevering. But 
altbiough unable to resist the dictation of any European power, he was— within Egypt— all- 
potent in establishing an order that had never existed before, so as to afford those facili- 
ties that have proved so valuable to the Indian transit. He found Egypt in anarchy ; 
and long before he had terminated his career the journey from the Mediterranean to Nubia 
was as secure as that from London to Liverpool. He learned to read, and attempted to 
write, after he had attained his fortieth year ; and when we add that the practical result 
of his efforts was to leave his family in the hereditary government of Egypt, Mehemet Ali 
must be admitted to have been, without exception, the most remarkable character in the 
modern history of the Ottoman Empire."* 

Abbas Pasha succeeded Mehemet Ali. He preceded his uncle 
Said; for, by the then existing law of succession, the reins of 
government fell to the " eldest male of the blood of Mehemet Ali." 
Abbas possessed neither the warlike impetuosity of his father 
Ibrahim, nor the ambition of his grandfather Mehemet Ali. He 
did not look beyond the bounds of Egypt for territory to acquire 
or for customs to imitate. It was enough for him that he was a 
good Mohammedan ; that the wheat and millet fields throughout 
the valley of the Nile yielded their yearly increase ; that the fella- 
hin prospered and paid their taxes without the application of 
kurbash and bastinado, and that there was peace among the people 
who acknowledged him their master. Though he did not court 
the favor of foreigners, he allowed an English company to begin 
the construction of a railway from Alexandria to Cairo, which was 
to be continued across the desert to Suez. But he himself under- 
took no great works, built no new canals, and did not even carry 
out the schemes and plans of his predecessors. Abbas has been 
called a bigot and a miser. He certainly was neither liberal in 
mind nor lavish with money.f It is not surprising, therefore, that 

*"A History of the Egyptian Revolution to the Death of Mehemet Ali," by A. A. 
Patton, P. R. G. S., Vol. II., pp. IT and 18. 

t Abbas has had few defenders. Henry C. Kay, in The Contemporary Review for March 
1883, says of him : " It is not my purpose to attempt the impossible task of justifying every 
act of his government. But, as a matter of justice and a fact of history, it ought to be 
stated that he was probably, though without the advantage of European education, the 
most aWe and the most eflScient administrator the country has seen since the death of 
Mehemet Ali. He has met with the misfortune of having his reputation sacrificed for 
political reasons. French mfluence was supreme and practically unchallenged throughout 
the reign of Mehemet Ali. Abbas Pasha, on his accession, manifested a disposition to seek 
some measure of support from England. He added an Englishman to the French officials 



— 10 — 

at Ms death lie left a large sum of ready money in the Egyptian 
treasury. Perhaps this was known by those who are said to have 
strangled him. At all events the money and the Government 
passed to Said in 1854. 

Said Pasha was a very different man from his nephew Abbas. 
Their tastes, their habits, their dispositions, their lives, and, con- 
sequently, their governments were diametrically opposite. In fact 
Said was everything that his predecessor was not. Sociable, witty, 
extravagant, sensual, and fond of all the delights of life, he seemed 
rather the gay French courtier than the imperturbable Moslem 
ruler. He set up a coiu:t not unlike that of Louis XIY. He wel- 
comed foreigners and entertained most lavishly. He forgot the 
sobriety enjoined by the Prophet, so that his dinners and his 
wines became famed for their richness and excellence. He accepted 
the suggestions of his foreign parasites and hastened to adopt this 
scheme or that scheme, according as the whim of the hour or the 
persuasive agreeableness of the schemer might move him. 

Among the foreigners attracted to Egypt at the beginning of 
Said's reign was a man of larger and nobler purpose than these 
grasping tricksters knew. Ferdinand de Lesseps had formed an 
early friendship with Said while acting as diplomatic attache in 
Egypt years before. At that time, also, he had conceived a plan 
destined to revolutionize the commerce of the world. It was not 
a new plan, however. The scheme of constructing a waterway 
between the Mediterranean and Red Seas had been suggested to 
all the great rulers of Egypt, the Pharaohs, the Persian, Greek, and 
Eoman conquerors, and the Arab Caliphs. Also, according to re- 
cent discoveries in the archives of Venice, it seems that the project 
of cutting the Isthmus was considered by the mariners of the 
fifteenth centviry.* A canal between the two seas via the river 
Nile actually existed for an unknown period in the dynasties of 

employed at his Foreign Office. He set about the construction, under the superintendence 
of English engineers, of a railway destined to connect Alexandria with Suez, an undertak- 
ing until then successfully opposed by France. He, moreover, placed his son under the 
care of an English tutor. The consequences may easily be understood. But the curious 
part of the matter is, that English writers, bj constant repetition, one after ttie other, have 
done more to propagate erroneous views of Abbas Pasha's reign than those of any other 
nation, the French probably included. It is not my object to defend Abbas Pasha's private 
character, further than by adding that the generality of the stories told about him rest 
upon no better foundation than the merest gossip." 

* '» Discoveries and Inventions of the Nineteenth Century," p. 163, by Robert Eout- 
ledge. 



— li- 
the Pharaolis, and again for a period of more than four hundred 
years under the Eomans, and lastly for a period of more than a 
century after the Arab conquest. But Mehemet Ali, though he 
had considered, had not favored the great canal scheme, and Fer- 
dinand de Lesseps was obliged, therefore, to await a more oppor- 
tune time for broaching his plan. He brooded over his idea of a 
waterway while England secui'ed the construction of a railway. 

With the accession, now, of his old friend Said, the cherished 
hopes of de Lesseps were kindled to expectation. Nor was he 
deceived in believing that the opportune time had arrived. He 
went at once to Egypt and laid his plan before the Viceroy. It 
was accepted by him on the fifteenth of November, 1854, with 
these words : " I am convinced. I accept your plan. We will talk 
about the means of its execution during the rest of the journey. 
[They were taking a Nile trip together.] Consider the matter set- 
tled. You may rely on me." * 

The concession had no sooner been announced than English 
influence was brought to bear against the canal scheme. Mr, 
Bruce, the English Consul in Egypt, told the Viceroy that he was 
acting too hastily in the matter. At Constantinople, Lord Strat- 
ford de Redcliffe tlirew obstacles in the way of the scheme, while 
in England the general attitude toward the canal was unfavorable, 
and even hostile. In January, 1855, the London Times declared 
against the proposed canal as an absolute impossibility. Lord 
Palmerston opposed the scheme from first to last. He held that 
the Porte must give its consent before the Viceroy could allow the 
canal, forgetting that the English Government had told a former 
Viceroy that he might construct a railway from Alexandria to 
Suez without the consent of his suzerain. 

In February the Sultan's Council was on the point of granting 
the necessary permission, when Lord Stratford interposed his 
influence to produce delay. His lordship urged that the railway 
ought to be enough without any canal. He hinted to the Porte 
that a canal might so increase the importance of Egypt that the 
child would break with its parental authority. An influence, also, 
was brought to bear upon the Viceroy, but probably not of so 
intense a kind as de Lesseps imagined ; for he wrote at the time : 
" He [the Viceroy] is even threatened with the displeasure of Eng- 

. * " The Suez Canal," p. 13, by Ferdinand de Lesseps. 



— 12 — 

land, whose fleets might attack him when the business on the 
Black Sea is ended." 

The whole matter had by this time assumed an international 
importance, with France at the head of the nations who favored 
the canal, and with England leading the opposition. Lord Clar- 
endon, in communication with the French Government, said that 
her Majesty foresaw inconvenience in leaving the matter to be 
decided between the Sultan and his Viceroy. He submitted the 
following objections to the scheme: 1st, the canal is physically 
impossible ; 2d, the project would require a long time for com- 
pletion; it would therefore retard the projected railway and in- 
jure Indian interests ; 3d, her Majesty's Ministers consider the 
scheme to be founded on an antagonistical policy on the part of 
France toward Egypt. The same objections and arguments were 
repeated by Lord Palmerston.* 

All this time Said Pasha was harassed by doubts and fears ; 
but at length, without receiving the authority of the Porte, and 
disregarding the attitude of England, he signed the final con- 
cession for the canal on January 5th, 1856. It is said that he 
was influenced by the assurance that the canal would redound to 
his immortal honor and glory. Be that as it may, it is, in a meas- 
ure, a monument to the generosity of the good-natured Viceroy, 
whose name, at least, is perpetuated by the port at the Mediter- 
ranean terminus. 

In 1858 de Lesseps launched his Cotnpagnie TTniverselle du 
Canal Maritime de Suez, with a capital of £8,000,000. More 
than half of this amotmt was subscribed for — the greater part 

* The whole policy of opposition, as manifested by England, is thus humorously, but 
faithfully summed up by Mr. D. Mackenzie Wallace, in his "Egypt and the Egyptian 
Question": " The consular representative of England does not approve the scheme, and 
warns his Highness against the insidious counsels of the plausible Frenchman. The cut- 
ting of a canal maybe advantageous for humanity, or rather for that portion of humanity 
which happens to have a commercial fleet and seaports on the northern shores of the 
Mediterranean ; but it wouW be ruinous for Egypt, because it would entirely destroy th^ 
lucrative transit trade, which might, on the contrary, be increased by continuing to Suez 
the Alexandria-Cairo railway. Then his Highness must remember that Lord Palmerston 
—terrible name in those days !— is opposed to the scheme, not from selfish motives, but be- 
cause he fears that it is merely a first step to a French occupation, by which, of course, 
his Highness would be the principal loser. Lastly, there is the little matter of physical 
impossibility. The most competent English engineers— and his Highness is too well-in- 
formed a man not to Ijnow that English engineers are much more practical and trustwor- 
thy than French ones— have declared with one accord that the proposed canal, if ever 
made, will remain merely a dry ditch." (p. 308.) 



— 13 — 

"being taken in France — and in 1860 Said took up the remainder, 
amounting to £3,500,000. De Lesseps began tlie work in the 
spring of 1859, although the consent of the Porte was not given 
until 1866. 

The attitude (jf England toward the canal remained unfriendly. 
When the engineering question had been settled, and the feasi- 
bility of constructing the canal proved, the English began to 
assert that it could not be made to pay. The policy of opposition 
bas been kept up even to the present day. As the question of the 
canal is to be dismissed now and to be taken up again only inci- 
dentally, as in its financial bearings upon the relation of England 
to Egypt, it may be well to notice how England has persisted in 
what appears a jealous opposition toward the Compagnie JJniver- 
selle. A single quotation will show how the London papers sought 
to bring the canal into discredit at a time when its success was still 
a matter of doubt: "The Peninsular and Oriental Company's 
steamer 'Poonah,' with the Indian and China mails, which arrived 
at Southampton yesterday, experienced, while in the Suez Canal, a 
severe sandstorm, which commenced at sunrise and continued, 
more or less furious, until Jive in the afternoon. During the 
storm she laid [!] right across the canal powerless. Tons of sand 
were thrown on the deck, and the masts and gear were covered 
with a thick coating." * 

Of late years the British ship owners have come to wish for a 
canal of their own, and they are inclined to dispute the claim of 
the Compagnie Universelle that it has the sole right to control 
the canal question until the ninety-nine years of the concession 
are up. The British Government, however, advised by the Lord 
Chancellor and the Law Officers of the Crown, has been forced to 
declare that the Company's claim is well grounded. It is to 
England's credit that the opinions of such men as E.. T. 
Reid, Q. C, M. P., prevailed. This honorable gentleman said: 
" The claim of M. de Lesseps and his Company to equitable treat- 
ment is well known, and is more creditable to him than to the 
intelligence of our past rulers. The Suez Canal is the work of his 
lifetime. He undertook it under circumstances of great discour- 
agement. He completed it in spite of the disapproval of the 

* Quoted from tlie London papers of May 1st, 1876, by Edward De Leon, in his "The 
Kh6dive's Egypt," p. 36. 



— 14 — 

British Government. And when it has proved an immense suc- 
cess, and the navies of the vs^orld are reaping the benefit of his 
speculation, we are invited to find a flaw in his title, to chop logic 
as to the meaning of his concession, and to creep out of a difficulty 
which is a mere matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, by refining 
upon words in defiance of the intention. Such conduct would be 
unworthy of the British Government. . . . The canal is of 
enormous value to oiu- shipping interests. It has saved us mil- 
lions upon millions of pounds by halving or nearly halving the 
route to India, and greatly reducing the distance by water between 
us and our entire Eastern dominions. It is admittedly of the 
utmost political advantage to us with reference to India. This 
vast profit, infinitely exceeding anything gained by the Canal Com- 
pany, has been acquired without risk of any kind to the British 
Government, and, indeed, has been forced upon us against our 
will by the enterprise of M. de Lesseps. "When the Company who 
bore the brunt of the outlay ask for an infinitesimal part of the 
profit conferred upon England, and ask it in the form of dues 
stipulated before the outlay was incurred, we are invited to beat 
them down by the threat of a rival canal. This would not be 
creditable in an individual. It would be wholly unworthy of a 
great nation." * And so the great nation decided. 

But to return to Said Pasha. Having described his relations 
to the Suez Canal, it only remains to record that he died in 1863. 
But, in passing, it must be noticed that a financial cloud, that was 
destined to blacken the Egyptian sky, and to let loose its 
bolts of distress and bankruptcy on the land of the Nile, was already 
discernible on the horizon. Said had exhausted the surplus accu- 
mulated by Abbas, and had left a debt of more than three millions 
sterling. How this was doubled, quadrupled, and doubled again 
under his successor the sequel will show. 

* The Contemporary Review, August, 1883. 



— 15 — 

CHAPTER II. 

Ismail's Ambitious Designs. 

Ismail, the son of Ibrahim, the son of Mehemet Ali, succeeded 
Said. It is said that Abbas, long before, had been very jealous of 
him. He must, at least, have disliked him heartily ; for the two 
men had nothing in common, and everything that the one shunned 
the other courted. While Abbas was ruling Egypt with a rigorous 
economy, Ismail sought the more congenial atmosphere of Paris. 
He obtained, in one capital and another, an intimate acquaintance 
with the civilization of the "West, and stored his mind with all 
those pictures of European development that, though the result 
of centuries in Europe, he thought might be reproduced in Egypt 
within his lifetime. Having secured thus " a European education,' ' 
Ismail returned to Egypt, after the accession of Said, and received 
from him a governmental portfolio. He seems to have had the 
entire confidence of the Viceroy, for twice he acted as regent. He 
commanded, also, the year before Said's death, an expedition to 
the Sudan. On his accession in 1863, therefore, Ismail was a man 
of experience — such experience as should have given him excep" 
tional qualification for a ruler. But greater than all the wisdom 
was the ambition that his observation had begotten. 

It seemed as if Ismail's dreams of wealth and power were to be 
realized immediately upon his accession. Our Civil War was to 
furnish the means to this end. Europe had depended upon our 
Southern States for her cotton, and when, by the war, the supply 
was cut off, there followed throughout Europe what has been called 
" a cotton famine." Especially in England the want threatened 
to become & great distress. The factories were closing, and legis- 
lators and economists were puzzled to find a way out of the danger. 
The shrewd Ismai], at this juncture, was not slow to perceive that 
the seed introduced into Egypt by his grandfather might bring 
him the coveted wealth, and he bent his entire energies to the 
production of cotton, borrowing money to buy the implements and 
tools, to secure the proper irrigation, and planning for work on 
a grander scale than the fellah at his chaduf had ever dreamed of. 
Ismail's success was greater than he could have expected in his 
most visionary moments. The soil of the Nile valley seemed ad- 



— 16 — 

mirably suited to the new industry, and every yield was enormous. 
The fellahin, the most conservative people under the sun, for- 
sook their lentils, their millet, and their wheat, and hastened, in 
their humble way, to acquire wealth after the manner of their lord 
and ruler. And they prospered as their race never has been 
known to prosper from the time when their remote ancestors were the 
pyramid-builders of the Pharaohs down to the present day. It was 
the Golden Age of modern Egypt. In three years the exports rose 
from four and a half millions to more than thirteen millions ster- 
ling. As is usually the case with those who enjoy unaccustomed 
and unexpected affluence, neither the Viceroy, nor the great 
pashas, nor the lowly fellahin, made wise use of their prosperity. 
Their extraTagances increased with their wealth. The Viceroy 
thought that the influx of gold would be permanent, and he spent 
and wasted accordingly ; the pashas believed that the vast estates 
that favoritism had bestowed upon them would continue to pro- 
duce in luxuriance the white flower that was so easily convertible 
into yellow gold, and they lived their voluptuous life of Parisian 
and Oriental excess in their Daira palaces ; and the fellahin 
thought not and cared not, so long as their burdens were light 
and they could enjoy the sensual life that tiie Prophet Moham- 
med allowed them. 

They had all counted in vain. Our Civil War had come to an 
end, and the Southern States were again supplying the markets of 
Europe ; the nliturally fertile valley of the Nile, denied the neces- 
sary rotation of crops or the chemical fertilizers that the agri- 
cultural science of to-day substitutes, had been ruinously ex- 
hausted ; and as a double consequence the Golden Age was ended. 
All the extravagances reacted upon the fellahin. The Viceroy 
could not or would not contract his expenses, and, of necessity, 
he turned to the money-lenders and the task-masters. The latter 
ground down the fellahin to a life that was nothing more than 
existence. Exorbitant taxes were forced from them with the aid 
of the kurbash, and their condition was more miserable than be- 
fore their recent prosperity. At this time the cattle murrain made 
its appearance in the Nile valley, and the loss was overwhelming, 
and, of itself, sufficient to impoverish the people for a time. The 
Egyptian Government, slow usually to give such assistance, was 
obliged to expend five million pounds to aid the suffering fella- 



— 17 — 

hin. But, to offset the gift and in lieu of unpaid taxes, the land 
of the unfortunates was appropriated, not by the Government, 
but by the Viceroy himself. In the years that followed he became 
master, in this fraudulent manner, of one-fifth of the cultivable 
land of Egypt. 

As the condition of the fellahin grew worse, the extravagances 
of Ismail seemed to increase. In 1866, at a time when he should 
have economized to the last degree, not only to relieve his coun- 
try but to pay his own debts, which were already of a threatening 
size, Ismail, yielding, as ever, to his inordinate ambition, purchased 
the title and rank of Khediv-el-misr (King of Egypt) from his 
Sultan. The firman that granted these honors and raised the 
limit of the Egyptian army from eighteen thousand to thirty thou- 
sand men, cost Egypt the increase from three hundred and seven- 
ty-six thousand to six hundred and seventy-five thousand pouilds 
of yearly tribute to the Porte. From this time on the Khedive 
Ismail, through the most prodigal use of money-bribes and pres- 
ents, seciired a succession of firmans from the Porte. A firman of 
1867 empowered him "to make laws for the internal government 
of Egypt, and to conclude conventions with foreign Powers as to 
customs duties and the police, postal and transit services. A fir- 
man of 1872 conceded to the Khedive the power of contracting 
loans without the Sultan's authorization " * — a power how used 
and abused ! — and established the law of primogeniture in his 
family. I A firman of 1873, "which Ismail obtained by bribery 

* "England's Duty in Egypt." Rj Join Westlake, Q,C,, LL.D. The Contemporary 
Review, December, 18S2. 

t This part of ttie firman, as it reads, " establishes the line of succession by order of 
primogeniture in Ismail's family— his eldest living brother, or this brother's eldest soli, 
succeeding in case of failure of direct male issue, to the exclusion always of the female 
line. In the case of the heir being a minor (i. e., under eighteen) on the Khedive's death, 
he is at once to assume the vice-regal title under a council of regency. If, in his will, the 
late Khedive have not nominated this council, the Ministers of the Interior, of War, of 
Foreign Affairs, of Justice, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Inspector-General 
of the Provinces, in power at his death, will form the council of regency, and will elect a 
regent from theii- body. Should the votes be equally divided in favor of two names, the 
regency falls to the minister holding the more important department, who will govern 
with the council of his colleagues, when their powers have been confirmed at Constanti- 
nople by an Imperial firman. The regent and the council of regency are immovable be- 
fore the legal expiration of their powers, i. e., before the majority of the Khedive. Should 
one of the council die, the survivors have power to elect a successor. Should the regent 
die, the council will elect another from their body and a successor to the place he will 
leave vacant in the council." (" Egypt Under Ismail Pasha," pp. 71, 72.) This law reads 
well, and remains unchanged to-day. It did not provide, however, for such a forced abdi- 
cation as occurred in 1879. 



— 18 — 

at Constantinople on a more than ordinary scale, removed all limit 
from the numbers of his army, and empowered him to conclude 
conventions with foreign States concerning all internal and other 
affairs of Egypt in which foreigners might be concerned."* So 
much for Ismail's expensive relations with his suzerain. They 
had brought him, it is true, a power such as Mehemet Ali had 
dreamed of after the fall of Acre, but they had helped drag him 
deeper into the meshes of a financial snare, from which he was 
destined to escape, only with the loss of ail the powers he had in- 
herited or so dearly purchased. 

Ismail's extravagances at home were equally enormous. When 
cotton was no longer recognized as king in the Nile valley, the 
Khedive quickly proposed to substitute the culture of sugar. Not 
only did he proceed to cultivate the cane, but he planned to man- 
ufacture the sugar. For this purpose he built nineteen factories 
and refineries, and imported the best of machinery from Europe. 
This attempt to convert agricultural Egypt into a manufacturing 
country must always be regarded as the crowning farce of Ismail's 
reign. The country may be said to be absolutely v/ithout fuel ; 
there are no coal mines, and the tax-paying trees are too few and 
far too valuable to serve as fire-wood. With all his advanced 
ideas, the Khedive seems not to have learned the first principles of 
political economy. Besides the building of the factories, a rail- 
road was required to make them accessible. This was constructed 
from Cairo to Assiut at vast expense. Canals, also, were needed 
for the proper irrigation; and they, of course, involved another 
great outlay. But there was never any hesitancy on account of 
expense ; and, the money being borrowed, the works were pushed 
ahead. 

It would not be right, however, to attribute all the debts of 
Egypt, incurred during Ismail's reign, to his inordinate extrava- 
gance. The cattle murrain, for example, cost the Government 
and people dear, as has been seen, but not through any fault of 
Ismail. In another matter the Khedive laid a heavy burden on 
the Government, but at the same time he won, and deservedly, the 
gratitude of his people and the applause of civilized nations. Said 
Pasha had promised to furnish the Suez Canal Company with a 

* "England's Duty in Egypt." By John Westlate, Q.C., LL.D. The Contemporary 
Review, December, 1882. 



— 19 — 

large amount of labor each year for the construction of the canal, 
and this labor was to be provided by the corvee, a system of forced 
service, in use as far back certainly as the age of the pyramid- 
builders. It was almost disastrous to the agriculture of the 
coimtry to have twenty thousand of the fellahin torn from their 
homes each month and forced to work on the canal. Ismail recoar- 
nized this fact and abolished the corvee. It is generally admitted, 
also, that he was influenced by humanitarian motives. And well 
he might have been! Oar own most dreadful tales of slavery 
<}ould be paralleled with the sufferings and tortures of those 
miserable mortals who were wrested from what little they had to 
make them happy in the fertile valley to endure the privations 
and almost certain death of that desert highway. Whatever the 
motive here, Ismail must always be credited with having per- 
formed a noble action. The Canal Company, deprived of the 
promised assistance, naturally demurred. This and a few other 
■disputed questions were finally referred to the Emperor Napoleon 
for arbitration, and he awarded the Company the somewhat exorbi- 
tant indemnity of three million, three hundred and sixty thousand 
pounds. This was in 1864. In 1866 Egypt re-purchased for the 
«»um of four hundred thousand pounds a domain that had been 
sold to the Canal Company five years before for seventy-four 
thousand pounds. It was a modest advance ! Of course such 
extraordinary expenses as these necessitated new loans. All the 
loans that Ismail raised are themselves so extraordinary that their 
details must be noticed as well as the methods that the Khedive 
employed in his endeavors to bear the burden of his obliga 
tions. 

Before proceeding to the loans it will be well to form an idea 
of the revenue of Egypt under Ismail. To do this it will be 
necessary to consider the taxes somewhat in detail, although it is 
impossible, as Mr. Cave and Goschen and Joubert found, to get 
perfectly accurate and trustworthy statistics on the subject, owing 
to the unsystematic and dishonest methods of a treasury system 
that was nothing more nor less than a hierarchy of swindlers, in 
which each officer got as much from the one belov^ him and gave 
as little to the one above as was possible. What the amount of 
the taxes was before Ismail's time, one can only guess ; but we 
may be sure that they never varied much from the utmost that 



— 20 — 

kurbash and extortion could raise.* The land-tax, immediately- 
after his accession, was increased by twenty-five per cent. This 
tax was again and again increased, until, in 1871, the famous 
Mukabala f was invented. This was a voluntary additional tax of 
fifty per cent, for six years, which, being paid, would free the land 
of the one assuming the self-imposed obligation from half the 
grain tax in perpetuity. The Mukabala was found to yield so 
readily to the demands of the moment — and Ismail lived in the 
present, borrowing no trouble from the thought of obligations to be 
met in the future — that it was enforced in 1876, and the period, 
at the end of which exemption should take place, was increased to 
twelve years. No tax ever met with such bitter denunciation as 
Mukabala did from its inception to the day of its abolition. It 
was bad for the payer and bad for the payee. "A ruinous finan- 
cial device," says Blanchard Jerrold, "seeing that for a sum of in 
all less than twenty-seven million pounds, spread over a dozen 
years, is thence afterward surrendered for all time nearly two 
million five hundred thousand pounds of its [Egypt's] surest and 
most easily collected revenue." % 

In order to form an idea of what the yearly revenue of Egypt 
was from 1870 to 1875, it is necessary to consult the reports that 
were made after that time; for up to 1875 there had been no at- 
tempt to estimate the revenue in detail. As the agricultui-al con- 
ditions did not vary much from year to year, the revenue during 
1877, for example, would be approximately equal to the revenue 
during 1872 or 1873. This analogical reasoning is allowable, but 
not very satisfactory ; for, unfortunately, even the official esti- 
mates of Europeans appointed for the purpose are found to vary 
greatly. The official estimate of Mr. Goschen, made in December, 

* That the condition of the tax-payer had not changed much in three thousand years 
may be gathered from a papyrus in the British Museum, contaming a par t of the correspond- 
ence between Ameneman, the chief librarian of Rameses the Great, and the poet Pentaur. 
Ameneman writes : " Have you ever represented to yourself, in imagination, the estate of 
the rustic who tills the ground ? Before he has put the sickle to his crop, the locusts have 
blasted part thereof; then come the rats and birds. If he is slack in housing his crops, the 
thieves are on him. The horse dies of weariness as it drags the wain. The tax-collector 
arrives ; his agents are armed with clubs ; he has Negroes with him who carry whips of 
palm-branches. They all cry : ' Give us your grain ! ' and he has no way of avoiding their 
extortionate demands. Kext, the wretch is caught, bound, and sent off to work, without 
wage, at the canals ; his wife is taken and chained, his children are stripped and plun- 
dered."— Quoted by Blanchard Jerrold, in " Egypt Under Ismail Pasha," p. 164. 

t M'&kahala = compensation. 

X " Egypt Under Ismail Pasha." 



— 21 — 

1876, placed the year's revenue at £10,804,300. Mr. Cave's esti- 
mate for the same year was a little over ten and a half millions. 
Mr. Romaine gives the official revenue, month by month, for 1877, 
reaching a total of £9,350,274 for the year. The Cairene Com- 
mittee, in 1878, placed the total income of the Khedive's Govern- 
ment at about eleven and a half millions ; but they considered this 
estimate low, and thought that, if it had been possible to count all 
revenues, the sum total would not have been less than thirteen 
millions sterling. This may readily be believed, if we may trust, 
approximately, the statement of Ismail Sadyk, the Miiffetish, or 
" Lord High Treasurer" of the Khedive, and one of the most no- 
torious rascals that ever plundered a state and people, that he had 
raised by taxation in one year the sum of fifteen million pounds. 
But some estimates varied as widely in the other direction, and 
placed the revenue even as low as seven and a half millions. The 
extremes are far apart. 

It will be interesting to dissolve one of the total estimates into 
its constituent parts ; and for this purpose we may take the report 
of the Cairene Committee- They placed 

The land tax at £7,346,219 

Date palm tax 211,046 

House, shop, and mill tax .... 28,195 

Poll tax* . . . . . . . 630,204 

Licenses and patents! . .... 793,253 

Miscellaneous Taxes. 

(1) Succession or transfer duties on legacies, 

mortgages, etc 103,685 

(2) Stamp tax (no statistics). 

(3) Salt tax t 400,000 

(4) Octroi and road duties on produce, fod- 

der, and building materials § . . 328,872 

* This tax was divided into three classes, viz.: 40, 30, and 15 piasters. The collectors, 
however, were instructed to produce aa average of 30 piasters ($1.50) a head. 

t These were imposed on all servants, operatives, tradesmen, and merchants. 

t Nine piasters imposed on every man, woman, and child over seven years of age. 

§ This figure the committee considered small, since irregular Governmental expenses 
were taken out of the octroi receipts, as, for example, the salaries of a corps de ballet ! 
When, later, Egypt came under European control, the Comptroller General encountered 
much opposition by his refusal to pay such salaries from such a fund. 

2 



— 22 — 



(5) Customs .... 




639,000 


(6) Navigation dues 


. 


110,185 


(7) Duties on fisheries 


. 


83,548 


(8) Law taxes 


. 


44,392 


(9) Tobacco tax 


. 


106,777 


(10) Tax on cattle sales. 


. 


45,402 


(11) Sheep slaughtered for food. 


. 


14,769 


(12) Animal tax 


. 


8,479 


(13) Stamp tax on manufactured 


goods. 


18,000 


(14) Payments of railways into Public Debt 


Department 


• 


602,990 


Total 


. £11,470,016 * 



From the foregoing notes and figures it will be seen that it is 
almost impossible to exaggerate the extortionate character of tax- 
ation in Egypt a decade ago. But it should be noticed in passing 
that the land of the natives only was taxed ; by a monstrous in- 
justice — an injustice that continues to the present day, though 
there is just now a prospect of its being remedied! — ttie Euro- 
pean property-holders have never paid so much as a brass far- 
thing into the state treasury on the land they have held. 

Whether, now, we place the yearly revenue at the lowest esti- 
mate, seven millions sterling, or at the highest, thirteen millions, 
or midway between the two, the fact always remains the same — 
that Ismail was unable to live within his income. With the same 
revenue Mehemet Ali would have made Egypt independent of 
Tui'key, and himself the champion of all Islam. Even the gay Said 
would have been at a loss for ways to squander such undreamed- 
of means. Bat with Ismail it was different. As we have seen, he 
could not forget the splendors of European Courts, or cease to 
envy the civilization of western countries ; nor could he contract 
the extravagances he had learned in the days when " cotton was 
. king " in Egypt. If he could not live and flourish and build and 
spend on the strength of his internal resources, he knew that 
there were bankers and money lenders iu Europe who would con- 

* Otliei' taxes, as on Are engiaes, ferries, jewelry, burials, marriages, tolls on bridges, 
and exemption from military service, were not counted, owing to absence of trustworthy 
statistics. 

t Vide seq. 



— 23 — 

sider the yearly overflow of the Nile the best of security. The 
story of his transactions with these unbelievers forms the most 
important chapter in the modern history of Egjpt ; but the story 
is devoid of romance ; it is as bold and bald and true as the 
working of a natural law. For the state, as for the individual, 
when debts are contracted to pay other debts, when further sums 
are borrowed to pay those, and when this system of discharging 
obligations is continued, the end is ruin. In the case of Egypt, 
the ever impending ruin has been long averted, owing as much — or 
more — to the political importance of the country as to its inherent 
wealth; but the burning question of that land to-day is the ques- 
tion of finance ; for the debts that are due to the follies of Ismail 
still stand, an unmanageable burden. And this is how the first 
Khedive brought about the financial disastei*, and his own downfall. 



CHAPTEE III. 



The Road to Ruin. 



It will be remembered that Said had left a debt of about three 
millions sterling. To be exact, he had effected in 1862 a seven per 
cent, loan in the European market of £3,292,800.* Of course he 



* For facts and figures I depend chiefly upon J. C. McOoan's "Egypt As It Is,' 
upon Mr. Cave's Report of 1S76, from which the follovv'ing concise table is taken : 



and 



LOAN OF 



1862 
1864 
1866 



1868 
1873 



Daira taken 
over by the 
State. 

1866 
1867 



Daira Loan 
of Ismail. 

1870 



1892 
1879 
1874 



1898 
190B 



1881 
1881 



Nominal 
amount of 
Loan, but 
Keal Debt 

of State. 



£, 

3,292,800 
5,704,200 
3,000,000 



11,890,000 
32,000,000 

55,887,000 



3,000,000 
2,080,000 



7)142,860 



Charge on 
Nomn'l Am't, 



pr c 

7 
7 
7 



Snk 
Fnd 



pre 

1 
8.87 



3.27 
3.4 



7 2.35 9.35 



Tot'l 



perc 

8 
10.87 



12.27 
12.4 



Amount 
Realized, 



4,864,063 
2,640,000 



7,193,334 

20,740,077 



35,437,474 



3,000,000 

2,080,000 



5,080,000 



5,000,000 



KealCharges on 
Am't Realized. 



Int. 



perc 

8.2 



11.56 
10.8 



Sink ,, 
Fund 



per c 



4.5 

18.9 



1.6S 
1.56 



Total 



perc 



12.7 
26.9 



13.24 
12.36 



12.27 
17.04 



Remarks. 



No particulars of 
amount realized. 

Railway Loan re- 
paid by six annual 
payments of £500,- 
000, equivalent to a 
Sinking F'nd of 18.9 
per cent. 



No particulars of 
amounts realized, 
but probably the 
whole. 



— 24 — 

did not receive this amount entire, for tlie commission rate of is- 
sue, etc., reduced tlie sum paid into tlie Egyptian Treasury to 
£2,500,000. But this loan did not prevent Said from leaving a 
further legacy of liabilities, which necessitated a second loan 
vs^ithin a year after his death. The amount of this one, which was 
raised in England, was £5,704,200. It yielded to the Treasury 
only £4,864,063. And still the indebtedness was not covered. Up 
to this time the financial troubles had come through no fault of 
Ismail's. But in 1866 he had begun to push the sugar industry; 
•and, not having laid by any of the enormous revenues from cot- 
ton, he was forced, in order to carry out his raih'oad scheme, to 
contract a seven per cent, loan of £3,000,000, which netted him 
£2,640,000. The cattle murrain, the abolition of the corvee, and 
his extravagances called for another loan only two years later. 
The nominal amount of this loan was £11,890,000; but heavier 
terms had to be made ; for, though a seven per cent, stock, it was 
issued at 75, and yielded, after the usual deductions, only £7,193,- 
834. In other words, the total annual cost of this loan was more 
than thirteen per cent. "The Khedive, by this time," as Mr. 
McCoan remarks,* "was fairly on the road to ruin." But the na- 
tional credit was still good, since the floating debt had been cov- 
ered by this last loan. 

Ismail seems not to have suspected the perils ahead. It was 
his aim to make a civilized country even out of uncivilized mate- 
rials, and to develop trade even where natural resoui'ces were 
wanting, let the cost be what it might. It certainly was great ; 
it was enormous. The outlay, even if the revenue of the coun- 
try had permitted it, would have been foolish extravagance; but, 
in view of Egypt's financial condition, it was nothing less than 
reckless robbery. The fellahin — the people of EgyjDt — were the 
sufferers. The kurbash exacted more extortionate payments than 
ever ; bvit all to no purpose. By 1873 the floating liabilities, pay- 
ing nearly fourteen per cent, interest, amounted to about £26,- 
000,000. The Messrs. Oppenheim, who had secured the loan of 
1868, now proposed to fund the entii'e mass of debts in a seven 
per cent, loan of £32,000,000. This offer, disastrous in its results, 
was accepted. The Egyptian Government received in cash only 
£11,740,077, the remainder of the amount realized, £9,000,000, 

*" Egypt As It Is," p. 142. 



— 25 — 

"being paid in bonds of tlie floating debt, wliicli the contractors 
bought up at a heavy discount and gave over to the Egyptian 
Government at 93. There was, to say the least, a good deal of 
Shylockism shown by the money-lenders of the "West in their 
financial relations with Egypt. But if they were knavish, Ismail 
was not altogether simple. Looking at the figures that tell the 
story of "this wicked waste of a country's resources," as Mr. 
McCoan calls it, we see that from loans amounting to £58,887,000, 
the Egyptian Government received only £35,437,474. At the end 
of 1875 the treasury had repaid £29,570,995 in interest and in 
sinking fund. Was so mach money ever paid for so little gain "? 

There were other loans than those above mentioned. The 
Dau^a, the immense personal estate of the Khedive, afforded ex- 
cellent security for supplementary loans. The first of these was 
negotiated in 1866, its amount being £3,887,000. The follow- 
ing year the Khedive compelled his uncle Halim to sell to him 
his inherited estate ; and to pay for the property obtained by this 
enforced sale, the so-called "Mustapha Pasha Loan'' of £2,080,- 
000 was negotiated. Still another Daira loan of more than seven 
millions sterling was raised in 1870 at seven per cent., the stock 
being issued at 75. Only five million pounds was handed over to 
the borrower. Thus the same story is told with the private as 
with the public loans. 

The question now was. How long could the ruinous rate of 
interest be paid on these enormous debts'? Up to 1875 it was 
regularly paid, and the credit of Egypt was good. But the crisis 
was now near at hand. The stock of the great loan of 1873 was 
quoted at 53 in the London market, and the Cairene Treasury 
was almost empty. Even Ismail Sadyk, the Muffetish, with all 
his tortures and threats, could not get piasters enough from the 
fellaheen to meet the demands that were measured by hundreds 
of thousands of pounds. And yet he was ordered to find money 
to pay the December dividend. At this juncture the Khedive 
appealed to England to rescue Egypt from ruin ; and produced, 
as his last card, the 176,000 Suez Canal Shares, held by his Gov- 
ernment. The Mviftetish was offering the same securities in 
negotiations with the bankers of Paris and Alexandria, and with 
the Credit Fonder of Prance, in his attempt to force upon them 
new Treasury bonds for £16,000,000 at fifteen per cent, interest. 



— 26 — 

After a series of advances and retreats on the part of tlie English 
and the French Governments, Disraeli's Government finally tele- 
graphed to the Khedive, in December, 1875, that England would 
give four millions sterling for the shares in drafts on Rothschild. 
The offer was eagerly accepted, and the crisis was tided over. 
The shares of the '73 loan in London rose twenty points at a 
jump, but after a few days they were quoted at 61, midway 
between the points of utmost depression and inflation. England 
was now given a more vital interest in the affairs of Egypt than 
she had before possessed. She had gone thither, in the first 
place, to further the demands of her commerce; she had then 
maneuvered for the protection of the interests of the British 
bondholders ; and now, in addition to these undertakings, she was 
to guard the rights that this purchase gave her, and increase the 
obligations that it heaped upon Egypt. 

Four million pounds, as Ismail soon found, could not stem the 
tide of disaster for long. Everything worth it had been mortgaged, 
and the Muffetish was offering treasury bonds to the extent of 
two hundred thousand and three hundred thousand and even four 
hundred thousand pounds in return for cash advances of one hun- 
dred thousand at twenty per cent. A few were taken, and with 
heavy sales of Daira sugar and corn the demands were satisfied 
for a time. The Khedive now invited England to investigate the 
financial condition of his country, and Mr. Stephen Cave, M.P., 
was sent out for this purpose. Nubar Pasha, the foremost of 
Egyptian statesmen, was called to the Cabinet, and at the begin- 
ning of 1876 everything had a reassuring aspect. But within 
three months Nubar had resigned, and Disraeli, to the consterna- 
tion of bondholders, had announced in Parliament that the Khe- 
dive requested that Mr. Cave's report be not published for fear of 
its effect upon Egyptian finances. But this request was disre- 
garded. The effect of the report, however, was more favorable to 
the Khedive than he expected, owing to the somewhat rose-colored 
view Mr. Cave took of the financial outlook. " Egypt," he wrote, 
" may be said to be in a transition state, and she suffers from the 
defects of the system out of which she is passing as well as from 
those of the system into which she is attempting to enter. She 
suffers from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste, and extravagance of 
he East, such as have brought her suzerain to the verge of rmn, 



— 27 — 

and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and 
inconsiderate endeavor to adopt the civilization of the West." He 
read the causes of Egyptian difficulty aright. But he was wrong 
in estimating that the yearly revenue from 1876 to 1885 would be 
more than double the cost of the administration. To meet the 
necessities of the Government he proposed another unification of 
all debts, exclusive of three of the earliest and smallest loans which 
were to be paid off by the operation of the Mukabala. The con- 
solidated debt, amounting to £75,000,000, was to bear interest at 
seven per cent., and to be redeemable in 1926. The project, how- 
ever, was not carried out. 

The Khedive Ismail, in the meantime, had succeeded in getting 
the greater part of his floating debt taken up in France. That the 
holders had been duped was evident before the end of March 
(1876), for there was no money in the Egyptian treasury to meet 
the April dividends, and the Khedive was appealing for aid to the 
English and French Governments. His overtures were flatly 
refused by England ; but when France realized that the Credit 
Fonder, the second flnancial institution of the land, was in a strait 
in consequence of its relations with Egypt, a Cabinet Council was 
summoned in Paris, and on the 31st of March the April dividend 
was disjDatched to London. And again the impending disaster 
was averted. 

Mr. Cave's scheme for the unification of the debt fell through, 
as above noticed, although coupled with certain measures of re- 
form, which provided for a regular control of the revenue under 
the administration of Europeans and natives, and for the establish- 
mesnt of debt and audit officers. The cause of failure was that 
nominations were left in the hands of the Khedive, who was him- 
self controlled by the corrupt Muffetish, Ismail Sadyk. France 
now proposed a financial scheme ; but this also failed of adoj)tion. 
In November of '76, however, the English and the French bond- 
holders united in sending to Egypt a joint commission, consisting 
of Ml'. Goschen, M.P., and M. Joubert, to solve the financial prob- 
lem. Theii' labor resulted in the Khedive's issuing a decree, Novem- 
ber 18th, 1876, that remodeled the debt on the following basis : * 

Title. Amount. Interest, etc. Security. 

Dnified £59,000,000 £4,130,000 General Revenues. 

Preference 17,000,000 886,000 Hallways, etc. 

Daira 8,825,000 450,000 Khedive's Estates. 



£84,825,000 £5,466,000 



* The Contemporary Review, Oct., 18S2, " Egyptian Finance," by M. G. Mulliall. 



— 28 — 

Tlie reforms of November 18tli secured a substantial power ta 
European comptrollers, and the downfall of Ismail Sadyk, wbo 
now disappeared from tbe face of the earth in the mysterious way 
common to the Orient. He left an immense property, which in- 
cluded three hundred women in his harem, two hundred and fifty 
men-servants, £600,000 in money, and 30,000 feddansf of land. 
The Mukabala, which would have been abolished if the unification 
proposed in May had been accepted, was retained by the Messrs. 
Goschen and Joubert in a slightly modified form. 

Those who fancied that plain sailing was now in store for the 
Khedive and the bond-holders were again doomed to disappoint- 
ment. Within a few months it was apparent that the financial 
state of afiairs was as bad as ever. The ordinary expenses were 
augmented by a special tax of two shillings an acre to assist 
Turkey in the war against Russia. Egypt, backed by England 
and France, whose interest it was to have all revenues applied to 
the public debt, for a time resisted the pecuniary demands of the 
Porte, though she told the Turkish envoj'-s that she would forward 
troops to the seat of war if the Porte would bear the expenses of 
transport and maintenance. The new Egyptian Parliament, how- 
ever, at last voted the special war tax and ten thousand troops 
were sent at the expense of Egypt. 

During 1877 the interest on the loans was raised by collecting- 
the taxes with ail the old-time cruelty (Mr. Mulhall says " the 
fellahin were basti«nadoed even more than before"; but that was 
not possible) and as much as nine months in advance. This ruin- 
ous system, of course, brought greater difficulties with each pay- 
day ; and at the beginning of 1878 the outlook, to say the least, 
was most doleful. It was at this time that the exiled Prince 
Halim, the uncle of Ismail and the most enlightened, perhaps, of 
the descent of Mehemet Ali, wrote a letter of advice to Ismail 
from Constantinople. The letter, which bears the date of March 
4th, 1878, is worth quoting, at least in part. He wrote : 

"1. Place the financial administration of the country in the hands of Europeans 
chosen by the interested Powers; such administration alone having the power to appoini 
and dismiss all officials connected with the finance of the country. 

" 2. Trie financial administration thus constituted, and all its dealings being carried 
on in broad daylight, you must appoint a Special Inquiry Commission, chosen by the high 
officials, to establish an equitable repartition of taxes, which are now arbitrarily distrib- 
uted and levied. 

t A feddan is about equal to an acre. 



— 29 — 

" 3. All property belonging to tlie princes and princesses shall be made over to tie 
State, so as to be used in payment of all debts. 

" 4. The revenue of all the Dalras, the Khedive's and his family's, being thus devoted to 
the paying off of public and private debts, the Civil List, the amount of which shall be 
agreed upon by the interested Powers, will suppjrt the Khedive and his family. 

"5. The reform tribunals, having over them a sovereign free from all personal inter- 
ests, and by whose care all the judgments which they pronounce shall be carried out, will 
be empowered, over and above their present jurisdiction, to try causes between natives, if 
the latter shall so choose it." 

These five articles, says Mr. Jerrold,* "became the ba- 
sis on which the discussion of Egyptian affairs turned." 
The first article of reform had already met with Ismail's appar- 
ent approval, the state revenues having been placed in the hands 
of two " Comptrollers- General", one English, and the other French. 
They were appointed for five years, with almost unlimited powers 
in the domain of finance. But the step was taken reluctantly ; 
for the Khedive realized that, to quote the words of Mr. Justin 
McCarthy,! " when a country has once accepted an investigation 
of its finances by foreign powers, and given the practical control 
of its treasury into the hands of foreign representatives, its claim 
to independence can hardly fail to be regarded as signally dimin- 
ished." Still more reluctantly, we may well believe, did the Khe- 
dive yield to the demand of the commission to hand over his vast 
private estates to meet the Daira coupons. But he had been 
forced into both of these actions by the troubles of 1877. Early 
in 1878, the Khedive made a bold effort to secure foreign favor, 
and quiet the discontent among the money-lenders of Alexandria. 
The Egyptian Government had announced, in 1877, that it could 
not pay the existing high rate of interest on the public debt : but 
before the bond-holders would consent to any reduction, they de- 
manded the appointment of a Commission to examine into the re- 
ceipts and expenses of the Government. The Khedive, in Janu- 
ary, 1878, allowed an investigation of receipts ; but would permit 
no examination of expenditures. Two months later, however, he 
issued the following decree : 

" We, Khedive of Egypt— with respect to our decree of the 27th cf January, 18Y8, in- 
stituting a superior Commission of Inquiry, considering that it is the duty of that Commis- 
sion to prepare and submit for our sanction regulations to secure the regular working of 
the public services, and to give a just satisfaction to the interests of the country, and to the 
public creditors— have decreed and do decree : 

* " Egypt Under Ismail Pacha," p. 256. 

t " England Under Gladstone," Chap. XIII. 



— 30 — 

" Article 1. The widest powers are given to the Commission we establish. 

"Art. 2. The investigation of the Commission of Inquiry will embrace all the ele- 
ments of the financial situation, always respecting the legitimate rights of the Government. 

" Art. 3. The ministers and officials of our Government will be bound to furnish di- 
rectly to the Commission, at its request and without delay, all information required from 
them. 

"Art. 4. There are named as members of the superior Commission of Inquiry: 
Pi'esident, M. Ferdinand de Lesseps; Vice-President, Mr. Rivers Wilson ; Vice-President, 
his Excellency, Riaz Pasha ; M. Baravelli ; Mr. Baring ; M. de Blignieres ; M. de Kremer. 

"Art. 5. A credit necessary for the expenses of the Commission will be opened on 
the budget of 1878, in accordance with the report which the President will present us. 

" Cairo, March 30th, 18T8. Ismail." 

On the 20tli of August, Mr. Elvers Wilson presented the re- 
port of the Commission of Inquiry. The report considered first 
the system of accounts employed by the Egyptian Government. 
It then explained the system of taxation, and discussed the corvee. 
the military conscription, and the water laws. The second part 
of the report was taken up with the estimate of the non- con- 
solidated liabilities. The amount of floating debt to be settled 
was found to be £6,276,000. The gross expenditure for 1878 was 
estimated at £10,405,665, and the gross receipts at £7,819,000. 
Adding the difference between receipts and expenditures, £2.586,- 
665, to the amount of floating debt, the total deficit for 1878 
would appear to be £8,862,665 ; but this sum was reduced to a 
little more than six millions sterling by deductions for security 
against partially guaranteed debts, and for amounts nominally due 
to the Dairas, but before that time surrendered. There was im- 
mediate need, th^erefore, for about six millions. The report closed 
with the following suggestions of reform : 

" That no taxes shall be imposed or gathered without a law, authoriz-ng them, being 
promulgated ; that future legislation may extend the taxation to foreigners ; that there 
shall be an efficient control over tax-collectors ; that there shall be a reserve fund to pro- 
vide against the contingency of a bad rising of the Nile ; that there shall be a special juris- 
diction for complamts on the subject of the collection and assessment of taxes for the 
special protection of the natives ; that existing vexatious taxes shall be aboJished except 
for works of public utility ; that the obligation to military service shall be placed under re- 
strictions ; and that all the immovable property of the different Dairas shall toe independ- 
ently managed by a special administration for the benefit of the creditors both of the state 
and the Dairas." 

These were excellent recommendations, though there was some- 
thing very naive in the suggestion that " there shall be a reserve 
fund to provide against the contingency of a bad rising of the 
Nile." It would have been as easy to resolve that, if the river 
failed to rise, copious rains should fall; for reserve funds are as 
rare in Egypt as rain-storms in the desert. Not the least good of 



— 31 — 

the recommendations was that providmg that foreigners should 
be taxed; a measure that the "Westerners have always been shame- 
fully slow to encourage. The reforms contained also a plan for 
the cadastral survey of Egypt, which was recognized in England, 
in France, and in Egypt, as just to the fellahiu and as the 
treasury's only safeguard against fraud and corruption. The 
Khedive accepted the report on August 23d in a speech express- 
ing entire approval of the work of the Commission, appreciation 
of their services, and determination to carry out the reforms. To 
show how thoroughly in earnest he was, so he said, he had recalled 
Nubar Pasha from exile and would entrust him with the formation 
of a new ministry. The new ministry was composed of the fol- 
lowing persons : Nubar Pasha, President of the Council, Minister 
•of Foreign Affairs and of Justice ; Riaz Pasha, Minister of Interi- 
or ; Ratif Pasha, Minister of War ; Ali Mubarek Pasha, Minister of 
Public Instruction, Agriculture and Pablic Works. The portfolio 
of Finance was left vacant, but it was soon offered to Mr. Rivers 
Wilson, who accepted the ofS.ce with the consent of the British 
Government. This excited the jealousy of France, to appease 
which the comparatively unimportant office of Public Works was 
offered to M. de Blignieres. Italy thea put in the claim that she 
should be consulted in Egyptian affairs; but her voice was ig- 
nored. 

Before any active steps had been taken toward inaugurating 
the proposed reforms, Mr. Wilson urged the necessity of another 
loan to meet immediate demands, and this, although the total 
debt already amounted to ninety-two millions sterling. But he 
had no choice in the matter; the loan was imperative. The only 
unmortgaged property on which a loan could be raised consisted 
of the Daira estates belonging to the Khedive's family. These, 
now, with a rent-roll of £430,000 a year, were handed over to the 
State, in consequence, not of ttie advice of Prince Halim, but of 
the utter necessity of the time. The loan was concluded with the 
Messrs. Rothschild, of Paris, in November, 1878, at the rate of 73. 
The nominal amount of the loan was £8,500,000, but with the dis- 
count of twenty- seven per cent, and the commission of two and a 
half per cent., the net product was only £5,992,000. Thinking 
that financial affairs could rest for the moment, Mr. Wilson now 
made a tour of inspection tHrough Lower Egypt. The people met 



— 32 — 

him with petitions which he received with promises of redress. 
He beheved and they had every reason to believe the words he 
uttered in a speech at Tanta. "A new era," he said, "has begun 
for Egypt. Reforms are ah^eady initiated, and if you will only 
have patience you can count on their completion. If you have 
grievances, make them known to us, and you shall be righted. 
We wish to establish equality and legality in the country, and the 
law shall no longer be for the rich alone ; it shall work for rich 
and poor alike." The fellahin might well have been happy; 
they had never in their ages of oppression received such assur- 
ances before. 

But tranquility was not yet. A number of creditors at Alex- 
andria had put an end to the financial negotiations in a most un- 
expected manner. These creditors had been watching their oppor- 
tunity. They had tried some months before to seize the furniture 
of the Palace at Ramleh, but had been foiled by the bailiffs. They 
had succeeded, however, in obtaining a lien on the very estates 
that were offered as security on the new loan. It was not sur- 
prising, therefore, that Baron Rothschild withheld the amount of 
the loan. To add to the Khedive's troubles, the unpaid officers of 
the army in Cairo were urging their claims. The delay of Baron 
Rothschild precipitated matters, and on February 18th, 1879, a 
military uprising occurred in Cairo, which nearly cost Mr. Rivers 
Wilson and Nubar Pasha their lives. While driving from a Coun- 
cil of Ministers their carriage was beset by a throng of officers, esti- 
mated at from four to twelve hundred; their driver was wounded, 
and they were insulted and forced back into the court-yard 
of the palace. The Khedive attempted to pacify the mob, but 
they were only dispersed by the force of arms. Nubar Pasha, the 
next day, offered his resignation. It was at once accepted by the 
Khedive, and again the foremost statesman of Egypt, and the only 
one worthy the name from the western conception of the term, 
went into exile. It was immediately claimed in England and 
Erance that Ismail had sought to bring about this result by insti- 
gating or conniving at the insurrection among the officers. It 
was generg-Uy known that Ismail had a pet aversion to Nubar. 
They were as different as an honest man and a cunning diplomat 
could well be, and it is certain that the Khedive would not have 
entrusted Nubar with the new Ministry if the influence of England 



— 33 — 

and France had not seemed to demand it. Confidence having 
been secured, Ismail was ready, and probably only too glad, to 
break with his Prime Minister. Nubar appreciated the desperate 
state of affairs that prevailed in Egypt. He had written to a 
friend on January 20th: "The everlasting political comedy or 
tragedy is being played on the little stage here, just as it is every- 
where else: a lost power sought to be regained, persons interested 
in not letting it be regained, who yet aid it for personal motives, 
or to give themselves importance — and not a sou in the Treasury 
withal. What a situation for the country, for the interested coun- 
tries, and for your friend ! "* 

England and France were naturally displeased with the dis- 
missal — for such it was — of Nubar Pasha; and while the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army was apologizing to Mr. 
Rivers Wilson for the insult he had received at the hands of the 
officers, the two Powers were preparing a protest to submit to the 
Khedive. Notwithstanding their demand Nubar was not re-in- 
stated ; but some of- the conditions they imposed upon the Khe- 
dive were followed in his attitude toward the new Cabinet. Is- 
mail's eldest son. Prince Tewfik, had been appointed President of 
the Council, Zulfikar Pasha Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. 
Wilson and M. de Blignieres had retained their former offices. 
The important condition that was imposed upon Ismail was em- 
braced by him in a letter to Tewfik, in which he said : " As the 
native Ministers now form a majority in the Cabinet, it is right, 
in order to restore the balance of power and lend to the interven- 
tion of our European Ministers all the usefulness possible, that 
they should be entitled to a veto on all measures they agree in 
disapproving." This sop thrown to the great Powers was soon 
counteracted. Egyptian and European influence clashed on the 
financial question, and Egypt came out first best. It was in this 
wise: Mr. Wilson, M. de Blignieres, Mr. Baring, and the Debt 
Commissioners submitted a plan for the equitable reduction of 
the claims of all ci'editors. The Khedive opposed this with an- 
other plan, giving the bond-holders better terms; and he was 
supported by the native Parliament, the pashas, the ulemas, and 
all the high dignitaries of the land. The counter projects were 

* Quoted from Appleton's AnnualCyclopcedia, 1879. 



— 34 — 

pushed so hard that, on April 7th, Prince Tewfik resigned the 
presidency of the Council, and the Khedive dismissed Mr. Wilson 
and M. de Blignieres. 

If, now, there was even a ship of state that sailed between 
Scylla and Charybdis, it was the unsteady craft that Ismail was 
trying to guide. If he avoided the rocks on one side, it was only 
to meet destruction on the other. The wrath of the Egyptians 
had been averted by the dismissal of the foreigners, and by the 
same act the wrath of the great Powers had been incurred. The 
French Government was in high dudgeon at the offense, and 
threatened to reinstate her representative by the force of arms, 
and asked England to join her. Bat England would not agree to 
any such decisive step. Even had she cared to, she would have 
found it difficult to spare more troops than were needed at chat 
time to oppose the Boers in South Africa. She preferred, there- 
fore, while waiting for the blood of France to cool, to send dis- 
patches to the Khedive demanding a reconsideracion of his hasty 
and unwarranted action. But the Khedive was now running 
things with a high hand. If England would not allow France to 
send an armed force to Egypt and did not do so herself, he could 
laugh at the demands and threats of dispatches. His people said 
that the unbelievers had brought all the trouble and the ruin 
upon the fair valley of the Nile, and he decided to cut loose from 
the Western influence and defy its power. He virtually repudi- 
ated the debts ahd responsibilities of his country in a way that 
would put our own Virginia to the shame, by issuing a decree, 
April 22d, in which he declared that, for the future, he would 
himself control the finances and regulate the discharge of liabili- 
ties. He seemed to be riding on the wave of triumph. The peo- 
ple thought that the day of Mehemet Ali was come again. 

But at this moment an unexpected voice of authority was 
heard. England and France were passing the time in an unavail- 
ing effort like that of two horses who cannot pull their load be- 
cause the one holds back while the other starts, when, suddenly, 
the German Chancellor made a protest that cost Ismail his throne. 
The German Consul at Cairo, on the 17th of May, simply informed 
the Khedive that the interests of German subjects must be pro- 
tected, let come what might, and that any arbitrary change of sys- 
tem at that time would be considered prejudicial to their inter- 



— 35 — 

ests. "What led the astute Bismarck to step into the leader's 
place at this juncture is, and must remain, an enigma.* Doubt- 
less he wished France still to be occupied with foreign affairs so 
that her internal development might not be commensurate with 
Germany's ; for at that day, more than now, there seemed a plaus- 
ible possibility that the grievances and hatred that did not die 
with Napoleon Third, might seek again a settlement by the sword. 
Certain it is that the very reasons that have led England to op- 
pose Frencli aggrandizement abroad have led Germany to favor 
the same, or, at least, to view with satisfaction the foreign com- 
plications that require the exportation of troops and treasure. 
Against France England has only had to protect her interests 
abroad, and Germany her interests at home. This may or may 
not account for the Chancellor's unexpected though timely inter- 
ference ; but the fact remains the same that his voice settled the 
Khedive's fate. England, France, Austria, Russia and Italy fol- 
lowed the lead of Germany, and protested against ajiy interfer- 
ence with the Commission of Control and the non- execution of the 
tribunal judgments. At this juncture the proposal to depose the 
Khedive, which the Porte had made to England and France in 
April, was reneAved. This time it was accepted. In place, how- 
ever, of the Sultan's nominee for the succession. Prince Halim, 
the uncle of Ismail, England and France insisted upon raising 

* Of this action and its consequences, Mr. Edward Dicey, writing in The Nineteenth 
Century of February, 1880, says: "How ttiis action came about lias never, so far as I 
know, been clearly ascertained. Germany liad a comparatively insignificant interest in 
the affairs of Egypt. A very small portion of the floating debt was due to German cred- 
itors. It is not easy to believe that Germany ever really contemplated any intervention in 
Egypt, and it is still less easy to understand how she could practically have intervened 
even if she had been so minded. But the prestige of Germany— her repute of strength, 
which is to a nation what credit is to an individual — stood her in good stead. The mere 
fact that Prmce Bismarck had declared the KhOdive could not be allowed to play fast and 
loose with the interests of German subjects produced more effect than all the dispatches 
indited Jrom London and Paris ; and from the day when Germany pronounced against the 
Khedive it was obvious that the end had come. Meanwhile, the initiative taken by Ger- 
many had a result which might easily have been foreseen, and which doubtless was fore- 
seen by those, whoever they may have been, who suggested to Prince Bismarck the ad- 
visability of his coming forward as the champion of the Egyptian creditors. It was felt at 
once in Paris that the time for vacillation had passed. The Republic could not allow it to 
be said that France was unable or unwilling to protect the interests of her subjects in 
Egypt, while the insignificant interests of the German creditors were safeguarded by the 
mere expression of Prince Bismarck's will; and the English Government recognized, on 
the one hand, that Prance could not be held back any longer, and, on the other, that we 
could not allow Germany to take into her own hands the forcible solution of the Egyp- 
tian question." 



— 36 — 

Prince Tewfik, the son of Ismail, to the tbrone. The diplomatic 
correspondence in discussion of this difference consumed a week 
or more in June; but on the 26th of that month the Sultan at last 
yielded and signed the firman deposing Ismail in favor of Prince 
Mehemet Tewfik. Four days afterward the ex-Khedive left the 
shores and troubles of Egypt behind him for an Italian life of 
luxury. If he had been a Pasha in the feudal days of Egypt, 
he would have forfeited his treasure and his life. As it was, 
he escaped with the latter, and was given an annual allowance of 
£50,000. 

The character of Ismail Pasha has been variously depicted. 
He has been painted with all the virtues, on the one hand, and 
all the vices, on the other, that a monarch can be heir to. Of 
course neither extreme gives the true picture ; and yet there is so 
much ground for each conception that one inclines, at first 
thought, to declare that Ismail was both the blessing and the 
curse of his country. We think of the development of Egypt 
during the sixteen years of his reign, of the public works, schools, 
railways, telegraphs, founded and fostered, and we bless his 
name ; but then we think of the cost, and the curse follows. 
We cannot sympathize with those who would shield Ismail by re- 
garding him as the dupe of his wicked Muffetish. He may have 
been deceived and cheated by the latter, but he could not have 
bee a altogether ignorant of the financial schemes of his treasurer. 
They worked in the same groove and to the same end. They 
were both ambitious, biit were not equally extravagant ; for the 
Muffetish grew rich correspondingly as the Khedive grew poor, 
although the money poured into the hands of the two alike. The 
Muffetish hoarded while the Khedive wasted; but the desire of 
the miser was no greater than that of the spendthrift, and he 
must not bear the blame for both. For the financial woes of 
Egypt under Ismail, some blame, undoubtedly, attaches to the 
European money-lenders, whose bargains were so disastrous to 
the Khedive. Their rates were often merciless. To prove that 
all the blame is theirs, Mr. Keay tells "A Tale of Shame "* from 
the British Blue Books, in which he supports his arguments with- 
many italics, small capitals, and exclamation points. But they 

*" Spoiling tlie Egyptians; A Tale of Shame." Told from the Blue Books. By J. 
Seymour Keay. 



— 37 — 

are not conclusive. They do not obliterats the fact of Ismail's 
extravagance. 

If we could wholly lose sight of the different acts of the finan- 
cial tragedy, the glory of Ismail's reign would still be marred by 
the means and measures he employed in carrying out his de- 
signs of development. No obstacle could turn him from his 
plan, and the teaching of economic science was ignored or misun- 
derstood. We have seen how he bent his energies upon the 
senseless attempt to refine sugar, when his country furnished no 
fuel to run his dearly bought machines. Western civilization was 
Ismail's model in all things. It was his ambition, from the start, 
to implant in Egypt European arts and ideas. He thought he 
could declare into existence what had been the slow development 
of centuries in more enlightened lands. Even when he must 
have known that his country was on the verge of ruin, he boasted 
that Egypt was no longer a part of Africa, but of Europe.* 
Nothing could be more ridiculous than the story of Ismail's at- 
tempt to give his people governmental representation. He did 
not propose to establish even a paper constitution ; and he had 
no idea of giving up any of his prerogatives when, in 1866, he. 
summoned the first Egyptian Parliament that had assembled 
since the day of Mehemet Ali.f The members of the new Par- 
liament had not the faintest idea of their duties and powers. 
When the first bill was submitted to them by the Khedive, and 
they were asked to signify their approval or disapproval, there 
was not a dissenting vote against the measure. For, they said, 
his Highness is the representative of Allah ; and his will, like that 
of Allah and the Prophet, is our law. But this political simplicity 
vanished before the end of Ismail's reign, though the voice of the 
Parliament was still recognized as the Khedive's voice. 

* In an interview witli Mr. Rivers Wilson, August 23cl, 187T, Ismail said : "My country 
is no longer African ; we now form part of Europe." From Annual Cyclopcedia for 1877. 

t Mr. McCoan, in " Egypt As It Is," page 117, thus describes the functions of the As- 
sembly: "In 1866 the Khedive revived the defunct Assembly of Delegates, one of the 
inchoate reforms projected by Mehemet All, but which had not met since his death. This 
germ ot an Egyptian Parliament consists of village sheikhs and other provincial notables, 
elected by the communes, and assembles once a year to receive from the Privy Council a 
report on the administration during the twelvemonth. Its function is also to consider 
and advise on all proposed fiscal changes, new public works, and other matters of national 
concern that may be laid before it. It has, of course, no legislative power; but in prac- 
tice its recommendations are received not merely with respect, but are often acted on by 
the Government." 

3 



— 38 — 

It is only fair to Ismail that a somewhat detailed statement 
should be made of the amounts expended by him in public works ; 
for, having seen how one loan after another was received, the 
question naturally arises, Where did the money go? There 
was a considerable sum that the greed of money-lenders did not 
absorb in commissions and interest, and a large part of this went 
into public works. Mr. Mulhall gives the following table of 
works established between 1863 and 1879, in his article on 
"Egyptian Finance :"* 

" Work. Amount. Observation. 

Suez Canal £6,TTO,000 After deducting value of sHares sold. 

Nile Canals 12,600,000 Made 8,400 miles at ^1,500 per mile. 

Bridges 2,150,000 Built 430 at £5,000 per bridge. 

Sugar-mills 6,100,000 Built 64, witt macliinery, etc. 

Harbor Alexandria.... 2,542,000 Greenfield and Elliott Contract. 

Suez docks 1,400,000 Dussand Bros. 

Alex, water-works 300,000 Price agreed by Paris Syndicate. 

Railways 13,861,000 Length 910 miles, new. 

Telegrapns 853,000 Length 5,200 miles, new. 

Light-houses 188,000 Built 15 on Red Sea and Mediterranean." 



£46,264,000 

We see thus that Ismail expended on works of public utility 
not less than forty-six millions sterling. Now, as the loans con- 
tracted by him netted only about forty-five millions, his admirers 
and defenders say at once that he did not squander, but that he 
spent all for the public weal. But there is the item of revenue, 
which these writers do not consider, and which yielded the Gov- 
ernment, in the sixteen years of Ismail's reign, not far from one 
hundred and fifty millions. How large a part of this was wasted 
by Ismail we can only guess ; but we may be sure that all those 
millions did not go toward defraying necessary Governmental 
expenses. The canals, railways, bridges, docks, etc., were the 
best work of Ismail's reign if the financial side of the question be 
left out of consideration. They brought in, it is true, a certain 
revenue, but this was by no means equal to the interest on the 
debts incurred to make the improvements. Where national de- 
velopment is only secured by contracting with each change a 
counterbalancing debt, it is doubtful if the changes can be con- 
sidered beneficial. There were, however, certain other outlays by 
Ismail that were of unquestionable advantage to the land, even 
though they produced no revenue. He established 4,632 public 

''Contemporary Review, October, 1882. 



— 39 — 

scliools, with 5,850 teachers, drawing salaries that ranged from 
£24 to £84 a year, and expended in the sixteen years of his reign 
no less than £3,600,000 for this purpose. He organized village 
banks — we will say with philanthropic intent to protect the fella- 
hin from the money-lenders — and lost £900,000 by the experi- 
ment. And he lost largely on the shares he took in the Nile Steam 
Navigation Company. On the other hand, just at the time of 
the financial difficulties of 1873, he embarked upon a war with 
Abyssinia which despoiled the Egyptian treasury of not less 
than £3,000,000. He squandered a vast sum in building palaces 
and theaters and in the entertainment of distinguished foreigners. 
His expenditures at the time of the opening of the Suez Canal 
were simply enormous. He gave bribes and presents at all times 
with true Oriental prodigality. Even if he could have afforded 
these outlays they would have been foolish ; as it was, they were 
wicked. And yet, as Mr. Mulhall says, " whatever the faults, he 
raised Egypt in the scale of nations" ; for there was an actual 
progress between the death of Said and the accession of Tewfik. 
It may be measured in the following table, prepared by IMr. Mul- 
hall:* 

"PEOGEESS or EGYPT IN SEVENTEEN YEAES. 

iasf Tear of Last Year of 

Said Pasha. Ismail Pasha. 

1S62. 1879. 

Acres tilled 4,052,000 5,425,000 

Value of imports £1 ,991,000 ^15.410,000 

Value of exports ^4,454,000 £13,810,000 

Revenue .' £4,937,000 £8,562,000 

Public debt £3,300,000 £98,540,000 

No. of public schools 185 4,817 

Railways — miles 275 1,185 

Telegraphs " 630 5,820 

Canals " 44,000 52,400 

Population 4,883,000 5,518,000 " 

If from this table could be excluded that decidedly negative 
item of progress denoted by the Public Debt in 1879, there would 
remain a good showing for Ismail ; but that one item cancels all 
the others, even as it was the primal cause of Ismail's overthrow- 
There was another reform, which has not yet been noticed be- 
cause bearing no direct relation to finances, that was accomplished 
during Ismail's reign, and for which he must, at least indirectly, 

* The Contemporary Revieiv, October, 1882. 



— 40 — 

be credited — the reform in judicial procedure. There had come to 
be a very pernicious increase of consular jurisdiction in Egypt 
after the death of Mehemet Ali. The native had to bring a suit 
against a foreigner in the foreigner's consulate, where he was al- 
most sure to be denied justice. With as little chance of justice, 
also, the foreign plaintiff had to sue the foreign debtor in the 
latter's consulate. Some consuls even claimed the right to sit in 
judgment of cases in which the natives were defendants. The 
Government suffered too. It was estimated, says Mr. McCoan,* 
that, in the four years preceding 1868, consular influence extorted 
from the Government £2,880,000 in satisfaction of claims, with- 
out judicial sanction of any kind. " The whole system," he goes 
on to say, "was, in fact, a scandal and a denial of justice all 
around." It was, if anything, worse in criminal than in civil mat- 
ters. The abuses were so flagrant that Nubar Pasha, in 1867, 
proposed a scheme of reform to the Khedive. It was submitted to 
France, but was unfavorably received. England, however, when 
approached on the subject, promised to give the reform her hearty 
support, provided the other Powers would concur. They did so 
in the Fall of 1869. Negotiations, however, were interrupted for 
a time by the war between France and Germany ; and when they 
were renewed, in 1871, the Sultan entered his veto against the 
scheme, though he afterward withdrew it at the demand of Eng- 
land and Russia. France now offered objections once more, and 
the negotiations dragged. Some of her amendments were ac- 
cepted ; but it was not until December, 1875, that the scheme was 
finally agreed to. 

The reform was inaugurated in February, 1876, to continue in 
force for five years. It is thus described by Mr. McCoan : | "As 
now constituted the new system includes three tribunals of first 
instance — one at Alexandria, a second at Cairo, and a third . . . 
at Zagazig — and a Court of Appeal, which also sits at Alexandria. 
Of the inferior courts, that at Alexandria — divided into two cham- 
bers, with equal jurisdiction — consists of fourteen judges, of 
whom six are natives and eight Europeans ; that at Cau-o, of three 
natives and five foreigners ; and that at Zagazig, of three natives 
and four foreigners. The nominal chiefs of all three are natives, 



" Egypt as It Is," by J. C. McCoan, p. 270. 



flUd, page 280 



— 4:1 — 

but foreign vice-presidents actually direct their proceedings. In 
the Court of Appeal the alien element is still more preponderant, 
the bench of eleven judges there consisting of seven foreigners 
and only four natives The judicial and other person- 
nel is thus complete, and the jurisdiction exercised includes all 
civil disputes between the Government and natives on the one 
hand, and foreigners on the other, as also those between foreigners 
of different nationalities ; and all suits and registrations of sale 
and mortgage whatsoever of real property." Such was the reform 
inaugurated; and a most excellent one it was. Not forgetting 
that Nubar was its author, we give the credit of it to Ismail's 
reign, just as we lay the blame of the Muffetish's villainy at his 
door. If all his changes had been as wisely carried out, his ambi- 
tious designs of raising Egypt to the plane of European civilization 
would not have failed so utterly of reaUzation. In this connection 
we must refer to Ismail's appointment, first of Sir Samuel Baker 
and then of Colonel Gordon, as Governors-General of the Sudan 
and of his apparently earnest attempts to suppress the slave trade. 
He gave Gordon carte blanche power to "punish, change, and dis- 
miss" officials, and assured him that Egypt would loyally support 
England in this "measure of humanity and civilization." "We shall 
see later how Baker and Gordon succeeded in their missions. 

Long before his collapse the shrewd Ismail must have known 
that his reign was doomed ; but he kept on his high-handed course 
to the end. The discharge of the European administrators and 
the virtual repudiation of debts were his last acts of bravado. 
Powerless and empty-handed, he made no protest against the fir- 
man of deposition. But "it would be a mistake," writes Mr. Edward 
Dicey * "to attribute Ismail Pasha's collapse to lack of personal 
courage. I should doubt his possessing any exceptional physical 
bravery; but he had to a remarkable degree the gambler's instinct 
and the gambler's boldness. He was not the man to forfeit his 
stakes while there was a chance, however remote, of holding on to 
his winnings. He threw up the game simply "and solely because he 
knew better than any one else that he had absolutely no cards in 
his hand." His people suffered him to depart into exUe without a 
protest or a murmur. It is true that "the resident European com- 
munity" — to quote Mr. Dicey's words once more — "to whom he had 

* The Nineteenth Century, February, 1880. 



— 42 — 

always been friendly, and who liad partaken freely of liis lavish, 
hospitality, stood by him in his disgrace, and his departure into 
exile was accompanied by sincere expressions of regret on the part 
of the Court circle and the European embassy, but without one 
solitary manifestation of sympathy on the part of the Egyptian 
population." 



CHAPTER IV. 

Mehemet Tewjfik, Khedive. 

Prince Mehemet Tewfik was not yet twenty-seven years old 
when he ascended the vice-royal throne of Egypt. He was a very 
different man from his father. He had not his inordinate ambi- 
tion, and lacked, consequently, some of the energy as well as the 
crafty diplomacy of Ismail. He had not, like his father, served an 
apprenticeship of experience in the gay capitals of Europe ; but 
he was not without the culture that European masters can inspire. 
He had a good knowledge of French and English, speaking both 
languages fluently. It may be doubted if he was as enlightened 
a Prince as his great uncle. Prince Halim, the exile of Constanti- 
nople, who was the choice of the Sultan for successor to Ismail ; 
but under the law of succession in Egypt, established by the firman 
of 1866, England could not well have supported Halim, even if 
she had preferred him, which she did not. The Porte had to yield 
Its eagerness to depose Ismail is not to be attributed to any over- 
sensitiveness at the scandal of his financial follies, but rather to 
the fact — which the Sultan foresaw — that if the Porte did not 
depose the Khedive, England and France would. Making thus, a 
concession to the inevitable, the Sultan would have still main- 
tained the semblance of his suzerain authority if he could have 
named the successor. But this was not permitted by England and 
France, who, by their dictation at this time, showed that they pos- 
sessed the virtual control of affairs in Egypt. 

And jet, after the deposition, England, at least, was loth to 
put her power further to the test. The opposition at home was 
to be feared and a definite policy was not outlined ; and the new 
Khedive was left to follow his own whim largely in the formation 



— 43 — 

of his Government. France did not relish this inaction on the 
part of England, and, for herself, insisted that M. de Blignieres 
should continue to act as representative. Germany and the other 
Powers having- retired from participation in the discussion of 
Egyptian affairs, England and France at last came to a compro- 
mise. They agreed not to insist upon the reinstatement of their 
representatives in the Khedive's Cabinet, but, instead, upon the 
appointment by the Khedive of two Comptrollers, one of whom 
should be nominated by France and the other by England. 
France named M. de Blignieres, who was accepted by Tewfik with 
much dissatisfaction. England did not insist upon the appoint- 
ment of Mr. Rivers Wilson, though losing thereby some prestige, 
but named Major Baring instead. Their powers were not defined; 
but it was understood that they would be as unlimited as France 
and England might choose to make them. 

In the meaatime there had been several ministerial changes since 
Tewfik's accession. He had placed the ministry under the lead- 
ership of Sherif Pasha. None but natives received portfolios. 
The ministry thus formed indicated a reactionary spirit and 
was totally out of sympathy with the reform movements instigated 
by Nubar Pasha. Tewfik feared to depart at once from the ways 
of Ismail ;. for he regarded his position as somewhat insecure so 
long as Ismail's covert overtures to the Porte were received. The 
Ex-Khedive sought to obtain permission of the Sultan to live in 
Cairo. This could not have been allowed without prejudicing the 
stability of the Egyptian Government ; but all fear of the possi- 
bility was ended when, on the 14th of August, the firman of inves- 
titure was presented to Tewfik. Four days after the Sherif Min- 
istry was dismissed and a new one formed, of which the Khedive 
himself assumed the presidency. But this was short-lived ; for, on 
September 21st, Tewfik gave up his position of Minister, and ap- 
pointed Eiaz Pasha to the presidency in his place. Riaz had been 
Minister of the Interior under Nubar, with whom he was in complete 
sympathy. It would seem, however, as if the Ministry should have 
been intrusted to Nubar, the most enlightened man of Egypt ; but 
Riaz was preferred by France and England because, in case of 
differences arising, he would hardly have the courage or strength 
to oppose the Dual Control, which was a consideration of some 
moment now that the Powers had no representatives in the Cabinet. 



^ _ 44 — 

Then, too, Nubar was not popular among the natives, being an 
Armenian and a Christian. At the same time that the Khedive's 
government was placed upon an apparently stable footing, the 
burdens of the f ellahin were materially lightened by unusually 
abundant crops. They were also less harassed than formerly by 
the tax-gatherers, who no longer forced money from them a year 
or more before it was due, but were content merely to collect 
arrearages. There seemed thus to be a brighter sky above Egypt 
than in the days of Ismail Pasha. 

But there was the great question of finance still remaining to 
be solved. To this the Comptrollers had turned their first atten- 
tion. The difficulty that met them at the outset was of an inter- 
national character. It will be remembered that Baron Roths- 
child had withheld a part of his loan at the beginning of the year, 
because individual creditors had obtained liens against the Daira 
domains, which Ismail and his family had ceded to the State. 
The domains could not be mortgaged to the Rothschilds until the 
liens had been satisfied ; for their legality had been upheld by the 
International Courts, whose law was that of a code based upon 
French law. This code, now, could not be deviated from or mod- 
ified in the least degree, except with the consent of all the Ppwers 
represented in the International Courts. But it was evidently a 
matter of right and necessity that funds borrowed to lighten cer- 
tain burdens of the State should be expended to that end, and not 
in the payment of the claims of individuals. An independent 
Power would have so decided at once ; but Egypt had to abide 
by the code, while the Comptrollers proceeded to try to secure the 
consent of the Powers concerned. This was a difficult task. 
Some of the lesser Powers were jealous of the Anglo-French con- 
trol, and had no desire to act upon its bidding. Italy and Aus- 
tria declined to sanction any change in the International code. 
Major Baring and M, de Blignieres themselves went to Vienna to 
expostulate, and with the strong influence of the nations they rep- 
resented, they were at last able, in November, to effect a compro- 
mise, by which all the liens on the domains, obtained before their 
mortgage to the Rothschilds, on February 3d, 1879, were to be 
satisfied from the unpaid balance of the loan ; while, with respect 
to all other debts, the Rothschilds were to have the first mort- 
gage on the lands. This was accomplished only by tedious nego- 



— 45 — 

tiations. In the month of November, also, the Khedive issued 
the following decree concerning the powers of the Comptrollers- 
General : 

" Art. 1.— The Comptrollers-General shall have in financial matters the most complete 
powers of investigation into all the public services, including those whose receipts have a 
special destination by virtue of decrees and contracts. Ministers and functionaries of 
every ranK shall be bound to give every information and to furnish every document re- 
quired by the Comptrollers and their agents. The Minister of Finance especially shall 
furnish the Control every week with a detailed statement of all receipts and expenditures 
at his Ministry. Every other Administration shall every month furnish a similar state- 
ment of receipts and expenditures. 

"Art. 2.— The Comptrollers shall agree upon the public services over which they 
shall exercise the rights of supervision and control conferred by this decree. 

"Art. 3.— The Governments of France and Great Britain having consented, for the 
moment, that the Comptrollers shall take no part in the management of the Administra- 
tion and financial services, the Comptrollers shall for the present confine themselves to the 
communicationtousor to our Ministers of such observations as their investigations give 
rise to. They shall also communicate to the Commission of the Debt all facts of a nature 
to interest the creditors of the consolidated Debt. They may also, on account of such 
facts, convene the Commissioners of Public Debt to examine such questions as the Comp- 
trollers or the Commissioners of Public Debt may think advisable to discuss in common. 

"Art. 4.— The Comptrollers shall have the rank of Ministers at the Council (of Minis- 
ters), and shall have a seat and a consultative voice there. 

" Art. 5.— At the end of each year, and more frequently if necessary, the Comptrollers 
shall commniiicate to us their work in a report, which shall be published by them and in- 
serted in the Moniteur Egyptien. 

"Art. 6. — The Comptrollers can only be removed from their posts with the consent of 
their respective Governments. They shall name their own officials and fix their salaries. 

"Art. T.— The expenses of the department of the Control shall be fixed by the Comp- 
trollers and approved by the Ministers. 

" Art. 8.— The amount required by them shall be paid to them monthly. 

"Art, 9.— Our Ministers are charged with the execution of this decree. 

" (Signed) Mehemet Tewfik, 

"November 15th, 1879. Riaz Pasha." 

The remainder of the year 1879 was consumed by the Comp- 
trollers in drafting a plan for the settlement of the financial ques- 
tion. Their report was presented to the Khedive in January, 
1880. Its most important suggestion was that a hne of demarka- 
tion should be drawn at December 31st, 1879 ; and that all debts 
contracted before that date should be settled by a law of liquida- 
tion, which should protect the Egyptian Government from all 
suits based on claims of earlier date than 1880. It had been un- 
derstood when the Comptrollers were appointed the previous 
summer, that a Commission of Liquidation should be instituted 
to draft such a law as the Comptrollers now suggested ; and, fur- 
ther, to devise some such scheme for the final settlement of finan- 
cial difficulties as was outlined in the report of the Comptrollers. 
The Commission was now appointed with the approval of Eng- 



— 46 — 

land, France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Egypt, and Sir Eivers 
Wilson was chosen its president. The Khedive, in a decree issued 
in March, outlined the duties of the Commission. It was to in- 
vestigate thoroughly the finances of the country, to draw up a, 
law of liquidation between Egypt and her creditors which should 
be binding on all concerned, and to make general provision ta 
ease Egypt of her burdens. The Governments represented in 
the Commission agreed to accept its decisions as binding on the 
International Courts, and to request jointly, after having given 
their own approval, that the other Powers represented in the In- 
ternational Courts should also consent to the new law. 

The work of the Commission was completed by the middle of 
July, and the Khedive at once signed the law of liquidation. It. 
provided for the payment of the floating debt by giving thirty per 
cent, cash and seventy per. cent in the bonds of a new preference 
debt. The national debt was converted into unified and preference 
stock, the former bearing interest at four per cent, and the latter 
at five per cent. The unified stock, amounting to $57,776,340, 
was secured by the land tax, and the preference stock, amounting 
to £22,587,800, was secured by the railways, telegraphs, etc. The 
Daira debt of £9,512,870, and the Domain debt of £8,499.620 were 
secured respectively by the Khedive's estates and his family's es- 
tates. The Mukabala amounted to £7,500,000. The entire in- 
debtedness was thus placed at over one hundred and five millions 
sterling. The* Mukabala tax was abolished, and a source of 
revenue cut off; but it was thought that the Daira, being freed 
now from debt, could be made to yield a revenue enough larger to 
counterbalance the loss of the Mukabala tax. The Khedive had 
previously signed decrees abolishing this tax and certain others 
that had been declared by the Commissioners of Inquiry to be an- 
noying to the tax-payer and of little profit to the State. The 
relief to Egypt by the new law was to be found in the reduction of 
the interest on the unified debt to four per cent. That would at. 
once bring the expenses of the Government below the sum of the 
revenues, and furnish a surplus that could be applied to the serv- 
ice of the debt. The practical working of the law secured this 
very result. In 1881, after the discharge of all obligations, there 
remained a surplus of £321,265, which enabled the Government to 
cancel nearly half a million of the funded debt. " The Liquida- 



— 47 — 

tion Law of 1880," says Mr. Mulhall,* "first put the finances on 
a sound footing and ... its effects have been just and 
beneficial." 

Other causes, also, worked to secure the prosperity of 
1880. There was an abundant harvest, and trade was vastly im- 
proved by the readjustment of the land tax, and by the abolition 
of taxes in kind. In short, the condition of the fellah was sub- 
stantially bettered ; and when the fellah is happy, Egypt prospers. 
The improvement in the national credit was the cause of a great 
influx of foreign capital, chiefly from France, which was directed 
toward the development of the agricultural resources of the land 
and toward the erection of buildings, and the improvement of 
mechanical appliances. Money was loaned at a lower rate of in- 
terest than formerly, and as a consequence the price of land rose 
rapidly. At the same time attention was aroused to secure the 
advancement of the people by giving them better facilities for edu- 
cation. The great Moslem university of Cairo instructed twelve 
thousand students in the philososhy of the Koran, but gave them 
no broader education than the word of the Prophet required. This 
was not enough for a country that was no longer isolated from the 
laws and learning of unbelievers as it had been for the centuries 
preceding. The actual contact with European nations now made 
it necessary to cultivate the learning of the West. A Commission 
was appointed to secure this end. 

But the reform and the prosperity were not to be without 
their hindrances. The Egyptians had had little thought for them- 
selves while their condition seemed hopeless. Suffering, they 
were content to exist. But now their prosperity seemed to arouse 
the prejudices of race and religion, and stirred the people to com- 
plain of the foreign influence and interference in Egypt. And 
though the prosperity was, as we have seen, in large part due to 
the foreign direction, there was some natural ground for complaint. 
The people could not look without envy and jealousy on the 
foreigners who were drawing immense salaries from the Egyptian 
treasiuy. Fifty thousand pounds a year was paid to European 
officials in the National Debt Office alone. f There might not have 

* The Contemp.rary Review, October, 1S82. 

tThe following salaries paid to foreign officials in the different departments were re- 
ported by Sir Edward Mallet to his government on May ISth, 1882 : Cabinet of the Khedive 
£3,000 (Egyptian pounds, £1 being about equal to $5) ; Maieh Sanieh, £676 ; Presidency of 



been complaint if salaries had gone solely to comptrollers, commis- 
sioners, and judges ; but there were, besides, French or English 
officials to direct the customs, the railways, the telegraphs, the 
harbors of Alexandria, of Port Said, and of Suez, the coast-guard, 
the light-houses, the post-office, the finance department of the 
Government, the public works, and the administration of the 
Domain and Daira lands. In all these offices, furthermore, the 
subordinate positions were divided almost equally between French- 
men and natives. Major Baring had been replaced by Mr. Colvin 
as English Comptroller, and M. de Blignieres had assumed the lead 
in control in consequence of his seniority and greater experience 
in Egyptian affairs. In every way France had been more aggres- 
sive than her ally, and hers was now the leading influence in 
Egypt. It was even whispered that the prophecy that the Medi- 
terranean would one day be " a French lake" was destined to ful- 
fillment. French accessions in northern Africa encouraged this 
kind of talk. But it mattered not to the Egyptians whether r- 
French or English controlled : they were all alike foreigners, 
and on that account hated. Both were bad, and either was as bad 
as the other. That they were apparently robbing the natives of 
the salaries that seemed rightfully theirs was enough to make the 
inborn hatred intense. 

The Khedive, however, had more tolerance for the foreigners, 
and more sympathy with the reforms they suggested. He be- 
lieved that the Comptrollers had the welfare of Egypt at heart, 
and he was ready to show his confidence by awaiting the develop- 
ment of the plans undertaken. This attitude, of course, tended 

tte Council of Ministers, £452 ; Teft of Gizeli and Gizereli, £436 ; Ministry of B'oreign 
Affairs, £2,088 ; Ministry of Finance, £1T,200; General Control, £14,101 ; Direction of the 
Cadastral Survey, £26,T8T ; General Inspection of tHe Octrois, £2,TT0 ; LigM-house Service, 
£10,239 ; Mint, £144 ; Ministry of War, £8,351 ; Ministry of Marine, £2,691 ; Ministry of 
Public Instruction, £T,905 ; Administration of the Wakflj, £2,034; Ministry of the Interior, 
£3,9T8 ; Government of Alexandria, £780 ; of Port Said, £8T0 ; of Suez, £163 ; of El Arish, 
£84 ; Municipality of Alexandria, £540 ; Cairo Police, £1,567 ; Alexandria Police, £2,793 ; 
Suppression of the Slave Trade, £2,052 ; Marine Sanitary Council and Quarantine, £5,290 ; 
Council of Public Health, £6,084 ; Ministry of Justice, £6,848 ; Ministry of Public Works, 
£26,216 ; Railroad Administration, £29,761 ; Telegraph Administration, £6,193 ; Port of 
Alexandria, £3,681 ; Administration of Customs, £16,647 ; Administration of the Port, 
£19,509; Postal steamer, £16,941 ; Salines, £162 ; Administration of the Public Domain, 
£25,042; Daira Sanieh, £19,672; Public Debt, £16,227; Parquet Administration, £3,083; 
Court of Appeals, £14,971 ; Alexandria Court of the First Instance, £22,344 ; Court of the 
First Instance at Cairo, £14,212 ; Court of the First Instance at Mansiirah, £8'859. Total, 
£373, 491. 



— 49 — 

to alienate the Khedive from his people. Among them a national 
feeling had been aroused. During 1881 this feeling was crystal- 
lized into a recognized national movement, which was to culminate, 
in 1882, in the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians." There was 
only one place where this movement could take form, and that 
was in the army. Up to 1881 this was still composed almost 
entirely of Egyptians ; but with the accession of Tewfik in 1879, 
the army's grievances had begun. The Sultan, notwithstanding 
the firman that Ismail had so dearly purchased, insisted upon en- 
forcing military restrictions. The limit of enlistment was placed 
at 18,000 men. Next to the interference of France or England, 
that of the Porte was most unpopular among Egyptians. The 
curtailment of the army, however, might have been endured ; but 
the innovations that were begun with 1881 were unbearable. 
The special grievance was the replacement of native officers by 
Turks. The leading spirit among the disaffected troops was 
Ahmed Arabi Bey. He had always been the friend of the fella- 
hin, from whom he had sprung ; and it had been the work of his 
life to secure their rights. Even under Ismail he had contem- 
plated inciting a national movement ; but the time did not seem 
ripe for it, and so he waited. Ismail had unjustly deprived Arabi 
of his army rank, though he was afterward restored. But the 
experience gave Arabi a sympathy for those officers, who, at the 
beginning of 1881, were removed without cause, that Circassians 
and Turks might be given places ; and he now became the cham- 
pion of those who had been thus wronged. In February Arabi 
and the other colonels demanded the dismissal of the Minister of 
War, a Circassian who favored the Turks and hated the Arabs. 
As soon as the Minister heard of the demand, he had Arabi and 
two colleagues arrested ; but they were rescued from prison by 
Arabi's regiment and borne off in triumph. The Circassian Os- 
man was removed, and Mahmud Sami was appointed to his place. 
For some months now the distrust existing between the military 
party and the Khedive increased. The colonels feared assassina- 
tion, and the Khedive a revolution. The rupture came on the 9th 
of September, in the so-called "Insurrection of the Colonels." 
On the morning of that day Arabi submitted a document to the 
Khedive, calling for the dismissal of the entire ministry, for the 
drafting of a constitution, and for the increase of the army to its 



— 50 — 

limit, 18,000 men. On the afternoon of tlie same day, with 4,000 
troops and eighteen cannon, the champion of the army marched 
to the palace to get the Khedive's answer. Arabi intimated that, 
if the demands were not met, Tewfik's successor would be forth- 
coming. And still the Khedive demurred ; but only for a time. 
He at length named a ministry ; which, however, was unsatisfac- 
tory to Axabi. The latter demanded that the formation of the 
Cabinet be left to Sherif Pasha. Sherif was second only to 
Nubar among Egyptian statesmen ; but he utterly lacked the lat- 
ter's firmness of character. This was to Arabi's liking; for he 
wanted not a master, but a slave. Sherif was, moreover, a good 
Mohamedan; and he was, therefore, better liked by the people 
than Nubar, the Armenian. The Khedive gave way to the inevit- 
able, and on the 14th of September Sherif formed a new ministry. 
The foreign Powers now awoke to the apparent danger of a 
still more formidable insurrection. As Mr. McCarthy rhetorically 
stated it, * "a wondering world began to ask whether Arabi Bey 
was the Cromwell of a great movement against an Egyptian 
Charles ; the Garibaldi of a struggle for national liberty against a 
foreign rule ; a scheming political adventurer, fighting for his own 
hand like Hal of the Wynd, or only a puppet, whose actions were 
guided by mysterious unseen strings." England was somewhat 
alarmed, but not to the extent of wishing to intervene herself. 
She wanted Turkey to send troops to Egypt to overawe the spirit 
of insurrection. , But France would not consent to any kind of 
Turkish intervention. The Sultan, however, was not to be baffled. 
The wiley Abdul Hamid did not propose to let Egypt drift away 
from his suzerainty again to the length that it had under Ismail. 
He may not have had any determined policy. If he had we are 
certainly ignorant of it. We simply know that he kept a jealous 
guard of his authority. From this time on there were intimations 
of mysterious signs of secret correspondence, first between 
the Sultan and the Khedive, and afterward between the 
Sultan and Arabi; but the signs were almost never sup- 
plemented with proofs. Abdul Hamid, did, however, take 
some steps openly that indicated a considerable degree of inde- 
pendence. He announced on September 20th that he had 
decided to send an emissary to Cairo. Both France and 

* " England Under Gladstone," by Justin McCartliy, M. P., Chapter XIII. 



— 51 — 

England protested, but notwithstanding this, he dispatched two 
emissaries on October 3d. Two days after this Lord Granville, 
the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed to M. St. Hilaire, 
who held the same portfolio for France, that the Khedive be, 
advised to receive the envoys, but "firmly to oppose any interference 
on their part in the internal administration of Egypt." * A joint 
note to this effect was sent to the Khedive. 

No sooner had the envoys arrived in Egypt than the feeling 
against the unbelievers began to show itself more openly. It is 
thought that the Sultan sent secret messages to encourage a show 
of bitterness on the part of the students of the University of 
Cairo, f The foreign population became alarmed at the evidences 
of hatred and hostility. To reassure them, and to protect them- 
if necessary, an English and a French vessel were sent at once to 
Alexandria. This move naturally excited the disapproval of the 
Sultan, but Lord Granville said through the English Ambassador 
at Constantinople, that the war-ships must remain at Alexandria 
so long as the envoys remained in Egypt. The Sultan hastily 
decided, therefore, to recall the envoys, and they left Egypt on the 
19th of October. Though their stay had been short, they had 
succeeded in fomenting the ill-feeling against England. 

It was known that France was occupied with the new acquisi- 
tion of Tunis, and all attention was turned to England with fear 
that she was bent on annexation. To allay this fear it became 
necessary for the British Government, in November, to instruct 
Sir Edward Mallet, her consular representative in Egypt, to assure 
the Khedive's Government that the British policy was opposed to 
intervention and foreign aggrandizement and would not favor the 
separation of Egypt from Turkey, nor contend for more than the 
fulfillment of the Sultan's firmans as already promulgated. It was 
declared, however, that this policy would not be maintained if 
disorders became prevalent. This was a firm note for Mr. Glad- 

* Quoted from " Shall We Annex Egypt?" by William Stone, M.A. 

t This great university has always been the hot-bed of Moslem fanaticism. When I 
arrived in Egjpt, two months after the emissaries had been recalled, it was considered al- 
most dangerous for foreigners to visit the university. A party of us went, however, and 
suffered no other indignity than hisses from the students whenever our faces were turned 
away. Some friends of mine were less fortunate in their visit a few weeks later. Not 
only were they hissed, but missiles were thrown at them, and they were actually set upon 
and driven from the place. The insult was prompted by the feeling that found vent a few 
months later in the Massacre of Alexandria. 



— 52 — 

stone's Government, whicli had not souglit a control in tlie affairs 

of Egypt, but had been compelled, rather, by the circumstance of 

governmental inheritance to accept what Disraeli bequeathed. 

The note had the eftect of averting for a time the dread of British 

occupation. The feeling of security was still further increased by 

a joint letter addressed to the Khedive by Lord Granville and M. 

Leon Gambetta, who has been called to the presidency of the French 

Cabinet on the 14th of November. Its purpose was less to calm 

the nationalists than to strengthen the Khedive's Government 

against the military party. The letter declared that England and 

France considered the maintenance of the Khedive's power the 

sole guaranty of the present and future welfare of Egypt. 

Soon after this, when all was apparently quiet in Egypt, 

I visited that country. I speak of this in order to quote from 

an article I wrote * describing an interview I was privileged to 

have with the Khedive on the 2d of January, 1882, in which he 

dwelt at some length upon the reforms he was endeavoring to 

introduce. The following quotation will indicate, to a certain 

extent, the Khedive's progressive ideas which we know to-day 

were vainly uttered : 

'• The Khedive desires and is aiming for three great reforms, religions, political and 
educational. On the last he rightly laid the greatest stress. 'For,' said he, 'while the 
people remain ignorant, reform in any direction is impossible ; but let learning be spread 
among the people and throughout the land, and political and religious reform will follow 
as a natural consequence in the path of educational advancement. For this reason,' said 
he, » I am devoting my greatest energies to the spread of learning. The people must 
know more than the Koran ;. they must know geography, and arithmetic, and algebra, and 
the sciences, and the modern languages. All these pursuits and studies are now being 
advanced; schools are being founded in all the large towns of Egypt, both Upper and 
Lower, and now the numbers have increased from the tea or fifteen thousand I found on 
my accession to between eighty and ninety thousand students. My own boys attend the 
common schools; and, though princes to the world, they are there boys with the other 
boys, and stand upon no different footing. Out of my own purse I have given fifteen 
thousand pounds a year to the schools since I came to the throne. Often, too,' he said, 'I 
go to the schools myself, and, if I say anything, I point to the United States for an exam- 
ple. I say that its greatness is due to the education of the people, to their enterprise, to 
their liberty of speech and freedom of thought; and I urge my people to become likewise 
educated, free and great. Another reform that I am about to introduce is the education 
of women. Heretofore they have always been ignorant, more like slaves and animals 
than free women ; but now they, too, shall have their schools, and, being educated, they 
can be better mothers to their sons, the coming children of a new Egypt. Soon, now, one 
of these schools will be opened in Cairo, and I shall send there my own little daughter and 
the daughters of the nobility of Egypt, and then the others will come. The women of 
enlightened countries are on an equal footing with the men, and they must be here also ; 
and, therefore, they must be educated. 

* The Independent, February 2d, 1S82. 



53 

"When travelers come here I do not wish them to look upon us as barbarians, but as 
the most enlightened country of the Orient. We have been barbarous in some things; 
but of these I wish to remove the last vestige, and I have already abolished some of the 
moat atrocious practices of our religion. Last year I put an end to that barbarous cere- 
mony of the Dosseh. Before then it was the custom, when the yearly pilgrims had re- 
turned from Mecca, bearing the holy carpet, to have a great ceremony, most revolting 
and barbarous. One hundred men would lie prostrate at the door of the mosque, with 
head toward Mecca, and over their bodies would ride upon a horse the sheikh of the 
mosque. Always from eighteen to twenty of this hundred were killed under the feet of 
the horse. Europeans used to go in crowds to see this spectacle, and then call it barbar- 
ous. It is true, it was barbarous, and was without authority from the Bible, the Koran, 
or the Prophet ; and so I abolished it. People said a revolution would follow ; but we are 
toetter for the change. 

" Another change that I am working for is to make my people content with one wife. 
I have but one myself, while my predecessor (my father) had many. I set the example I 
wish my people to follow ; for, thank God, I make my own personal desire second to the 
welfare of Egypt and my people. When the people tell me the Koran says a man may 
have four wives, I tell them to read further on in the same book, where it says that the 
man who is content with one wife wUl lead a better, purer, and happier life. As it is now, 
family happiness is impossible. The children of one mother are jealous of those of another, 
and the man cannot be the same husband to four wives that he would be to one. The man 
and woman must be equal, and live their lives for each other and their chUdren. And this, 
I say, is not inconsistent with, but the better interpretation of, our religion. 

" Further, I desire to make my people liberal in regard to religious beliefs and respect- 
ful toward Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans alike. They must not call the Christian the 
Devil, as they have heretofore ; but must respect, if they do not believe. I myself am a 
Mussiriman. I go to the mosque once a week; for, though;my father did not do so before 
me, I, nevertheless, said when I came into power, that I would respect my religion and 
live up to its teachings. But I encourage all religions. Here, in Cairo, I gave land on 
which to build a Protestant mission, where the young might be instructed; also other 
land on which to build a hospital, open to people of all religions ; and just within a few 
days I have given land in Upper Egypt for the erection of another Protestant mission. All 
this I do without changing my own religion or asking others to change theii-s. In fact, 
when a person wrote me the other day that he would like to change his religion for mine, 
I replied : Follow the teachings of your own religion and you will be good without any 
change. It is difficult,' the Khodive went on, with a perceptible sadness in his voice, 
< for me to do all that I would like to, or give my people all that I desire while other 
Powers have their hands in my pockets. Still, I have decreased the royal expenses greatly 
since I ascended the throne. My allowance is half a million dollars, and even out of this 
I give considerable. My father before me spent between ten and fifteen millions yearly 
In supportmg his five or six hundred women and a palace and household tdat rivaled the 
Vatican for size. But I have great hopes for Egypt,' he concluded, ' and shall live and 
work for her prosperity.' " 

It will be admitted that these are views of an enlightened 
ruler, even though subsequent events may have proved him a 
weak one. The Khedive's Prime Minister, Sherif Pasha, said at 
the same time : " Give us time for our reforms ; let us have ten 
years of peaceful toiling, and Europe will be astonished at the 
vitality of a long-suffering nation, at the prosperity and wealth, 
the progress and rapid development of a country so long misgov- 
erned and for ages kept in ignorance and in the bondage of servi- 
3 



- 54 — 

"tude."* But there were so many disturbing elements in the condi- 
tion of affairs in Egypt that the dream of ''years of peaceful toil- 
ing" was as vain as it was impossible of realization. 



CHAPTER V. 

Egypt for the Egyptians. 



On the 4:th of January, 1882, Arabi Bey was taken into the 
Cabinet as Assistant Minister of War. ' Just before this the 
Chamber of Notables, strongly representative of the national 
party, had convened on the summons of Sherif Pasha. Sherif at 
once proposed a Parliamentary reorganization, wishing to intro- 
duce the principle of ministerial responsibility and give the Nota- 
bles full constitutional prerogatives. They were to be no longer 
the mere consultative body that Ismail organized with his false 
show of reform. The Notables had outgrown their former pious 
regard for the will of the Khedive, and were not only willing to 
accept all that Sherif offered, but demanded in addition that the 
budget be submitted to them. This met with a quick opposition 
on the part of the Comptrollers-General. The two Powers vetoed, 
on the 7th of January, the demand for constitutional government. 
Arabi and the Nationalists were incensed. They longed for con- 
stitutional liberty, and knew not that it appears only as the result 
of a slow internal growth, of which the germ had as yet barely 
taken root in Egypt. Outside of the Copts, the Christian Syrians, 
and the merchants of Cairo and Alexandria, there were few men 
in Egypt who had the faintest conception of what was meant by 
constitutional liberty. The Porte, however, not to neglect an op- 
portunity to show its suzerainty, protested against the veto and 
appealed to the other Powers. Gambetta was eager to make the 
most of the complications, and proposed to England that they 
should dispatch a joint expedition to Egypt to re-establish order. 
England refused, and Gambetta's aggressiveness was cut short by 

* Quoted from " The Belgium of the East." p. 138. 



— 55 — 

the defeat of his Ministry. He was succeeded by De Freycinet, 
whose policy was diametrically opposed to Gambetta's. The 
new minister was for non-interference. He replaced the zealous 
De Blignieres by M. Bredif, thus giving England the predomi- 
nance in the control that goes with seniority. 

While now the "Western Powers were occupied with diplomatic 
negotiations with the Porte, the Chamber of Notables submitted 
an alternative to Sharif Pasha : either he must accept their con- 
stitutional demands or resign from the Ministry. He resigned, 
and Mahmud Barudi formed a new cabinet with Arabi Bey as 
Minister of War and Marine. The military party now took the 
lead. Arabi and six other colonels were promoted to the rank of 
^general, with the title of Pasha. Some five hundred promotions 
were made during three months. At the same time many Euro- 
pean clerks were dismissed from their offices. Arabi's popularity, 
meanwhile, was steadily increasing. In April he claimed to have 
discovered a plot to assassinate himself and other generals. Some 
£fty officers, many of them the still unpopular Circassians, and all 
of them believed to be loyal to the Khedive, were arrested and 
iried by court martial, and forty were sentenced to be banished 
ior life to the White Nile — a sentence considered equivalent to 
<3eath. This produced an agitation. The foreign consuls pro- 
tested; the Sultan was fui'ious that the Circassians whom he had 
himself decorated with favors should be thus dishonored ; and 
the Khedive refused to give the sentence his signature. Finally, 
Tiowever, he commuted the sentence to exile from Egypt. But 
this displeased his Nationalist Ministry, who, on the 14th of May. 
convoked the Chamber of Notable^ without the consent of the 
Khedive. The Notables, however, refused to sit. At this juncture 
England and France, who had reconciled their differences, gave 
notice to the Powers that they were about to send a joint fleet to 
Alexandria to uphold the authority of the Khedive and preserve 
the status quo. And the Sultan, who slyly sought to ride on the 
crest of every wave, sent a note to the Egyptian Ministry, chiding 
them for summoning the Chamber unconstitutionally and rebuk- 
ing them for their threat to oppose with force the landing of 
Turkish troops in Egypt. This was considered by the Powers an 
irregular communication on the part of the Porte. But the wily 
Sultan was to be charged with more irregular notes than that. 



— 56 — 

His alleged secret correspondence from this time on is believed to 
have concealed many plots and intrigues. 

On the 20th of May the united English and French squadrons 
appeared in the harbor of Alexandria. Five days later the English 
and French consuls demanded the dismissal of the Ministry and 
the expatriation of Arabi. The ministers forthwith handed in. 
their resignations ; but Arabi declared that he would remain at 
the head of the army. In the meantime the fortifications about 
Alexandria were increased and the harbor was put in a state of 
defense. The guards at Cairo swore to oppose with force any 
foreign intervention ; and the sheikhs and Bedawin of the desert 
promised their support against European, but not against Turkish, 
intervention. Lord Dufferin, the English Ambassador at Con- 
stantinople, naively informed the Sultan that, as the Porte's au- 
thority had never been called into question, it would not be nec- 
essary for Turkish troops to co-operate to quell the fractious 
spirit ; England and France would be quite equal to the task. The 
poor Khedive, from the day he dismissed the Ministry, was beset 
with trials and torments. He could not form a new Ministry, and 
the utmost influence was brought to force him to reinstate Arabi 
as Minister of War. The commanders of the Alexandria fortifica- 
tion said they would obey the orders of no one but Arabi. Nota- 
bles, sheikhs, ulemas, officers, urged and even demanded the rein- 
statement. At Jength Tewfik was forced to give way. The Sul- 
tan telegraphed that he would send a commissioner to Egypt to 
investigate the troubles. France objected strenuously to his com- 
ing, but England and the other Powers thought that he might 
avert the impending danger. England, however, continued to op- 
pose any military expedition from Turkey. De Freycinet felt that 
France had been left in the liu'ch and proposed that a conference 
of all the Powers be held at Constantinople to settle the Egyptian 
question definitely. But in the meantime the Sultan had dis- 
patched Dervish Pasha to Egypt to lend support, as he announced, 
to the Khedive. 

The commissioner arrived on the 8th of June. His presence 
had no quieting effect. Arabi was the only Minister who had 
been appointed ; and he was, in fact, the hero and the autocrat of 
the hour. But, through the influence of Dervish, a ministry was 
formed favorable to the Khedive, with Ragheb as President. It 



— 57 — 

was, l^wever, powerless to still the tumult of passion that had 
been aroused in Egypt during the past few months. Hatred of 
the Christians was shouted through the streets.* The people 
who had cowered before the kurbash during all the woes of Is- 
mail's reign, who had seen the wealth of the Nile valley melt away 
before their eyes year after year, who had abjectly begged for 
baclcsheesh from every stranger in their land, now sprung to a po- 
sition of independence and defiance. Fanaticism was burning 
to its utmost intensity. It became a flame of fury on the llth of 
June, in the massacre at Alexandria. 

Just what the immediate cause of that outbreak was, is a dis- 
puted point. It is claimed, on the one hand, that it began by a 
Maltese stabbing an Arab ; and, on the other, that the massacre 
was preconcerted, being countenanced by Arabi himself. Colonel 
Long, who was in Cairo at the time, saysf that a secret council 
was held in that city on the evening before the massacre, which 
Arabi and several of the notables attended. One of the number, 
who had openly preached the duty of massacre in the raosques of 
Alexandria, arrived in that city before the hour of the slaughter. 
The troops at Alexandria, who had proclaimed that they would 
obey the orders of no one but Arabi, turned their bayonets against 
the Europeans and aided the Arabs in the massacre. The police 
joined the same mad throng. These facts would seem to point to- 
ward complicity on the part of Arabi. The massacre was as horrible in 
its way as the massacre of the Memluks in 1811, or the Syrian 
massacre of 1860. The Oriental is frenzied at the sight of blood, 
and impelled to the most atrocious crimes. His fury does not 
spend itself ; it is only checked when the opportunity of blood- 
shed is exhausted or some force interposed. The Maltese, the 
Greeks, and other Europeans banded together, and offered, at 
last, an effectual resistance ; but not before about a hundred of 
their number had been butchered, and some five hundred Arabs 
had been killed. 

Abuse was heaped upon the English and French Admirals, who 
had offered no assistance to the Europeans of Alexandria, although 
they had witnessed the outrages and had sufficient force on the 
ships, within sight, to quell the disturbance. Their boats were 

'"The Three Prophets." By Col. C. Chaille Long. Page 119. 
nbU. Page 120. 



— 58 — 

ready to land tlie marines, but the Admirals could not act with- 
out orders from their Governments. So they said, at least ; but 
they might as well have claimed that they should not take in sail 
at the approach of a hurricane except by governmental sanction. 
As Colonel Long says :* " It is difficult to understand the hesitan- 
cy of an officer to assume responsibility, however great, in the 
presence of a great crime like this committed against humanity." 

The massacre created, naturally, a panic among the Europeans 
in Egypt. They fled from Cairo to Alexandria, and from Alexan- 
dria they took passage in any craft that would bear them from the 
scene of crime and the seat of danger. It was a stampede for 
life, with no thought of the property forsaken. The Khedive, on 
the 13th of June, accompanied by Dervish Pasha, went to Alexan- 
dria to endeavor to restore quiet by his presence. He formed a 
new Ministry at the dictation of the German and Austrian Con- 
suls on the 16th, giving Arabi his old place as Minister of War, 
and retaining Ragheb as President of the Council. But England 
and France refused to recognize the Ministry. The Khedive was 
in despair. His departure from Cairo had left Arabi the virtual 
ruler there. The latter was at the high tide of his power. The 
Sultan, immediately after the massacre, had conferred a great 
honor upon him by investing him with the order of the Medjidieh. 
Dervish Pasha, the Sultan's representative, was believed to be 
working in his behalf, and to be fomenting rebellion. Arabi said 
himself when, nJonths later, his power was gone : " The Sultan, 
the real sovereign of this country, also sided with us, and loaded 
us with marks of his approbation. His representative concurred 
in our resistance, and his trusted officers exhorted us to defend 
the country from what they termed the rapacity of England. 
The opening acts of the war were carried on in his name."! So 
far back as February the Chaplain to the Sultan had written to 
Arabi : "In a special and secret manner I may tell you that the 

Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim, or Tewfik 

His Majesty has expressed his full confidence in you.":}: During 
the flight of Europeans, Arabi was sounding his cry of " Egypt 

*" The Three Prophets." Page 129. 

t" Instructions to My Counsel." The Nineteenth Century. December, 1S82. By Ahmed 
Arabi. 

JQuoted from Arabi's papers in Broadley's "How We Defended Arabi." Pages 169 
and 170. 



— 59 — 

for the Egyptians," and was exercising the utmost activity possi- 
ble in military preparations. The warlike spirit had spread 
throughout the country, and recruits and money were pouring in. 
Work on the fortifications at Alexandria was pushed with renewed 
vigor. 

Meanwhile the Conference of Powers had met at Constantino- 
ple on June 23d; but nothing had been accomplished. The 
Porte would not commit itself to policy or to action. It is proba- 
ble, however, that it contemplated the restoration of all its old power 
in Egypt. England, at all events, feared this. The possibility of 
such a thing was a menace to the Indian Empire. While, therefore, 
the Conference was slowly seeking a solution of difficulties, Eng- 
land resolved to take decisive action ; not so much, as has been 
held by some, to mete out punishment for the Alexandrian massa- 
cre as to protect her interests in Egypt and the farther East. 
But, whatever her motives, she acted in the service of the world's 
civilization when she set her face against the Sultan's restoration 
of power in Egypt. 

On the 6th of July, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, the Admiral of 
the British fleet, at Alexandria, protested against the continued 
work on the fortifications about the harbor, and announced to the 
military governor, Tulba, that, unless the work ceased, he would 
open fire upon the fortresses. Tulba replied that the Admij;al's 
assertions as to the work of fortifying were unfounded. But elec- 
tric lights from the British vessels discovered the Egyptian sol- 
diers hard at work by night. On the 10th, Admiral Seymour sent 
a second message : "I shall carry out the intention expressed to 
you in my letter of the 6th inst., at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th 
inst., unless, previous to that hour, you shall have^temporarily sur- 
rendered to me, for the pvirpose of disarming the batteries on the 
isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbor of 
Alexandria." The Khedive's Prime Minister replied to this, re- 
fusing to comply with the Admiral's demands, whereupon the lat- 
ter sent a brief message containing the implication that his threat 
would be carried out. These messages had not been exchanged 
without creating great alarm among the Exiropeans who still 
remained in Egypt. The Consuls appealed to the Admiral for 
delay and sought to mediate, and the Porte, through its London 
Ambassador, demanded that the bombardment be interdicted ; 



— 60 — 

but the Admiral's determination remained unaltered. Endeavors 
were now made to put all remaining foreigners on shipboard. 
Many had lingered in Cairo, loth to leave their posts or their 
property. The notice given them was short — so short that 
Admiral Seymour has been bitterly blamed for his haste.* 
The impending bombardment, it was known, would be avenged on 
any unfortunate foreigners who might thereafter fall into Arab 
hands. 

Late on the afternoon of July 10th, all the vessels in the Alex- 
andrian harbor, except the British fleet, weighed anchor, and 
passed out to sea, their decks swarming with refugees of many 
nationalities. The French fleet was among the departing ships. 
If a Gambetta had been Premier of the French Government, 
Admiral Conrad would have remained. He would have insisted 
upon joint action or joint inaction. But De Freycinet was weak. 
After seeing the disfavor with which France had suflered interven- 
tion in Tunis, he feared to sanction intervention in Egypt. And 
so Admiral Conrad and his fleet sailed avs^ay; and France, as the 
sequel has shown, passed from a controlling power in Egypt. 

The story, from a military point of view, of the bombardment 
of Alexandria, is best told from the official reportsf of Admiral 
Seymour. He wrote the following from his flagship Tnvincihle, 
on the 20th of July: 

" At 7 A.M., on the llth, I signaled from tie Invincible to the Alexandria to fire a shell 
into the recently armed earthworks, termed the Hospital Battery, and followed this by a 
general signal to the fleet, 'Attack the enemy's batteries ! ' when immediate action ensued 
between all the ships in the positions assigned to them, and the whole of the forts com- 
manding the entrance to the harbor of Alexandria. A steady flre was maintained on all 
sides until 10:30 a.m., when the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandria, which had been hitherto 
under way, anchored off the Light-House Port, and by their well-directed fire, assisted by 
that of the Inflexible, which weighed and joined them at 12:30 p.m., succeeded in silencing 
most of the guns in the forts on Eas-el-Tin ; still some heavy guns in Port Ada kept up a 
desultory flre. About 1:30 p.m., a shell from the Superb, whose practice in the afternoon 
was very good, blew up the magazine, and caused the retreat of the remaining garrison. 
These ships then directed their attention to Port Pharos, which was silenced with the as- 
sistance of the Temeraire, which joined them at 2:30 p.m., when a shot from the Inflexible 
dismounted one of the heavy guns. The Hospital Battery was well fought throughout ; and, 
although silenced for a time by a shell from the Inflexible, it was not until 5 p.m. that the 

* Vide Introduction to " Panny Stone's Diary," by Stone Pasha, in The Century Maga- 
zine for June, 1884. 

t These official reports, as well as detailed descriptions of the defenses of Alexandria 
and of the attacking fleet, and statements of the effect of the flght upon ships and fortifica- 
tions, are given by Lieut.-Commander Casper P. Goodrich, of the U. S. Navy, in his 
" Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt." 



— 61 — 

artillerymen were compelled to retire from their guns by the Are of the off-shore squadron 
and the Inflexible. The Invincible, with my flag, supported by the Penelope, both ships be- 
ing at anchor, the latter on one occasion shifting berth, and assisted by the Jl/onarc/t, under 
way inside the reefs, as well as by the Inflexible and Temeraire in the Boghaz and Corvette 
Channels, succeeded, after an engagement of some hours, in silencing and partially 
destroying the batteries and lines of Mex. Fort Marsa-el-Khanat was destroyed by the ex- 
plosion of the magazine after half an hour's action with the Monarch. 

" About 2 P.M., seeing that the gunners of the western lower battery of Mex had aban- 
doned their guns, and that the supports had probably retired to the citadel, I called in the 
gun-vessels and gnn-bcats, and under cover of their Are landed a party of twelve volun- 
teers, under the command of Lieut. B. E. Bradford, of the Invincible, accompanidd by 
Lieut. Richard Poore, of that ship, . . . [and three others] . . . who got on shore 
through the surf, and destroyed, with charges of gun-cotton, two 10-inch M. L. E. guns, 
and spiked six smooth-bore guns in the right-hand water battery at Mex, and returned 
without a casualty beyond the loss of one of their boats {Bittern's diugy) on the roots. 
This was a hazardous operation very well carried out. Previous to this, after the action 
Tiad become general. Commander Lord Charles Beresf ord, of the Condor, stationed as re- 
peatmg ship, seeing the accuracy with which two 10-inch rifled guns in Fort Marabout 
were playing upon the ships engaged off Fort Mex, steamed up to within range of his 7-inch 
90 cwt. gun, and by his excellent practice soon drew off the fire. I then ordered him to be 
supported by the Beacon, Bittern, Cygnet, and Decoy, the Cygnet having been engaged with 
the Eas-el-Tin forts during the early part of the day. I am happy to say, during the action, 
no casualties happened to those vessels, owing, in a great measure, to the able manner in 
which they were maneuvered, and their light draught enabling them to take up their posi- 
tions on the weakest point of the batteries. The action generally terminated successfully 
at 5:30 P.M., when the ships anchored for the night. 

" The force opposed to us would have been more formidable had every gun mounted 
on the line of works been brought into action ; but in the Eas-el-Tin batteries, few of the 
large smooth-bores, and fewer still of the French 36-pounders, bought in the time of Mehemet 
Ali, were manned, the Egyptians preferring to use the English 10-inch, 9-inch, S-inch, and 
smaller muzzle-loading rifled guns. These guns are precisely the same as those which her 
Majesty's ships carry, and no better muzzle-loading guns can be found. They were 
abundantly, even lavishly, supplied with projectiles of the latest description, chilled shot, 
and the sighting of the guns was excellent. The same may be said of the guns in the Mex 
Lines, excepting that in them the 36-pounders were more used, and that one, if not two, 
15-inch smooth-bores were brought into action, in addition to the 10- inch, 9- inch, and 
smaller M. L. E. guns fired. Fort Jlarabout brought two 10-inch M. L. E. guns into action 
at long range, shell after shell of which came up toward the in-shore squadron in an ex- 
cellent line, falling from ten to thirty yards short. Not one shell from the guns in the 
southern batteries burst on board her Majesty's ships during the day." 

Though the Arabs' shells failed, their other shot took effect. 
The Alexandra was struck twenty-five times, and the Invincible 
was pierced by six shots. The shells from the ships burst, maiiy 
of them, over or in the city, destroying much property. The Eng- 
lish loss for the day was six killed and twenty.seven wounded. 
The Arab loss was much greater. At least one hundred and fifty 
men in the forts were killed ; but trustworthy information as to 
their casualties is wanting. The Arabs stood by their guns with 
an undreamed-of courage ; for the forts were not silenced till 
the gunners had been killed. On the 12th of July the firing was 
resumed. Admiral Seymour said, in his dispatch : 



— 62 — 

" On the morning of the 12tli 1 ordered the Temeraire and Inflexible to engage Fort 
Pharos, and after two or three shots had been flred a flag of truce was hoisted on Fort 
Kas-el-Tin, and I then sent my flag lieutenant, the Honorable Hedworth Lambton, in to 
discover the reason, and, from his report, there is no doubt it was simply a ruse to gain 
time ; and, as negotiations failed, my demand being to surrender the batteries command- 
ing the Boghaz Channel, one shot was flred into the Mex Barracks Battery earthwork, 
when a flag of truce was again hoisted. I then sent Lieutenant and Commander Morri- 
son into the harbor, in the Helicon, and on his going on board the Kh6dive's yacht, the 
Itahrussa, he found she had been deserted, and he reported, on his return after dark, his. 
belief that the town had been evacuated." 

Such, indeed, was the fact. Arabi had gone, but the Khedive 
had remained. The Khedive had presided at a Cabinet Council, held 
at Ras-el-Tin, on the morning of the 10th, and had given his sanc- 
tion to the proposed defense of the city. That evening, accom- 
panied by Dervish Pasha, and his immediate household, he retired 
to the palace of Ramleb, where he remained during the bombard- 
ment. On the afternoon of the 12th he sent to Admiral Seymoui', 
imploring his protection. Arabi claimed that by this act the Khe- 
dive basely deserted his people. But Tewfik feared for his life. A 
band of soldiers had sought entrance to the palace, asserting that 
they had Arabi's instructions to murder the Khedive. Arabi is 
said to have countermanded this order, and to have stationed a. 
guard about the palace, when he determined to evacuate the city. 
Another story states that Tewfik bought his life with bribes and 
orders of distinction. At all events the trembling Tewfik re- 
mained at Ramleh while Arabi withdrew his forces and his follow- 
* 

ers along the Mahmudieh Canal. 

And now the fair city of Alexandria became such a scene of 
pillage, massacre, and wanton destruction as to make the world 
shudder. It was the old tale of horrors. Houses were plun- 
dered and burned; the European quarter, including the state- 
ly buildings surrounding the Great Square of Mehemet 
Ali, was sacked, and left a heap of smoldering ruins ; and 
more than two thousand Europeans, for the most part 
Levantines, were massacred with all the cruelty of oriental 
fanaticism. This was on the afternoon of the 12th. It was 
the second massacre that had occurred under the very eyes of 
the British fleet. The Admiral's failure to prevent it has been 
called unfortunate by some, and criminal by others. It seems 
to have been wholly without excuse. The most plausible pallia- 



— 63 — 

tion of the neglect is found in Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich's 
" Keport," but even that carries its blame. He sajs :* 

" A few hundred men comld have seized and held the place on July 12th, so great was 
the fear on the part of the Egyptians, both soldiers and citizens, caused by the bombard- 
ment—a fear not known, at the time, to the British Commander-in-chief. In consequence 
of the lack of information, this memorable battle was followed by one of the most shock- 
ing, wanton, and deplorable catastrophes of the century," 

The blue-jackets were landed on the 13 bh, and cleared the way 
before them with a Gatling gun. The next day, more ships having 
arrived, a sufficient force was landed to take possession of the en- 
tii-e city. The Khedive was escorted back to Ras-el-Tin from 
Ramleh, and given a strong guard. Summary justice was dealt 
out to all hostile Arabs who had been captared in the city. In 
short, English intervention was followed by English occupation. 

The bombardment of Alexandria had defined clearly the re- 
spective positions of Arabi and the Khedive toward Egypt and the 
Egyptian people. The soldiers and the sympathy of the land were 
with Arabi. His cry was, " Egypt for the Egyptians," and these 
words embodied everything that was held dear and sacred by the 
people. The Khedive was not only weak in the eyes of his people, 
but he was regarded as the tool of England. He had deserted his 
soldiers and fallen on his knees to beg the protection of unbe- 
liever s. From the moment the first shot was fired upon Alexan- 
dria Arabi was the real raler of the people. But England could 
never suffer Egypt to exist solely " for the Egyptians." With 
France she had placed Tewfik on the throne to protect the inter- 
ests of her bondholders, and to secure her power in and over the 
country along side of which flowed the chiefest artery of her com- 
mercial life. Her duty and her interest compelled the re-estab- 
lishment of Tewfik's power. He was the nominal ruler, and must 
onee more be made so in fact. If Arabi refused to end his prepa- 
rations for war at the bidding of the Khedive, and persisted in op- 
posing the defenders of the Khedive, then he was a rebel and the 
leader of rebellion, and he must be compelled by force to submit. 
Such was the reasoning that led England to play the role of the 
Khedive's defender, and to prepare for a war in Egypt. 

The Conference at Constantinople was stirred by the news of 

• Page 75. 



— 64 

the bombardment of Alexandria. It presented a note to tlie Porte, 
on the 15th of July, requesting the dispatch of Turkish troops to 
restore the status quo in Egypt. But the Sultan had no idea of 
taking the part of the Christian in what all Islam regarded as a 
contest between the Moslem and the unbeliever. Arabi had called 
himself the defender of the faith. He and his followers were the 
soldiers of the Prophet. The ulemas and dignitaries of the mosques 
of Stambul advised the Sultan not to risk his Caliphate by oppos- 
ing the heroes of the Mohammedan faith. And so Abdul-Hamid 
deliberated and delayed. France was uneasy at the prospect of 
war, and Gambetta, now the leader of the opposition, was furious 
at the prospect of being out of the row. He appealed to the 
Prench Chamber to insist upon dual intervention, but in vain- 
Eve a the timid De Preycinet went farther than the Chamber would 
sanction. He proposed to confine operations to the protection of 
the Saez Canal, and applied for a supplementary credit in order 
to undertake the necessary military preparations. But the credit 
was denied, and he resigned on the 24th of July. A ministry with 
a policy of positive inactivity was formed by M. Duclerc. Con- 
trasted to the strange inertness of Prance was the attempt at in- 
terference on the part of Russia, Austria, and Italy. Eussia would 
have given Egypt to England if she could have won the Bosphorus 
as an offset ; but Prince Bismarck did not approve the contem- 
plated annexation by Russia, and his power over Austria and Italy 
was such as to «nable him to frustrate the plan. The Sultan ap- 
pealed to Bismarck to support the Porte against England as well ; 
but this the German chancellor declined to do, telling the Sultan 
that he must yield to the inevitable in Egypt. And thus the 
diplomatic contest was left to the chief combatants, England and 
Turkey. 

In Egypt, the Khedive had been prevailed upon, after some 
demur, to proclaim Arabi a rebel and discharge him from his 
Cabinet. Arabi had issued a counter-proclamation, on the same 
day, declaring Tewfik a traitor to his people and his religion. 
Having received the news of the Khedive's proclamation, Lord 
Dufferin, the British ambassador at Constantinople, announced to 
the Conference that England wa^ about to send an expedition to 
Egypt to suppress the rebellion and to restore the authority of the 
Khedive. Thereupon the Sultan declared that he had decided to 



— 65 — 

send a Turkish expedition. Lord Dufierin feigned to accept the 
Sultan's co-operation, but demanded that the Porte, as a pre- 
liminary step, should declare Arabi a rebel. Again the Sultan was 
confronted with the danger of incurring the wrath of the Moslem 
world. He could not declare Arabi a rebel. He was manifestly 
in an uncomfortable position. His sympathies were with Arabi. 
But if he fought he must fight against him ; for he could not op- 
pose England ; and if he kept out of the fray he must suffer the 
humiliation of seeing a foreign force settle the affairs of his suze- 
rainty. He was between two fires. In his desperation he sent a 
force of three thousand men to Suda Bay with orders to hold them- 
selves in readiness to enter Egypt at a moment's notice. Lord 
Dufferin now submitted a proposal for co-operation, naming the 
following conditions : 

" 1. Ttat the Turkish contingent sliould be restricted to 5,000 men. 2. That it should 
land at Abukir, Damietta, or Rosetta. 3. That its movements and operations should be 
regulated by a previous agreement between the English and Turkish commanders. 4. 
That a Turkish military commissioner should be attached to the English headquarters 
and an English commissioner to the Turkish headquarters ; and, 5. That the English and 
Turkish troops should evacuate Egypt simultaneously."* 

The representatives of the Porte in the Conference would not 
accept these conditions, wishing any Turkish expedition to act in- 
dependently of England. In the meantime, however, the English 
expedition had arrived in Egypt, and was proceeding to crush the 
rebellion, regardless of the diplomatic delays and bickerings at 
Constantinople . 



CHAPTER VI. 

Arabi's Rebellion, and the Reforms that Followed. 

For a month after the bombardment, the British army at 
Alexandria was satisfied simply to hold its position. Lieutenant- 
Commander Goodrich describes the role it played during this 
time as " of a negative character, in the main consisting in an 
efficient if passive defense of the city against the Egyptians en- 
camped and intrenched at King Osman and Kafr Dowar."t Several 

* Quoted from Appleton's Annual Cyclopcedia, for 1882, p. 250. 
t" Report," p. 8T. 



— 66 — 

sorties, however, were made on the armed railway trains ; but 
there was scarcely an engagement worthy the name. On the 21st 
of July an army corps, under the command of General Sir Garnet 
Wolseley, had been ordered to Egypt, and pending his arrival the 
army of occupation preserved, for the most j)art, an attitude of 
defense, though making an occasional reconnoissance. On the 28th 
of July the British Parliament formally recognized the prepara- 
tions for war by a vote of two million three hundred thousand 
pounds for the expense of the expedition. It was not until the 
15th of August that Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived with his force* 
in Egypt. The English at that time held only two points, Alex- 
andria and Suez, while the entire Egyptian interior, as well as 
Port Said and Ismailia, were held by Arabi, whose force, it was 
estimated, now amounted to about 70,000 men, of whom at least 
50,000 were regulars. 

The objective point of General Wolseley's expedition to crush 
Arabi, was, of course, the city of Cairo. There were two ways of 
approaching that city, one from Alexandria, through the Delta, 
and the other from the Suez Canal. There were many objections 
to the former route. The Delta was intersected by a net-work of 
canals, dikes, ditches, and railways, all of which were in Arabi's 
hands, and made the region easily defensible. la fact, the banks 
of the canals and dikes were natural fortifications as they stood. 
On the other hand, the way from Ismailia, the central station of 
the Suez Cana?, to Cairo, was along an unobstructed and single 
railway route. Then, too, the desert by the latter route was com- 
paratively free from the pestilential^diseases of the Delta. Owing 
to the Sweet Water Canal, the question of water presented no 
difficulties. There was, however, an obstacle to the choice of 
Ismailia as a base of operations ; but it was a piu*ely moral one, 
and was easily overcome, or, rather, disregarded. The Suez Canal 
was supposed to be neutral water. Count Ferdinand De Lesseps, 
the President of the Suez Canal Company, assiu'ed Arabi, whom 
he met at Ismailia, after the opening of hostilities, that England 
would so regard it, and thus prevented Arabi from establishing 

* Lieutenant-Commander Goodricli (" Report," p. 104) gives the following totals of tlie 
principal corps under General Wolseley's command: Infantry, 15,642 (officers and men) ; 
cavalry, 2,304; artillery, including siege trains, 2,435; engineers, 1,161; commissariat 
and transport coii)S, 1,298 ; army hospital corps, 313 ; army medical department, 429. The 
Indian contingent brought the total number of men up to about 35,000. 



— 67 — 

Egyptian fortifications along the canal. But England felt no 
obligation to recognize any neutrality. De Freycinet's scheme to 
enforce the neutrality had cost him his premiership, and there was 
little force in the orders and threats of the President of the Canal 
Company. England, therefore, consulted simply her own inter- 
ests, acting upon the principle, which is doubtless sound, and will 
b)e so long as might makes right, that "the neutrality of any canal 
joining the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans will be main- 
tained, if at all, by the nation which can place and keep the strong- 
est ships at each extremity."* In other words. General Wolseley de- 
cided to enter Cairo by way of the Suez Canal and IsmaUia. 

But he kept his plan a profound secret. Admiral Seymour 
alone knew his purpose. On the 18th of August, all the orders for 
an attack on Abukir, where Arabi's force was concentrated, were 
issued, and concerning this plan rumors were purposely allowed 
to reach the newspaper correspondents. On the 19th, the tran- 
sports moved eastward from Alexandria, >as if to attack Abukir : 
but under the cover of darkness that night, they were escorted on 
to Port Said, where they learned that the entire canal, owing to 
the preconcerted action of Admiral Seymour, was in the hands of 
the British. On the 21st, the troops met Sir Henry McPherson's 
Indian contingent at Ismailia. Two days were now consumed in 
rest and jJi^eparation. The Egyptians had cut off the water sujd- 
ply, which came from the delta by the Sweet "Water Canal, by dam- 
ming the canal. A sortie to secure possession of the dam was 
therefore deemed necessary, and was successfully made on the 
24th. Fiu'ther advances were made, and on the 26th, Hassassin, 
a station of some importance on the canal and railway, was occu- 
pied. Here the British force was obliged to delay for two weeks, 
while organizing a hospital and a transport service. This gave 
Aiabi opportunity to concentrate his forces at Zagazig and 
Tel-el-Kebir. But he knew that it was for his interest to strike at 
once before the British transports could come up with the advance. 
He, therefore, made two attempts, one on August 28th, and the 
other, on September 9th, to regain the position lost at Hassassin. 
But he failed! in both, though inflicting some loss upon his oppo- 
nents. 

*Stated thus in Goodrich's " Report," p. 125. 

tArabi could not recognize defeat. His dispatches to the Ministry of War at Cairo 
concerning the engagement of September 9th, are, to say the least, amusing. In one he 



— 68 — 

On tlie 12tli of September preparations were made by General 
Wolseley for a decisive battle. He had become convinced* from 
daily reconnoissance and from the view obtained in the engage- 
ment of September 9th, that the fortifications at Tel-el-Kebir 
were both extensive and formidable. Against an enemy so strong- 
ly intrenched, and whose force consisted of about 38,000 men and 
fifty-nine siege-guns, it would have been folly to advance across 
an open desert ; and it was therefore decided to make the approach 
under cover of darkness. All possible precautions were taken to 
guard against alarm. Bugle calls and fires were prohibited after 
nightfall, and strict silence was enjoined. The camp was struck 
as noiselessly as possible, and at 1:30 on the morning of the 13th 
General Wolseley gave the order for the advance, his force con- 
sisting of about 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalrymen, and sixty field 
guns. They had only the stars to guide them ; but, so accurately 
v/as the movement conducted, that the leading brigades of each 
division reached the enemy's outposts within two minutes of each 
other. " The enemy," says General Wolseley,! " were completely 
surprised, and it was not until one or two of their advanced sen- 
tries fired their rifles that they realized our close proximity to 
their works. These were, however, very quickly lined with infan- 

said (wide Goodricti's "Report," p. 144): "At sunrise the enemy came out with infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery, and firing began, and continued on both sides for about an hour. 
Then the Arabs charged like lions, displaying a courage and bravery which enabled them 
to drive back the inemy, who were much more numerous than ourselves. Then they 
followed the enemy, driving them until they had killed about 100 of them [the British 
offlcialreport says two], and dispersed the rest, driving them back into their tents. The 
Arabs captured their oxen, about 500 meters of torpedo- wire, and other military stores, and 
then returned to their posts victorious. This engagement, including the attack and the 
pursuit, lasted about six hours. , . . Thanks be to God, not one of the Arabs nor of the 
soldiers was wounded. Give this news to those under your administrat'on." Three days- 
after, he sent another dispatch, with a different statement as to casualties : " I give you 
good news, which will cause you joy, and will delight each individual of the people — 
namely, that the engagement of Saturday (9th of September) was the most serious battle 
that has yet taken place between us and the English ; for the force of both armies was very 
great, and the fighting lasted for twelve hours, with impetuosity and daring, while the 
cannonade and the discharge of musketry were unceasing, poiuring down like rain on the 
field of battle. Still, we lost only thirty-one men, martyrized, and 150 were slightly, not 
dangerously, wounded, according to the ofllcial returns presented by the various regiments,, 
witn gi-eat exactness and precision. It had been thought that our casualties would have 
been double that number, owing to the seriousness of the engagement and its long dura- 
tion. Moreover, from true observation, it has been proved to us that the number of the 
enemy killed and remaining on the field of battle is about 2,500, and their carts were in- 
sufficient for carrying off the wounded," etc. 

* Vide his official report of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, dated Cairo, September 16th, 18S2. 

t/6id. 



— 69 — 

try, who opened a deafening musketry fire, and tlieir guns came 
into action immediately. Our troops advanced steadily without 
firing a shot, in obedience to the orders they had received ; and, 
when close to the works, went straight for them, charging with a 
ringing cheer." The intrenchents were not carried without a se- 
vere struggle. The Egyptians fought with a desperate coirrage, 
and hundreds of them were bayoneted at their posts. " More in- 
telligence," declares Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich,* " and less 
downright cowardice in the upper grades might have converted 
these men into a formidable army." But what could the rank and 
file accomplish when " each officer knew that he would run, but 
hoped his neighbor would stay."t At the first shot Arabi and his 
second in command took horse and galloped to Belbeis, where 
they caught a train for Cairo. Most of the other officers, as the 
reports of killed and wounded show, did the same. 

The Egyptians fired their first shot at 4:55 A. m., and at 6:45 
the English had possession of Arabi's headquarters and the canal 
bridge. The British loss was fifty-seven killed, 380 wounded, and 
twenty-two missing. The Egyptian army left about 2,000 of their 
number dead in the fortifications. There is no report of the 
wounded ; but they probably were not proportionate to the num- 
ber killed ; for, if rumor is to be trusted, the wounded were not 
spared by the British saber and bayonet. There was, however, 
some excuse for the alleged cruelty on the part of the attacking 
troojjs. An Egyptian, like the wild beast of the jungle, gets an 
added ferocity and desperation with each wound. " So many 
cases are authenticated," says Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich,:}: 
of the virulence displayed by the Egyptian wounded, that it is 
demonstrated, beyond question, that many of these fellows not 
only shot at the stretchermen engaged in carrying off the injured, 
but, in some cases, actually killed the very Englishmen who had 
stopped to give them water or to bind their wounds." The same 
author makes the following observations upon the battle from a 
military point of view:§ 

" In view of the decisiveness of tbe victory, comment appears unnecessary. It may be 
alleged that the mode of attack adopted was hazardous to the degree of imprudence ; that 

*Keport. Page 15T. 

■\ldem. 

tldcm, 

iTdem. Page 158. 



— 70 — 

no commander would dare to employ sucli tactics on European territory; that a niglit 
marcli of nine miles could only be followed by a properly disposed and immediate assault 
under circumstances so exceptional as to be providential. It must, however, be remem- 
bered that General Wnlseley understood his enemy, knew his military habits and numbers, 
as well as the ground intervening ; had a fairly good idea of his intrenchments, a just 
appreciation of his morale, a strong conviction as to the proper manner of engaging him, 
anfi confidence in the officers and men of his own command. What he would have done 
had the enemy been of a different character, is another question, whose consideration does 
not come within the province of this report. It seems a sufficient answer to such criticisms 
as are briefly referreci to above, to remark that the means were adjusted to the end to be 
reached, and that the justification (if any be needed) of the risks incurred lies in the suc- 
cess which attended them — a success as rare as it was complete." 

A proof of the completeness of the success was the entire dissipa- 
tion of Arabi's army. Groups of soldiers, it is true, were scattered 
to different parts of Egypt ; but the army organization was com- 
pletely broken up with the battle of Tel-el- Kebir. 

The movements that followed the decisive victory were promptly 
begun and most effectively executed. The best account is given 
in the words of General Wolaeley's dispatch of September 16th : 

" The enemy were pursued to Zagazig, twenty-five miles from our camp at Hassassin 
by the Indian Contingent, the leading detachment of which reached that place, under 
Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V. C, a little after 4 p.m., and by the cavalry division, 
under General Lowe, to Belbeis, which was occupied in the evening. Major-General Lowe 
was ordered to push on with all possible speed to Cairo, as I was most anxious to save 
that city from the fate which befell Alexandria in July last. 

" These orders were ably carried out, General Lowe reaching the great barracks of 
Abbassieh, just outside of Cairo, at 4:45 P.M., on the 14th instant. The cavalry marched 
sixty-five miles in these two days. The garrison of about 10,000 men, summoned by 
Lieutenant-Colonel H, Stewart, assistant adjutant-general to the cavalry division, to sur- 
render, laid down their arms, and our troops took possession of the citadel. A message 
was sent to Arabi Pasha through the prefect of the city, calling upon him to surrender 
forthwith, which he«did unconditionally. He was accompanied by Tulba Pasha, who was 
also one of the leading rebels in arms against the Khedive. 

" The Guards, under Ms Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, reached Cairo early 
on the 15th instant." 

"With an energy, as remarkable as it was praiseworthy, General 
Wolseley prevented the war ending with horrors * like those with 
which it began. Axabi's revenge was forestalled by that rapid 
desert journey. Before leaving England, Wolseley had predicted 
that he would enter Cairo on the 16th of September ; but with 

* The death of the eminent Oriental scholar. Professor Palmer, which occurred on 
August 12th, 1882, was one of the horrible tragedies for which the Egyptian war was 
responsible. Justin McCarthy (in " England under Gladstone," Chap. XIII.) makes the 
following reference to the loss the world sustained in his death. "Professor Edward 
Palmer was one of those rare men who possess what appears to be an almost incredible 
facility for learning languages. He was well-nigh the ideal scholar, devoted to learning 
lor learning's sake, yet never tainted by the faintest tinge of pedantry, pride, or afl'ecta- 
tion. The story of his life has been told by his close friend, attached admirer, and liter- 
ary colleague, the well-known novelist, Mr. Walter Besant. It is a touching and a thrill- 
ing record of marvelous accomplishments, of brilliant performance, of patient, determined 



— 71 — 

still a day to spare the feat was accomplislied, and Arabi's Rebel- 
lion was completely crushed. 

England now stood alone. The victory had been won without 
the aid of France or the intervention of Turkey. In Constantino- 
ple negotiations regarding Turkish expeditions were still pending 
when Lord Dufierin received the news of AVolseley's success, and 
announced to the Porte that there was now no^^need of a Turkish 
force in Egypt, as the war was ended. France at once prepared 
to resume her share in the control ; but England, having borne the 
sole responsibility of the war, did not propose now to share the 
influence her success had given her. And it was for the interest of 
Egypt that she should not. As in the campaign just ended, 
England had been able to achieve a quicker and more effectual 
success alone than would have been possible with a joint com- 
mand of jealous powers, so now, peace having been restored, a 
single supervision and direction promised a steadfastness to the 
Government that could not have been effected under a re-establish- 
ment of the joint control. AVhile there was a general agreement in 
England as to what other powers should not do, there was a wide 
difference of opinion as to the individual course to be pursued by 
the British Government. Lord Derby, who became Colonial Sec- 
retary soon after the end of the war, was in favor of withdrawing 
from Egypt altogether, and leaving the country to "stew in her 
own juice" ; but the judgment that declared that anarchy in Egypt 
would mean injury to the world, prevailed. Egypt could not 
stand alone ; and Anglo-Saxon support, with its civilizing influ- 
ences, was the best to be found. 

struggle toward success, of success achieved, of honors won, of flim friendship, and a 
peaceful, happy home — and all ended by a sudden, terrible death in the Wady Sudr. In 
the summer of 1SS2, Professor Palmer agreed to go out for the Government to Egypt to 
prevent any alliance between Arabi and the Bedawin tribes of the desert. It seems 
strange that so precious a life should have been risked on such an errand, though Profes- 
sor Palmer's knowledge of the languages of the East was proverbial. It is not very sur- 
prising that, when he and his party were captured by hostile Arabs, their doom should be 
death. It is certain that short work would have been made of any emissary from Arabi 
who was caught attempting to interfere with the relations existing between some Eng- 
lish General and, say, an Indian regiment. We shall, perhaps, never exactly know the 
story of the tragedy near Nakl. It is certain, however, that Palmer and his companions, 
were caaptured through the treachery of the Sheikh Meter Sofieh, who was their guide, and 
that Palmer, Captain Gill, and Lieutenant Charrington were shot. Some thii'teen of the 
Arabs of the tribe that killed Palmer and his companions were afterward captured, brought 
to trial, and Ave of them were hanged at Zagazig on February 28tti, 18S3. The remains of 
Palmer, Gill, and Charrington were recovered, carried to England, and interred in St. 
Paul's Church." 



— 72 — 

England's first duty, after quiet was assured, was to send away 
all the Britisli troops, except a force of about 11,000 men, wliicli 
it was deemed advisable to retain in Egypt until the Khedive's 
authority was placed on a safe footing throughout the land. At 
the same time it was decided to reorganize the military establish- 
ment of Egypt, and Baker Pasha, an Englishman in the service of 
the Sultan, was invited to superintend this work. The Khedive 
summoned a new cabinet, giving the leadership to Sherif Pasha, as 
Minister of Poreign Affairs. 

What should be done with Arabi was the question of para- 
mount interest, when once the Khedive's authority was re-es- 
tablished and recognized. Tewfik and his Ministers, if left to 
themselves, would unquestionably have taken his life ; for in the 
Orient an unsuccessful revolutionist knows but one fate. But 
England was determined that Arabi should have a fair trial. To 
secure this, an irresistible pressure had been brought to bear upon 
Mr. Gladstone's Government by the English press. It was decided 
that the rebel leaders should appear before a military tribunal, 
and they were given English counsel to plead their cause. 
The preliminary negotiations occupied several months, during 
which time Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier, Arabi's counsel, became 
acquainted with the peculiarities of Egyptian legal procedure,* 
and Arabi wrote out his story of the rebellion.! The general 
tenor of his tale was to prove himself innocent of the charge of 
rebellion. He declared that Tewfik was the traitor; for the Sultan,, 
the real sovereign of Egypt, encouraged the resistance against 
England that the Khedive did not dare show. If Arabi obeyed his 
sovereign, how could he be a rebel? He vauntingly wrote : 

" But the truth is, I am no ' rebel.' I led the nation in seeking the liberty of our coun- 
try, and employed all honorable means to this end, respecting the laws, not thinking of 
self, as others say, but of the welfare of Egypt. I became commander of the troops ap- 
pointed to defend the country in a lawful manner, and by the order of the Sultan, the Khe- 
dive, the Chamber, and with the sanction of the nation. As regards accusations of 
massacre and incendiarism, I laugh them to scorn." 

Such were the words that Arabi wrote in October, when lying in 

prison in Cairo. If he had stood by them, he would have had the 

respect of all who had heard the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians," 

*"How We Defended Arabi and His Friend;*. A Story of Egypt and the Egyptians." 
By A. M. Broadley. 

t" Instructions to My Consul. " In The Nineteenth Century of October, 1882. By Ahmed 
ArabL 



— 73 — 

and to many lie would liave posed as a hero and a martyr ; but 
witMn , two months he had acknowledged himself guilty of 
rebellion, and was cringing at the feet of England and all English- 
men. 

The trial was a farce. Everything was "cut and dried" before- 
hand. It was arranged that Arabi was to plead guilty to rebel- 
lion, that he was forthwith to be condemned to death by the 
court, and that the Khedive was immediately to commute the 
sentence to perpetual exile. In fact, the necessary papers were 
drawn up and signed before the court met for Arabi's trial on 
December 3d. First, the following charge was read :* 

" Ahmed Arabi Pasha, you are charged before us, on the report of the Commission of 
Inquiry, with the offense of rebellion against his Highness the Khedive, and of thereby 
committing offenses against Article 96t of the Ottoman Military and Article 59t of the Otto- 
man Penal Code. Are you guilty or not guilty 7" 

Upon Arabi's saying that his counsel would answer for him, Mr. 
Broadley read the following : 

" Of my own free will, and by the advice of my counsel, I plead guilty to the charges 
now read over to me." 

An adjournment of several hours was then taken, as a matter 
of form, we must believe," for the deliberations were all held in 
advance. Upon reassembling the clerk of the court read the fol- 
lowing sentence : 

" Whereas Ahmed Arabi Pasha has admitted having committed the crime of rebellion 
in contravention of Article 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article 59 of the Ottoman 
Penal Code ; and whereas, in face of this ad mission, the court has only to apply the articles 
already cited, which punish the crime of rebellion by the penalty of death ; for these mo- 
tives the court unanimously condemns Ahmed Arabi Pasha to death for the crime of 
rebellion against his Highness the Khedive by application of the said articles and orders. 
That the said judgment be submitted for the consideration of his Highness the Khedive." 

But the judgment had already been submitted, so that the 
clerk was able to read the following decree from the Khedive at 
once: 

* The documents and articles here given are quoted from Mr. Broadley's " How We 
Defended Arabi," pp. 326, 332, 336, and 341. 

t Art. 96.— All persons who to the number of eight or more revolt, using their arms, 
and refuse to disperse, or do not cease the revolt on receiving the orders of a superior au- 
thority, may be punished with death. 

t Art. 59.— Whoever, without an order from the Government, or without a legal mo- 
tive, shall assume the command of a division, a fortified place, or city, etc., and any com- 
mander who, without a legitimate motive, shall persist in keeping his troops under arms 
after their disbandmeut has been ordered by the Government, may be punished with 
death. 



— 74 — 

" We, Mehemet Tewflk, Khedive of Egypt : Wbereas Ahmed Arabi Pasha has been 
condemned to death by judgment of Court Martial of this day's date, by application o^ 
Articles 96 of the Military Code and 69 of the Penal Code, and whereas we desire, for rea- 
sons of our own, to exercise in reference to the said Ahmed Arabi Pasha the right of par- 
don which appertains to us exclusively, we have decreed and do decree as follows : The 
penalty of death pronounced against Ahmed Arabi is commuted to perpetual exile from 
Egypt and its dependencies. This pardon will be of no effect, and the said Ahmed Arabi 
will be liable to the penalty of death if he enters Egypt or its dependencies. Our Minis- 
ters of the Interior, War, and Marine, are charged with the execution of this decree. 

" (Signed) MEHEMET TEWFIK." 

Arabi was glad to escape with liis life, if we may judge from 
his profuse thanks. He thanked Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, 
Lord Dufierin, Sir Edward Malet, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Broadley, Mr. 
Napier, the English people, the English press, and others to whom 
he felt specially grateful. It is not reported that the Khedive was 
among the number. On the 26th of December Arabi and his six 
companions, Mahmud Sami, Yacub Sami, Mahmud Fehmy, Tuiba 
Osmat, Ali Fehmy, and Abd-el-Al Hilmy, upon whom the same 
sentence had been passed, left Cairo for the Island of Ceylon, 
there to spend their life of perpetual exile. 

All this while France had been chafing under the prospect of 
the abolition of the Dual Control. England had proposed in its 
stead a Public Debt Commission, of which she offered the presi- 
dency to France, by way of a sop to appease any anger ; but Pre- 
mier Duclerc rejected the proposal. It therefore became necessa- 
ry for Lord Granville to define the position of England in Egypt. 
This he did on January 25th, 1883, in an identical note to the 
Powers. He reeited that the Anglo-French control had not been 
the result of international agreement, but of tripartite understand- 
ing between England, France, and Egypt ; and that, France hav- 
ing withdrawn from Egypt at the beginning of the war, England 
had to suppress the rebellion without assistance. She now pur- 
posed to keep an army of occupation in Egypt only so long as to 
secure the permanency of the re-established Government. Lord 
Granville announced, further, that England would favor new reg- 
ulations to provide for the future neutrality and inviolability of 
the Suez Canal. He was careful to insert in his note that the 
protection of Egypt would be considered the only justification 
for the military occupation of the canal. He begged that the 
Powers would alter the Capitulations so that foreigners in Egypt 
might be taxed, a plan, as we have seen, that is contemplated 
in every scheme of reform, but never carried out. He also 



— 75 — 

suggested tlie prolongation of the mixed tribunals for another 
year.* 

With regard to internal matters in Egypt, Lord Granville an- 
nounced that certain reforms in the army, in the police, and in 
political institutions had been undertaken. 

Reference has already been made to the appointment of Baker 
Pasha to supervise the reorganization of the Egyptian army. At 
the beginning of 1883 he was superseded by Sir Evelyn Wood, 
who undertook to introduce, so far as practicable, a discipline and 
treatment similar to those employed in the British army. Re- 
lieved from the supervision of the army Baker organized a police 
force of 4,000 men, which was divided into urban and rural con- 
stabulary and officered by Englishmen. The reform in political 
institutions was the work, largely, of Lord Dufferin. He had been 
sent from Constantinople to Cairo, early in November, with the 
special mission of bringing order out of governmental chaos. In 
two months he had prepared a scheme of legislative reorganiza- 
tion. This was, however, somewhat altered ; so that it was not 
until May, 1883, that the plan in its improved form was accepted 
by the decree of the Khedive. 

The new constitution provided for three classes of Assemblies : 
the "Legislative Council," the "General Assembly," and the '-Pro- 
vincial Councils," of which there were to be fourteen, one for each 
province. The Legislative Council was to consist of thirty mem- 
bers, fourteen of whom were to be nominated by the Khedive, 
and sixteen of whom were to be elective. Of the latter, one would 
represent Cairo, another the towns of Alexandria, Damietta, 
Rosetta, Suez, Port Said, Ismailia, and El-Azich, and the remain- 
ing fourteen would represent each one a province. The elective 
members were to be chosen for terms of six years, and might be 
indefinitely re-elected. The Council were to meet as often as once 
in two months. Its influence on legislation was to be so great, 
says Mr. Amos,t that" it is hardly conceivable that a law could be 
persisted in, in the face of a determined remonstrance of the Leg- 
islative Council." No law or decree of a legislative character 
could be promulgated unless the Government had obtained the 

*Their expiration had been flxecl for 1831, but two yearly prolongations had already 
been added to the original term of five years. 

t"The New Egyptian Constitution." By Sheldon Amos. The Contemporary Review, 
June, 1883, 



— 76 — 

opinion of the Council. If it should dissent from that opinion, 
the Government must give its reasons. A special article provided 
that the Budget must be submitted and that the Council might 
express its opinion and wishes on each section thereof. The rea- 
sons for dissent must be given as in other cases. The Legislative 
Council was to have further, the right to discuss freely the con- 
dition of the country and to consider any needful legislative reforms, 
and to call for the drafting of measures, to be submitted to itself, 
which should serve as the basis of legislation. 

The General Assembly was to consist of eighty-four members : 
the eight Ministers of State, the thirty members of the Legislative 
Council, and forty-six elected members. The latter were to be 
elected for terms of six years, and, as with the members of the 
Legislative Council, might be indefinitely re-elected. The Assembly 
must meet as often as once in two years, and its functions wereto be 
largely of a financial character. No new tax could be levied un- 
less it should receive the vote of the Assembly, and no public loan 
could be contracted unless the Assembly should be consulted. The 
reasons of dissent on the part of the Government must be given 
to the Assembly, as to the Legislative Council. 

The fourteen Provincial Councils were to consist each one of 
from four to eight members, and were to divide between them the 
representation of the six thousand villages in Egypt. Consider- 
able legislative power in local government was to be given them, 
such as the voting of extraordinary taxes for local improvement, 
which were to take effect merely upon the sanction of the Gov- 
ernment. Every Egyptian man, over twenty years of age, was to 
vote (by ballot) for an "elector- delegate" from the village in the 
neighborhood of which he lived, and the "electors- delegate" from 
all the villages in a province, were to form the constituency that 
should elect the Provincial Council. The term and re-eligibility 
of the members of the Provincial Council were to be the same as 
with members of the other two bodies, except that at the end of 
three years one-half of the Provincial Council was to be renewed 
by lot. The "electors- delegate" were also to elect directly the 
forty-six elective members of the General Assembly; but they 
were to have no share in the elections of members of the Legisla- 
tive Council. Each Provincial Council was to elect from its own 
number one member of the Legislative Council. 



- 77 — 

Sach, in brief, was the scheme that Lord Daiferin proposed 
and the Khedive sanctioned. It was well received* by many who 
thought that it promised a brilliant future for Egypt. The idea, 
however, of looking to the fellahin of Egypt for the exercise of 
<;onstitutional rights and duties, strikes any one who is acquainted 
with their abject condition and disposition as almost absurd. 
It is well enough for the Westerner to import the ideas that 
have been the slow growth of centuries in the most highly civil- 
ized lands; they will have their inflaence; and yet it must always 
be borne in mind that the political idea is the fruit only of inter- 
nal growth. Lord Dufferin framed the Constitution ; but he knew 
that the chiefest truth among his recommendations lay in the 
following paragraph : 

" The chief requirement of Egypt is justice. A pure, cheap, and simple system of jus- 
tice will prove more beneficial to the country than the largest constitutional privileges. 
The structure of society in the East is so simple that, providecl the taxes are righteously 
assessed, it does not require much law-making to make the people happy. "t 

The scheme of reorganization was carried forward to the ex- 
tent of electing the "■ electors-delegate" in September ; but by that 
time Egypt was again in a state of such disquietude that the Brit- 
ish advisers of the Khedive considered it unwise to put the new 
institutions into operation. In place of Legislative Council and 
Oeneral Assembly, the Khedive appointed a Council of State, con- 
sisting ■ of eleven Egyptians, two Armenians, and ten Europeans. 
The reforms were set aside for the time being in view of impend- 
ing troubles and dangers in the Sudan. 



CHAPTER VII. 

The Sudan and the Mahdi. 



The Siidan comprises the vast region lying between the Equator 
and the southern boundary of Egypt at the first cataract of the 
Nile, and extending from the Red Sea and Abyssinia on the east 

*Vide The Contemporary Review for June, 1883, where Mr. Amos says: "Certainly 
bad government will henceforth be rendered difficult in Egypt, and the worst government 
Impossible. 'The Legislative Council' may one day expand into as true a legislature as 
the 'House of Commons.' " 

tLord Dufferin's Scheme for ttie Reorganization of Egypt, Feb. 6th, 1883. 



— 78 — 

to a western indefiniteness — to tlie point, one might say, from 
which a slave could be carried to the Nile with some chance of 
profit for the slave-hunter. Since the day of Mehemet Ali, the 
country had been to Egypt very much what Egypt was to Turkey 
before the day of the great Pasha. Mehemet Ali appropriated the 
Sudan to himself with that free-handed robbery that was charac- 
teristic of power in the time of feudalism, and his successors, ex- 
cepting perhaps Said, did all they could to keep up the system of 
robbery and spoliation that he had begun; and, on the other 
hand, the chiefs of the native tribes did all they could to resist 
the power of Egypt, often even to the point of bloodshed and 
murder, or paid their enforced tributes unwillingly and only after 
these had been diminished by all possible peculations. There was 
an extensive inland commerce in the Sudan that made it a valuable 
province. The yield of ivory, ostrich feathers, grains, and tropi- 
cal fruits was very large ; but the traffic in slaves was the great 
industry of the country. The Sudan supplied the slave markets 
of the Eastern world. It was this feature of commerce that first 
attracted the attention of the West to the Sudan. It was the 
motive of mercy that encouraged the interference of civilized 
people. 

Ismail, with all the ambition of Mehemet Ali, was ready ta 
listen to any plans for increasing his authority, especially if they 
were suggested by Europeans. He had long entertained a scheme 
of aggrandizemejit in the Sudan, and he fancied that expeditions 
to suppress the slave-trade, if organized in his name, would some- 
how secure the extension of his power. It may be doubted if 
he appreciated the humanitarian motives that suggested to Eng- 
lishmen the necessity of such an expedition as Sir Samuel W. 
Baker was deputed to lead in 1869 ; but he gave Sir Samuel his 
hearty co-operation, and appointed him Governor-General of the 
entire region south of Gondokoro. Several years before that time 
Ismail had reasserted Egypt's authority, which had been suffered 
to lapse through the inactivity of Said and the opposition of the 
Sudanese, by an extension of his dominion to the west in 
the conquest of Darfur, and now he was glad to have his Governor- 
General push on to the south. The story of Sir Samuel's attempt to 
reach his province, and of his success in abolishing the slave-traffic 
only for the time that the slave-posts were under his eye is told in 



— 79 — 

his own book, " Ismailia." It is enough to state here that, despite 
his strenuous and most worthy efiorts, he made no permanent im- 
pression upon the trade he sought to wipe out ; on the contrary, 
by his opposition to the most influential men of the Sudan, the 
slave-traders, he brought Egypt into greater odium than before, 
and increased the hatred that had always been felt for Egyp- 
tian rule. 

The successor of Sir Samuel Baker was Colonel Charles George 
Gordon, familiarly known as " Chinese Gordon " from his remark- 
able career in the suppression of the Tai-ping rebellion in China. 
He was, perhaps, the most humane man in England ; but his char- 
acter was as firm as it was sweet, and his courage was as great as 
his pity. Of the man whose name has been for years a household 
word among the civilized and the heathen, whose feats have won 
the admiration of the world, and whose charities have been the in- 
spiration of the rich and the comfort of the poor, it is unnec- 
essary to write. Suffice it to say that Gordon had the quali- 
ties that fitted him pre-eminently for the work he under- 
took when, in 1874, he started upon his mission to the 
Sudan. He did not give Ismail credit for much philanthro- 
py; for, before he left Cairo for Khartum, he wrote to Eng- 
land:* "I think I can see the true motive of the expedition, and 
believe it to be a sham to catch the attention of the English peo- 
ple ; and feel like a Gordon who has been humbugged." Going 
to the Equatorial Province, however, solely on the authority of 
Ismail, he did not question the latter's motives too closely, but ap- 
plied himself to the work of the expedition. He was to establish 
a series of posts between Khartum and Gondokoro and to sup- 
press the slave-trade. In eighteen months Gordon retiu^ned to 
Cairo and resigned his commission under the Khedive. This is 
what he had done at that time rf 

"He had mapped the White Nile from Khartum to within a short distance of the Vic- 
toria Nyanza. He had given to the slave trade on the White Nile a deadly blow. He had 
restored confidence and peace among the tribes of the Nile valley, so that they now freely 
brought into the stations their beef, corn, and ivory for sale. He had opened up the water 
communication between Gondokoro and the Lakes. He had established satisfactory rela- 
tions with King M'tesa. He had formed Government districts, and established secure 
posts with safe communication between them. He had contributed a revenue to the Khe- 
divial exchequer, and this without oppression. The Tai-ping Kebellion established Gor- 

* " Chinese Gordon." By Archibald Forbes. Page 125. 
t Ibid, p. 157. 



— 80 — 

doQ's genius as a military commander ; tlie Equatorial Provinces, -when he left them, tes- 
tiflednot less to his genius as a philanthropic and practical administrator." 

Gordon resigned because Ismail Tacub, the Governor-General 
of the Sudan, threw so many stumbling blocks in his way. While 
he -^as doing «».]lhe could to suppress the slave-trade, Ismail Yacub 
was doing all he could to foster it. At the beginning of 1877 the 
Khedive removed the latter, and wrote the following to Gordon on 
February 17th : " Setting a just value on your honorable char- 
acter, on your zeal, and on the great services you have already 
done me, I have resolved to bring the Sudan, Darfur, and the prov- 
inces of the Equator, into one vast province, and place it under 
you as Governor- General."* Gordon accepted the larger responsi- 
bilities and duties of the office bestowed upon him. For two years 
and more he worked with indomitable energy in crushing the 
slave-traffic, in putting down insurrection, and in establishing his 
authority throughout the vast provinces nominally under his con- 
trol. In spite of almost insuperable difficulties in the way of inad- 
equate resources, both military! and financial, he accomplished 
wonders. If he had been content to remain at Khartum after the 
fall of Ismail, the fame and fear of the False Prophet might never 
have been known in Egypt ; but he was disgusted with the abdi- 
cation, and insisted upon resigning, to the no small relief, proba- 
bly, of the new Khedive and his Ministers, who were glad to be rid 
of all the servants of Ismail. 

After Gordon, left the Sudan, in 1879, an Egyptian Pasha was 
appointed Governor-General, and the country relapsed into its 
former feeling of bitterness toward Egyptian rule. It was not 
long before the disaffection found its leader. He was no less a 
person than the Mahdi, whose coming had been foretold by the 
prophet Mohammed. He chose an opportune moment to act as the 
champion of his people. They had been incensed at the suppres- 
sion of the slave trade, they hated the Egyptian rule, and they be- 
lieved that the fourteenth century of the Hegira, which was close 
at hand, would, in accordance with prophecy, usher in an era of 
unexampled prosperity and happiness. 

Mehemet Ahmed, who called himself the Mahdi, was an ob- 

*Quotedfrom " Chinese Gordon," p. 159. 

t" The Sudan had been well-nigh drained of troops for the support of the Sultan in 
his war with Russia."—" Chinese Gordon," page 162. 



— 81 — 

scure carpenter's sou, who had studied religious creeds with one 
sect of dervishes in Khartum, and with another sect in Berber' 
until 1870, when he became o^fahir, or dervish-chief, himself. He 
then retired to the island of Abba, on the White Nile, where he 
became famed for his piety. He lived in a cave, and gave himself 
up to prayers, fastings, and mortifications of the flesh. He won a 
wide notoriety, and made many disciples. Eich gifts were be- 
stowed upon him, and the neighboring sheikhs gladly gave him 
their daughters in marriage. His brotherhood in Khartum heard 
of his devotion, wealth, and influence, and sent to him, early in 
1881, a messenger to bid him arise, in answer to the call of God, 
and lead a great army. Mehemet Ahmed took up the sword at 
once, and in May declared to the fakirs of the faith of the Shiites 
that he was the Imam Mahdi, the new Messiah who had come to 
lead new believers into the fold of Islam, and to annihilate all the 
infidels on the face of the earth. His declaration met with no de- 
nial among the Shiites, whose religious order was confined almost 
wholly to the Sudan ; but at Cairo, Constantinople, and Mecca, 
the report of a Mahdi was scoffed at. Where were the signs* and 
portents that should herald his coming ? 

But the Mahdi set about the establishment of " a universal 
equality, a universal law, a universal religion, and a community of 
goods,"* and swore that he would visit with death all who did not 
believe in and follow him. In August Eauf Pasha, the Governor- 
General of the Sudan, became alarmed at the growing power of the 
False Prophet, for such he had been declared by the ulemas of 

*"The greater signs, among wMch the coming of the Mahdi is reckoned, are seven- 
teen in all, and it must be coiifessed that some at least among these seem unlikeiy to be, 
for the present, literally fulfilled. The sun must rise in the West ; the beast must emerge 
from the earth near Mecca; the walls of Stambul must fall by miracle before an invading 
foe; the Messlh ed Dejal, or 'Lying Anointed One,' marked K F E on his forehead, one- 
eyed, and riding from Irak on an ass, must lay waste the earth. The true Messiah (our 
Lord Jesus) must appear on the minaret at Damascus, must reign in Jerusalem, and de- 
feat Gog and Magog), and slay ed Dejal at the gate of Lydda. A massacre of the Jews, 
and invasion of Syria by the great giants (Gog and Magog), who are to drink diy the Sea 
of Galilee, a smoke which shall fill the world, a relapse of Arabia into paganism, the dis- 
covery of hid treasures in the Euphrates, the destruction of the Kaaba by Negroes, beasts 
and stones speaking with human voices, a fire of Yemen, a man of the sons of Kahtan 
wielding a rod, and an icy wind from Damascus which shall sweep away the souls of all 
who have faith as a grain of mustard-seed, and blow to heaven the Koran itself ; these are 
the wonders which, together with the coming of the Mahdi, will prepare the way for the 
tremendous Y6ssr ed Din, or final day of judgment."—" The Guide of Islam." By C. R. 
Conder, The Fortnightly Review. 

t" The Story of Chinese Gordon." A. Egmont Hake. Vol. II., p. 24. 



— 82 — 

Constantinople and Cairo and the Grand Sherif of Mecca, the 
highest priest of Islam ; and he sent an army to crush him. But 
the Mahdi easily repulsed the Egyptian * force, as he did also a 
stronger force sent against him at the end of 1881. In June, 1882, 
he fought his first great battle, and won a brilliant victory. Abdel 
Kadir, who had succeeded Raut' Pasha as Governor- General, sent 
out the strongest force he could muster; but it was overwhelmingly 
defeated by the Mahdi's fanatical followers. Not a commander 
escaped with his life, and nearly every Egyptian soldier perished. 
And now for a time the False Propnet had things pretty much his 
own way. Arabi's Rebellion not only diverted attention from the 
Sudan, but it drew largely upon the Sudanese garrisons for troops 
to support the nationalist cause. The Mahdi became more and 
more aggressive, and his ranks and his coffers were continually 
filling. Bat, in attacking El Obeid, he was repulsed with heavy 
loss. He was beaten off only temporarily, however ; for he soon 
returned and laid siege to the garrison, which was finally com- 
pelled to yield, on the 15th of January, 1883. The commander of 
the garrison and many of his subordinates saved their lives by 
taking service under the Mahdi's standard. 

The news of the fall of Obeid reached Egypt about the begin- 
ning of February. The serious insurrection demanded the atten- 
tion of the Khedive. Lord Dufferin, however, advised letting the 
Mahdi alone so long as he remained in Kordofan. But the Egyp- 
tian Governmeat determined upon an expedition, and entrusted its 
command to Colonel Hicks, a retired English officer. It was im- 
possible, so soon after Arabfs Rebellion, to send as strong a force 
as was desirable; but it consisted of eight English officers, 6,000 
infantry, 1,000 irregulars, 500 cavalry and a small force of artillery. 
The English Government in no way sanctioned the expedition. 
Lord Granville gave Sir Edward Malet, the British consul at Cairo, 
positive orders not to offer any advice on the question. After the 
first engagement between Hicks and the rebels, on April 9th, in 
which the former achieved a brilliant success. Hicks made many 
appeals to Malet for reinforcements ; but the latter merely passed 
them on to the Egyptian Government without comment. "In 

*The government forces in tlie Sudan were in large part made up of Egyptian sol- 
diers, the Sudanese soldiers being sent to Egypt in at least equal numbers. This exchange 
of military was held one of the chief grievances agamst Egyptian rule. 



— 83 — 

other words," says Mr. McCarthy,* " though England had interfered 
in Egypt by force of arms to keep the Khedive on his throne, 
though Cairo was occupied by English soldiers, though it was 
clearly in England's power, and in her right, to counsel the Egyp- 
tian Ministry as to the course they should pursue in the most 
difficult of all Egyptian questions, the Ministry still affected to 
keep up the absurd pretense of exercising no influence upon the 
■councils of Egypt." England could not shirk her responsibility 
by keeping silent. She was bound in all honor to give her advice 
3,t least; and refusing, she failed of her just duty and obliga- 
tions.! 

The summer and rainy season of 1883 were passed by Hicks 
Pasha in Khartum ; but on the 9th of September he set out for 
El Obeid, the stronghold of the Mahdi. The story of his march 
and the details of the final tragedy will probably never be authen- 
tically told. The last bits of news were in the letters of Edmund 
O'Donovan to a London newspaper. He seems to have appreciated 
the dangers of the expedition. On September 23d he wrote to a 
iriend : " It would be odd if the next intelligence from this part of 
the world told that I, too, had gone the way of all flesh. How- 
ever, to die even out here, with a lance-head as big as a shovel 
through me, will meet my views better than the slow, gradual 
sinking into the grave which is the lot of so many. . , . You 
know I am by this time, after an experience of many years, pretty 
well accustomed to dangers of most kinds, even some extra. Yet 
I assure you I feel it terrible to face deadly peril far away from 
civilized ideas, and where no mercy is to be met with, in company 
with cravens that you expect to see run at every moment, and who 
will leave you behind to face the worst." When this friend next 
heard of U'Donovan, he had "gone the way of all flesh." 

The accepted account of the slaughter of Hicks Pasha's army 
of 11,000 men is that, having been treacherously led into an am- 
buscade on the 1st or 2d of November, they fought for three days 
vnth the courage and hopelessness of that smaller band at Ther- 

*'«Bagland Under Gladstone." By Justin McCarthy, M.P. Chapter XV. 

fMliy, then, it may be asked, did not the Liberal Government use its influence to 
prohibit General Hicks's useless expedition? The question very plausibly suggests Eng- 
lish responsibility for the expedition, and the consequences, or supposed consequences of 
its failure." — " English Policy in the Sudan." British Quarterly Review, July, 1SS4. 



mopylse under Leonidas of old ; then, overcome with heat, thirsty 
and fatigue, their ammunition gone, they fell where they had 
fought, before the fury of the Mahdi's hordes. All the Egyptians, 
were massacred, and only one European is known to have escaped. 

It was more than two weeks before the terrible news reached 
Khartum and was telegraphed to Cairo. It would be difficult to 
say whether the panic was greater in Egypt or in the Sudan. Lx 
the Sudan, governors of provinces, at the report of the Mahdi's 
victory, declared their allegiance to the holy cause, and flocked ta 
his capital with troops and treasure. Nothing succeeds like 
success. The vast region from Kordofan to the Equator was 
kindled to a fanatical zeal. The route from Khartum to Suakim,, 
on the Red Sea, was intercepted by a lieutenant of the Mahdi's. 
The grasp of the Mahdi seemed to be closing about Kliartum, 
Colonel de Coetlogen, with his slender garrison of 4,000, could 
not hold that city before the sweep of the rebel forces. In Cairo 
the consternation was no greater over the defeat than over Eng- 
land's opposition to an expedition to crush the Mahdi. Lord 
Granville telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring, who was now the 
British representative in Egypt, that the Government would lend 
neither English nor Indian troops to assist an expedition. He 
advised the abandonment of the Sudan. But the Khedive's min- 
isters said that they could not give up the territory that belong ed 
to ■ the Sultan, and of which Egypt was simply the guardian. 
While negotiations between England and Egypt were pending,, 
the IQiedive's Government decided to send a force to Suakim to 
relieve the beleaguered Egyptian garrisons at Sinkat and Toker,. 
and open the route from the Red Sea to Berber so as to allow the 
Egyptians in Khartum a way of escape. The expedition was 
placed under the command of Baker Pasha. 

But now, January 4th, 1884, Mr. Gladstone's Government ex- 
pressed its advice more forcibly than a month before. "It is in 
dispensable," wrote Lord Granville, "that her Majesty's Govern- 
ment should, as long as the provisional occupation of the country 
by English troops continues, be assured that the advice which, 
after full consideration of the Egyptian Government, they may 
feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive should be followed. 
It should be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and governors 
of the provinces that the responsibility which, for the time rests 



— 85 — 

on England, obliges her Majesty's Government to insist on the 
adoption of the policy which they recommend ; and that it will be 
necessary that those ministers and governors who do not follow 
this course should cease to hold their offices." This was what 
Mr. McCarthy calls "interference with a vengeance."* It was the 
decisive, if tardy, assertion of authority. The note was equiva- 
lent to saying that, in future, England's will was to be the law of 
Egypt. From Downing Street the order was issued that the Su- 
dan must be abandoned, whereupon Sherif's Ministry resigned. 
Nubar Pasha was called to his place ; and he telegraphed at once, 
of course at England's dictation, to Baker at Suakim that he must 
prepare for evacuation. 

But the question that now presented itself was, How should the 
evacuation be effected? The answer was furnished by the Pall 
Mall Gazette^ of London. Its issue of January 9th contained the 
following words : 

" At present it is obviously out of the question to send an army of relief to Colonel 
Coetlogen. Baker Pasha's force seems inadequate even to relieve Smkat. In common 
with the ex-Khedive, of whom he speaks with remarkable cordiality, General Gordon 
deprecates the dispatch of either Indian or English troops to the Sudan. But if we have 
not an Egyptian army to employ in the service, and if we must not send an English force, 
what are we to do? There is only one thing that we can do. We cannot send a regiment 
to Khartum, but we can send a man who, on more than one occasion, has proved himself 
more valuable in similar circumstances than an entire army. Why not send Chinese Gor- 
don with full powers to Khartum, to assume absolute control of the territory, to treat with 
the Mahdi, to relieve the garrisons, and do what can be done to save what can be saved 
from ttie wreck in the Sudan? ... No one can deny the urgent need in the midst of 
that hideoufe welter of confusion for the presence of such a man, with a born genius for 
command, an unexampled capacity in orgaiiizmg ' ever-victorious armies,' and a perfect 
knowledge of the Sudan and its people. Wny not send him out with carte ilanche to do the 
best that can be done ? He may not be able single-handed to reduce that raging chaos to 
order, but the attempt is worth making, and if it is to be made it will have to be made at 
once." 

Immediately the popular feeling was found to be heartily 
in accord with this suggestion, and a clamor was raised on all 
sides for the dispatch of Gordon to the Sudan. The British Gov- 
•ernment, some weeks before, had offered to appoint an English 
officer to go to Khartum and organize the evacuation ; but the 
Egyptian Ministry had not taken up the offer. Now, however, 
Nubar informed Sir Evelyn Baring that such an appointment 
would be accepted. The British Govei'nment, therefore, at once 
communicated with Gordon, recalling him from Brussels on the 

*" England Under Gladstone." Chapter XV. 

6 



- 86 — 

17th of January, where he had just arrived to receive the last in- 
structions of the King of Belgium, before proceeding on an anti- 
slavery mission to the Congo. He returned to London that same 
day, and on the morning of the 18th was closeted with memtjers 
of the English Cabinet. On Saturday, the 19th, the London Times 
startled the world with the following announcement : 

"It will be a welcome surprise to the country to learn that General Gordon started 

last night, not for the Congo, but for Egypt He takes with him as his Military 

Secretary, Lieutenant- Colonel Stewart, who was on duty at Khartum so late as last year,, 
and whose knowledge of the affairs of the Sudan is second only to that of General Gordon 
himself. The immediate purpose of the General's mission is, we understand, to report on 
the military situation m the Sudan, to provide in the best manner for the safety of the 
European population of Khartum and of the Egyptian garrisons still in the country, as 
well as for the evacaation of the Sudan with the exception of the seaboard. His appoint- 
ment will be received by the country with a certain sense of relief, as showing that the 
Government has been willing to seek the best advice and to select the most competent 
agent for the development of its policy in the Sudan." 



CHAPTER VIIL 

The Mission of Gokdon. Opeeations in the Eastern Sudan. 

England had now taken a firm stand. She largely increased 
her responsibilities by entrusting Gordon with the Sudanese mis- 
sion. She had been niggardly even with advice in the case of 
Hicks, but she was ready to hazard all with Gordon. Her un- 
questionable responsibility will be proved by the following docu- 
ments. The day that Gordon left London, Lord Granville gave 
him this note of instruction : 

"FOEEiGN Office, Jan. I8th, 1884. 
"Sir:— Her Majesty's Government a^'e desirous that you should proceed at once to 
Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Sudan and on the measures which 
it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding posses- 
sions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartum. Tou are 
also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the 
interior of the Sudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administra- 
tion by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the seacoast can best be secured. In 
connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the 
steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possi- 
bly be given to the slave trade by the present insurrectionary movement and by the with- 
drawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior. You wi'l be under the instructions of 
her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your reports to her 
Majesty's Government should be sent under flying seal. You will consider yourself author- 
ized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire 



— 87 — 

to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring. You will "^'^ 
accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will assist you in the duties thus confided to you. 
On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir E. Baring, who will arrange 
to meet you, and will settle with you whether you should proceed direct to Suakim, or 
should go yourself or dispatch Colonel Stewart to Khartum, via the Nile. 

1 am, etc., (signed) Granville." 

While Gordon was on his way to Egypt he wrote the following 
notes, explanatory of the above instructions, and developed in ac- 
cordance with the views expressed at the conference on January 
*18th. These notes were forwarded from Cairo to the Foreign 
Office at London : 

" I understand that her Majesty's Government have come to tae irrevocable decision 
not to incur the very onerous duty of securing to the peoples of the Sudan a just future 
Government. That, as a consequence, her Majesty's Government have determined to re- 
store to these peoples their independence, and will no longer suffer the Egyptian Govern- 
ment to interfere with their affairs. 

" 2. For this purpose her Majesty's Government have decided to send me to the Siidan 
to arrange for the evacuation of these countries, and the safe removal of the Egyptian em- 
ployes and troops. 

" 3. Keeping paragraph No. 1 in view, viz., that the evacuation of the Sudan is irrevo- 
cably decided on, it will depend on circumstances in what way this is to be accomplished. 
My idea i3 that the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultana 
who existed at the time of Mehemet All's conquest, and whose families still exist ; that the 
Mahdi should be left altogether out of the calculation as regards the handing over the 
country; and that it should be optional with the Sultans to accept his supremacy or not. 
As these Sultans would probably not be likely to gain by accepting the Mahdi as their sov- 
ereign, it is probable that they will hold to their independent positions. Thus we should 
have two factors to deal with ; namely, the petty Sultans asserting their several independ- 
ence, and the Mahdi's party aiming at supremacy over them. To hand, therefore, over to 
the Mahdi the arsenals, etc., would, I consider, be a mistake. They should be handed over 
to the Sultans of the states in which they are placed. The most difficult question is how 
and to whom to hand over the arsenals of Khartum, Dongola, and Kassala, which towns 
have, so to say, no old standing families, Khartum and Kassala having sprung up since 
Mehemet All's conquest. Probably it would be advisable to postpone any decision as to 
these towns till such time as the inhabitants have made known theii- opinion. 

" 4. I have, in paragraph 3, proposed the transfer of the lands to the local Sultans, and 
stated my opinion that these will not accept the supremacy of the Mahdi. If this is agreed 
to, and my supposition is correct as to their action, there can be but little doubt that, as far 
as he is able, the Mahdi will endeavor to assert his rule over them, and will be opposed to 
any evacuation of the Government employes and troops. My opinion of the Mahdi's force 
is, that the bulk of those who were with him at Obeid will refuse to cross the NDe, and that 
those who do so will not exceed 3,000 or 4,000 men ; and also, that these will be composed 
principally of black troops who have deserted, and who, if offered fair terms, would come 
over to the Government side. In such a case, viz., ' Sultans accepting transfer of territory 
and refusing the supremacy of the Mahdi, and Mahdi's black troops coming over to the 
Government,' resulting weakness of the Mahdi, what should be done should the Mahdi's 
adherents attack the evacuating columns? It cannot be supposed that these are to offer 
no resistance, and if in resisting they should obtain a success, it would be but reasonable to 
allow them to follow up the Mahdi to such a position as would Insure their future safe 
march. This is one of those difficult questions which our Government can hardly be ex- 
pected to answer, but which may arise, and to which I would call attention. Paragraph 1 
fixes irrevocably the decision of the Government, viz., to evacuate the territory, and, of 
course, as far as possible, involves the avoidance of any fighting. I can therefore only 



say, that having in view paragraph 1, and seeing the difficulty of asking her Majesty's 
Government to give a decision or direction as to what should be done in certain cases, that 
I will carry out the evacuation as far as possible according to their wish to the best of my 
ability, and with avoidance, as far as possible, of all fighting. I would, however, hope 
that her Majesty's Government will give me their support and consideration, should I be 
unable to fulfill all their expectations. 

" 5. Though it is out of my province to give any opinion as to the action of her Majesty's 
Government in leaving the Sudan, still, I must say it would be an iniquity to reconquer 
these peoples, and then hand them back to the Egyptians without guarantees of future 
good government. It is evident that this we cannct secure without an inordinate expendi- 
ture of men and money. T'le Sudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever will be 
so. Larger than Germany, France, and Spain together, and mostly barren, it cannot be 
governed except by a Dictator, who may be good or bad. If bad, he will cause constant 
revolts. No one who has ever lived in the Sudan can escape the reflection : ' What a use- 
less possession is this land.' Few men can stand its fearful monotony and deadly climate 

"6. Said Pasha, the Viceroy before Ismail, went up to the Sudan with Count F. de 
Lesseps. He was so discouraged and horrified at the misery of the people that at Berber 
Count de Lesseps saw him throw his guns into the river, declaring that he would be no 
party to such oppression. It was only after the urgent solicitation of European consuls 
that he reconsidered his decision. Therefore, I think her Majesty's Government are fully 
justified in recommending the evacuation, inasmuch as tne sacrifices necessary toward se- 
curing a good government would be far too onerous to admit of such an attempt being 
made. Indeed, one may say it is impracticable at any cost. Her Majesty's Government 
will now leave them as God has placed them ; they are not forced to fight among them- 
selves, and they will no longer be oppressed by men coming from lands so remote as Cir- 
cassia, Kurdistan, and Anatolia." 

Colonel Stewart, also, while on the way to Cairo, addressed, some 
observations to the Foreign Office, of which the following is of 
some importance as showing Gordon's independence of Egypt and 
direct dependence upon England as the authority of his actions : 

" [, of course, understand that General Gordon Is going to the Sudan with full powers 
to make all arrangements as to its evacuation, and that he is in no way to be interfered 
with by the Cairo Ministers ; also, that any suggestions or remarks that the Cairo Govern- 
ment would wish to make are to be made directly to him and her Majesty's Minister Plen- 
ipotentiary, and that no intrigues are to be permitted against Ms authority. Any other 
course would, I am persuaded, make his mission a failure." 

While Gordon was in Cairo, Sir Evelyn Baring communicated 
to him the following additional instructions : 

" Lord Granville ' authorized and instructed you to perform such duties as the Egyp- 
tian Government may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir 
E. Baring.' I have now to indicate to you the views of the Egyptian Government on two 
of the points to which your special attention was directed by Lord Granville. These are, 
(1) the measure which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garri- 
sons still holding positions in the Sudan, and for the safety of the European population in 
Khartam; (y) the best mode of efl'ectiTig the evacuation of the interior of the Sudan. 
These two points are intimately connected, and may conveniently be considered together. 
It is believed that the number of Europeans at Khartum is very small, but it has been esti- 
mated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move north- 
ward from Khartum only when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn. These people are 
native Christians, Egyptian employes, their wives and children, etc. The Government of 
his Highness the Khedive is earnestly solicitous that no effort should be spared to insure 
(the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss of life. As re- 



— 89 — 

gards the most opportune time and tie best method for effecting the retreat, whether of 
the garrison or of the civil populations, it is neither necessary nor desirable that you 
should receive detailed instructions. A short time ago the local authorities pressed 
strongly on the Egyptian Government the necessity for giving orders for an immediate 
retreat. Orders were accordingly given to commence at once the withdrawal of the civil 
population. No sooner, however, had these orders been issued than a telegram was 
received from the Sudan, strongly urging that the orders for commencing the retreat 
should be delayed. Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the position at 
Khartum is now represented as being less critical for the moment than it was a short time 
ago, it was thought desirable to modify the orders for the immediate retreat of the civil 
population, and to await your arrival. You will bear in mind that the main end to be pur- 
sued Is the evacuation of the Siidan. This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, 
by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of her Majesty's Government. It meets with 
the full approval of his Highness the Khedive, and of the present Egyptian Ministry. I 
understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy, and 
that you think it should on no account be changed. You consider that it may take a few 
months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that ' the restoration of the 
country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet 
All's conquest, and whose families still exist ' ; and that an endeavor should be made to 
form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely 
concurs. It will, of course, be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be 
kept in the Sudan merely with the view to consolidating the power of the new rulers of 
the country. But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, 
your knowledge of the country, and of your comprehension of the general line of policy to 
be pursued. "You are, therefore, given full discretionary power to retain the troops for 
such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the 
country may be accomplished with the least possible risk of life and property. A credit 
of £100,000 has been opened for you at the Finance Department, and further funds will be 
supplied to you on your requisition when this sum is exhausted. In undertaking the dif- 
ficult task which now lies before you, you may feel assured that no effort will be wanting 
on the part of the Cairo authorities, whether English or Egyptians, to afford you all the 
co-operation and support in their power." 

On the 26tli of January General Gordon, Colonel Stewart, and 
the newly-appointed Sultan of Darfur,* with no escort beyond 
their personal attendants, left Cairo for Khartum, by way of Siut, 
Assuan, Wady Haifa, Abu Hamed, and Berber. 

While this daring party was hastening toward Khartixm as 
swiftly as railway, steamer, and camel could carry them, events of 
a portentous nature were occurring elsewhere. On the 5lh of 
February the British Parliament was opened, and on the same day 
the news was received in London that Baker Pasha had been de- 
feated near Tokar, with a loss of 2,000 men, and had fallen back 
with the remainder of his army — some 1,200 — on Trinkitat, himself 
escaping death by a reckless dash through the Arab ranks. Os- 
man Digna, the Mahdi's lieutenant, had carried all before him. 
Trinkitat could not hold out against him, and fears were enter- 

* The Khedive had reinstated the heir to the Sultanship, who was a captive in Cairo, 
as the first step toward carrying out Gordon's policy. 



— 90 — 

tained even for Suakim, although Admiral He wett had just landed 
a force there. These were not favorable auspices for the opening 
of Parliament. The customary placid language of the Queen's 
Speech yf&s strangely at variance vrith the feelings of those who 
listened to it. A vote of censure upon the Government was at 
once moved, but it was rejected in the form offered, and the sub- 
ject was postponed for a few days. In the meantime public opin- 
ion on the necessity of active interference and responsibility had 
strengthened to the point of insistance. The London Times 
voiced the widespread sentiment in saying :* " This fatuous effort 
to evade the grasp of facts must now be abandoned, and even with 
respect to the past the world will be obstinately incredulous. Not 
only in Europe, as may be seen from the strong language used by 
the French Press, but among the Mahommedan populations of the 
East, England is held to be responsible for the expeditions of 
Hicks Pasha and Baker Pasha not less than for the mission of 
General Gordon." 

The excitement caused by the news of Baker's defeat was 
further increased by the report of the slaughter of the Sinkat gar- 
rison. Baker's expedition had utterly failed in the offensive. The 
vote of censure came on the 12th. The identical motion was 
offered in the upper House by Lord Salisbury, and in the lower 
House by Sir Stafford Northcote, "that this House, having read 
and considered the correspondence relating to Egypt laid on the 
table by her Majesty's command, is of opinion that the recent 
lamentable events in the Sudan are due, in a great measure, to 
the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by her Majesty's 
Government." The motion was carried against the Government 
by one hundred majority in the House of Lords, but it was lost in 
the House of Commons, where Mr. Gladstone made an ingenious 
defense of his policy of non-intervention, and of his claim of ir- 
responsibility for the slaughter of the Hicks and the defeat of the 
Baker expedition. Relief had not been sent to Sinkat, because it 
was believed that such a move would endanger the lives of Gordon 
and those whom he had been sent to rescue, and the chief desire 
of her Majesty's Government was to secure the evacuation, the 
peaceful evacuation, of the interior of the Sudan. England was 
the guardian of Egyptian interests and the welfare of the land de- 

* February Tth, 1884. 



— 91 — 

manded that Gordon's mission should be successfully executed. 
" For," said Mr. Gladstone, " I look upon the possession of the 
Sudan — I won't say as a crime — that would be going a great deal 
too far — but I look upon it as the calamity of Egypt. It has been 
a drain on her treasury, it has been a drain on her men." The 
Government was saved in the Commons by a majority of forty- 
nine. 

In spite, now, of the reasons assigned for not having rescued 
the garrison of Sinkat, the English Government authorized the 
dispatch of General Graham for the relief of Tokar, Admiral 
Hewitt having already, with English sanction, assumed the general 
command of forces at Suakim. Before Graham had landed his 
force at Trinkitat, however, Tokar had succumbed, the greater 
^art of the garrison joining the standard of Osman Digna. On 
the last day of February Graham marched forth and met and 
overcame the intrepid lieutenant of the Mahdi on the field where 
Baker's force had been defeated. This success was followed up 
by further advances, and on March 13th a decisive victory was 
won. The backbone of the Mahdi's power in the eastern Sudan 
seemed broken. But at this junction General Graham was or- 
dered to embark his troops and leave the seat of war at once 
This was a fatal order. Then was the time, Osman's forces having 
been beaten and scattered, to open the route from Suakim to 
JBerber and afford an egress for the garrisons of the interior. The 
opportunity was missed and never was presented again. Osman 
gathered together his forces, strengthened his power at his leisxu'e, 
and held himself in readiness to carry out his old threat of 
sweeping Suakim and every soul it contained into the Red Sea. 



CHAPTER IX. 

GoKDON AT Khartum, and the Government in London. 

We left General Gordon on his way to Khartum. He arrived 
there on February 18th. At Berber he had issued a proclamation 
declaring the purpose and policy of his mission. He had come to 
establish tranquility and prevent the shedding of Moslem blood ; 



— 92 — 

to secure to tile inhaloitants their riglits of property, and put au 
end to injustice and oppression. He reduced the taxes one-half 
and wiped off all arrearages. He conferred upon the people the 
right, of which they had been deprived at the expense of time, 
treasure, and blood, to hold slaves as property, with full control 
over their services. He guaranteed them the privileges they en- 
joyed under Said Pasha and promised prosperity and happiness. 
In consequence of this proclamation Gordon's journey from Berber 
to Khartum was a triumphal march. The natives flocked to bless 
him as their king and deliverer, and he was received at Khartum 
with cries of rejoicing. His proclamation had a very different 
effect in the outside world. European nations stood aghast. 
Gordon, the arch enemy of the slave trade, declared himself its 
friend ! England received the news with consternation and hor- 
ror. Every Wilberforce of the nation raised his voice of protest. 
The clamor precipitated a second vote of censure, which was offered 
by M. Labouchere on March 15th, the ground of censure, how- 
ever, being nominally the useless waste of life in the operations 
about Suakim. The Government barely escaped defeat, the ma- 
jority being only seventeen. The criticism on General Gordon for 
his slave-trade proclamation was as blind as his policy was far- 
sighted. He had been sent to secure the evacuation of the Sudan, 
after which every sane man knew the country would return to its 
old traffic ; for Gordon could scarcely be expected to say : "We are 
to withdraw, bui^you are to frown upon the slave trade just as 
though we were here to compel you. The peaceful evacuation, 
Gordon well knew, could only be secured by conciliations, and the 
best favors to grant were those the people were bound to gain. 
The wisdom of his proclamation needed no further proof than the 
excessive friendliness of the greetings along his march and of his 
reception at Khartum. 

Gordon devoted his first day in Khartum to acts of mercy. 
He said to the people : "I come without soldiers, but with God on 
my side, to redress the evils of this land. I will not fight with 
any weapons but justice." He won the hearts of all at once by 
burning the Government books and all instruments of torment 
and torture, by releasing the unjustly imprisoned, and by devoting 
himself personally to the sick and the wronged. That first day, also, 
he sent a dispatch to Sir Evelyn Baring, saying that it would be 



— 93 — 

folly to leave the Sudan unless some one were to take his place as 
Governor-General. Anarchy and misery would surely ensue. He 
named Zubair Pasha* as the one above all others to select for the 
position. "He alone," he wrote, "has the ability to rule the Sudan, 
and would be universally accepted by the Sudan." Sir Evelyn 
Baring forwarded the suggestion the next day to Earl Granville, 
and heartily urged its adoption, believing, as he said, that Zubair 
was the only possible man. 

It had been supposed, and, in fact, General Gordon himself 
had so understood it, that he was to have the dictatorial power in 
the Sudan that the crisis demanded. The English Government, 
however, immediately repelled the notion of appointing old slave- 
trading Zubair Governor- General. A long series of telegrams 
passed between Gordon, Baring, and Granville on the subject. 
Gordon besought and Baring expostulated ; but the Government 
was blind to all reason — to everything but the fear of a renewal of 
the slave-trade, which, in point of fact, was assured the day the 
evacuation of the Sudan was decided upon. General Gordon 
afterward reduced the Government's reasoning oa this point to 
a simple form if "I will not send up A., because he will do this ; 
but I will leave the country to B., who will do exactly the same." 
Baring telegraphed to Granville (March 9th): "As regards slavery, 
it may certainly receive a stimulus from the abandonment of the 
Sudan by Egypt ; but the dispatch of Zubau' Pasha to Khartum 
will not affect the question one way or the other. No middle 
course is possible so far as the Sudan is concerned. We must 
either virtually annex the country, which is out of the question, 
or else we must accept the inevitable consequences of abandon- 
ment." But the British Government wished to abandon, and yet 
avoid the "inevitable consequences." Gordon maintained that 
to prevent anarchy it was necessary to "smash up" the Mahdi, 
and that Zubair was the only one who had enough influence and 
prestige of family to do it. Gordon could not bear the thought 
of leaving the Sudan to ruin. He sent a further argument,:]: that 

• Zubair had had great power in the Sudan, where he was king of the slave-traders. 
He was, at this time, confined in Cairo, his captivity being lightened by a liberal allowance. 
Zubair was supposed to bear an undying grudge against Gordon, because he had killed 
the former's son in the Sudan during a previous campaign. 

f'General Gordon's Journal." Page 42. (Sept. 17th.) 

tMarch 8th. 



— 94 — 

should have had some weight with the Government: "If you do 
not send Zubair you have no chance of getting the garrisons away; 
this is a heavy argument in favor of sending him." 

But it was no use. On March 28th, Earl Granville sent a long 
note to Sir Evelyn Baring, in which he reviewed the discussion at 
length, and even rehearsed the slavery antecedents of Zubair. It 
is impossible after all the months that have intervened since that 
note was written to read it dispassionately. Granville wrote: 
"Her Majesty's Government, on the perusal of General Gordon's 
advice, were under the impression that he gave undue weight to 
the assumed necessity of an immediate evacuation of Khartum, 
and they inquired whether it was urgent to make an arrangement 
at once to provide for his successor, expressing a hope that Gen- 
eral Gordon would remain for some time." In other words, her 
Majesty's Government thought that the "necessity of an imme- 
diate evacuation" could be more judiciously determined in Down- 
ing Street than in Khartum. The question could be decided cer- 
tainly more safely. It is not necessary to go through Lord Gran- 
ville's note in detail. The vain desire is clearly manifest throughout 
that Gordon should not abandon the Sudan in evacuating. Gordon 
said that* he could pursue but one coiu'se ; Granville denied him 
thatj but suggested no alternative. "Let Gordon stay a while : 
the Government will deliberate. So far as is known he is not in 
any immediate danger at Khartum. We will not let Zubair leave 
Cairo." That was the gist of the note. A week later Mr. Glad- 
stone naively remarked that General Gordon could leave Khartum 
"at anytime if he felt so disposed." Little did he know the fiber 
of the man's honor if he thought he could, under any conditions, 
"feel disposed" to desert the garrisons he had been sent to rescue. 
He felt that the lives of some 29,000 persons, composing the gar- 
risons at Bahr Ghazelle, Sennar, Kassala, Khartum, Shendy, Ber- 
ber, Abu Hamed, and Dongola were in his hands. He would not 
be false to his trust. 

The story of Gordon's government at Khartum, of his dealings 
with the people, of his sorties against the threatening forces of 
the Mahdi, and of his untiring zeal and dauntless personal cour- 
age, is. told in his own journals* and dispatches to Sir Evelyn 

*A large and very valuable part of Gordon's journals were lost wlien Colonel Stewart's 
party was massacred, In September, 1884. Gordon Had entrusted them to tliat officer, be- 



95 - 

JBaring, and in the letters of Mr. Power, the correspondent of the 
London Times. Oui* concern is less with those details than with 
the relations existing between Gordon and the British Govern- 
jnent. The Egyptian Government quite drops out of notice, all 
negotiations proceeding independently of the Khedive. 

From first to last, so long as communication was kept up with 
Gordon, the British Government pursued a policy of opposition 
to his proposals. His long-continued and persistent calls for 
Zubair were disregarded. He desired permission to proceed to 
El Obeid for a peaceful negotiation with the Mahdi, whom he ap- 
pointed Sultan* of Kordofan ; but he was told to remain at Khar- 
ium. He said that Berber should be relieved, and that the route 
from Suakim to Berber should be kept open ; instead of this, the 
^British troops were withdrawn from the Eed Sea littoral. He de- 
.sired that Turkish troops should be sent there ; but this proposal 
"was vetoed, presumably on diplomatic grounds. He wished to go 
from Khartum to Bahr Ghazelle and the Equatorial Provinces ; 
T3ut he was told again not to proceed beyond Khartum. He 
begged that troops be sent to Wady Half a and Assuan; but the 
request was refused. Later he urged the necessity of a British 
diversion at Berber ; but his plea was not heeded. Was it not 
strange that the English Government should have sent Gordon 
\o the Sudan with the explicit understanding that his judgment 
should determine the means and methods of evacuation, and then 
jiever, in any essential particular, follow his advice ? The world 
<3alled it almost a crime. Early in April Gordon sent an undated 
message to Sir Evelyn Baring, containing the following words : 
*'As far as I can understand, the situation is this : you state your 
intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you 
refuse me Zubair. I consider myself free to act according to cir- 
cumstances. I shall hold on here as 1 ong as I can ; and if I can 
suppress the rebellion, I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to 
Ihe Equator ; and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning 
the garrisons of Sennar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the 
•certainty that you will, eventually, be forced to smash up the 

liCTlug that they would be safer thau if kept by himself, in Khartum. Stewart's Journals, 
which Gordon considered very valuable, were lost at the same time. Viae seq. 

*The appointment was scornfully rejected by the Mahdi, who sent dervishes to Gor- 
•don, ordering him to embrace the Moslem faith. 



- 96 

Mahdi under great difficulties, if you would retain peace in Egypt." 
As Mr. Hake says :* " The breacli was complete. The great sol- 
dier declined to serve as an instrument of dishonor." 

In England the bitterest criticism was heaped upon Mr. Glad- 
stone. The Liberals in Parliament became hostile to their own. 
Government. On the 12th of May a third vote of censure was 
jDroposed, in which the Government was charged with indifference- 
to the success of Gordon's mission and the safety of his person. 
Again the Government escaped, but with the small majority of 28 
in 578 votes cast. The result would probably have been fatal to 
Mr. Gladstone, if the vote had been postponed for a month. Then 
his Government would have been held responsible for the fall of' 
Berber and the terrible massacre that occurred there on June 2d. 
A fourth vote might have been proposed, had not a different phase 
of the Egyptian trouble been forced upon Parliament for consid- 
eration before the news was received. 

As always, the finances of Egypt were in a bad way. For 
three years the deficits of the Treasury had been accumulating, 
till they amounted to something over £8,000,000. The indemni- 
ties for losses sustained in the bombardment, burning, and pillage 
of Alexandria, made about half of this sum ; and the expenditures 
for the military constituted the chief item in the remaining half. 
The British Government desired to meet the deficit by a new 
loan ; but, as this could not be done without conflicting with the 
Law of Liquidation, it was decided to summon to a Conference 
those Powers that had agreed to the establishment of the law. 
Accordingly, on the 19th of April, Lord Granville sent an identi- 
cal note to the great Powers, inviting them to a Conference in. 
London, to consider whether a modification of the Laws of Liqui- 
dation would not be for the financial interest of Egypt. Ger- 
many, Austria, Kussia, and Italy accepted the invitation at once ; 
but France, with something of her old-time jealousy, objected to< 
a Conference that could not consider the political as well as the 
financial question. Lord Granville, however, was firm in his in- 
sistance upon the limitation so far as the Conference was con- 
cerned ; but he entered into a diplomatic correspondence with M. 
Waddington. The result of the exchange of views, or, as it was 

*"Tlie story of Ctinese Gordon." Vol. II. Page 166. 



— 97 — 

«alled, "the Anglo-French agreement," was submitted to Parlia- 
ment by Mr. Gladstone before the Conference met. Trance re- 
signed all claim of control in Egypt, and agreed never to land 
troops in the Delta without the consent of England. On the other 
hand, England agreed to withdraw her military forces from Egypt 
before the 1st day of January, 1888, unless the Powers should re- 
quest the contrary. In the meantime she was to prepare a scheme 
for the neutralization of Egypt, which should be submitted to the 
Powers. The Caisse de la Dette Puhlique, it was agreed, should 
1)6 placed under the multiple direction of the Powers. But all 
these arrangements, as Mr. Gladstone said, were dependent upon 
the will of the Conference, which, in turn, should be binding upon 
England according as Parliament, by its votes, determined. 

England being thus carefully guarded behind two big ifs^ the 
Conference met in London on June 28th. Its progress was slow, 
and as it failed of its purpose ultimately its details need not be 
given. The Powers were so hopelessly disagreed that the Con- 
ference was dissolved on the 2d of August. France, the leader of 
the opposition to England, could not secure the formulation of a 
future policy. As a last straw she endeavored to obtain an ad- 
journment of the Conference till October, but, instead, it was 
adjourned sine die ; and thus, all participation in the affairs of 
Egypt was lost to her. This was practically accomplished by her 
-withdrawal from a joint supervision at the time of Arabi's Re- 
bellion ; but now, for the first time, her position of looker-on was 
determined. Germany seemed satisfied with having egged on 
France to a point where the refusal of her demands would only in- 
crease the growing coolness between the British and French Gov- 
ernments. Turkey, of course, had found no following in urging 
her rights and ability to control Egypt without the help of Eastern 
Powers. Italy, the only pronounced ally of England in the Con- 
ference, retired with the distinction that this alliance had brought 
upon her, and accepted, as her share of the " spoils" the thanks 
which Sir John Saville Lumley, British Minister to Italy, was in- 
structed to bestow upon her for the support which she gave to the 
British proposals in the Conference. 

The glory of the collapse of the Conference, if there were any, 
fell to England. It was demonstrated that the Powers could not 
control Egypt in unison ; it was left to England to do the work 



— 98 — 

alone and to earn the praise or the blame. The financial question', 
remaining still unsettled, the Government commissioned Lord. 
Northbrook to go to Egypt and investigate the " condition o£ 
affairs so as to advise the English Government as to what counsel 
should be given to the Egyptian Government in the present cir- 
cumstances." Of course it was understood that the "counsel" 
would be of a more peremptory character than advice usually is ; 
for counsel and command to the Khedive have long been regarded 
in England as one and the same thing. The High Commission 
found the finances of Egypt in such a muddle that one of two 
courses seemed inevitable ; to make a declaration of bankruptcy- 
with a reduction of the coupons, or to turn the revenues tempo- 
rarily from the sinking fund for the redemption of the certified- 
debt into the Egyptian treasury. The latter alternative was- 
chosen, and wisely, as it seems, although it was a breach of the 
Law of Liquidation. Lord Northbrook held that, if the tribute ta 
Turkey and the expenses of the Government could be met for a. 
time, and if the revenues should afterward be reverted to the 
sinking fund, the coupon holders would lose less than by a decla- 
ration of bankruptcy. By the decree of the Khedive, September 
18th, the Law of Liquidation was suspended for six weeks. This 
called forth the united remonstrance of the Powers. The plan,, 
however, was persisted in. 

General Gordon, meanwhile, seemed to have dropped com- 
pletely out of iftind. No word had been received from him since 
May. By the fall of Berber telegraphic communications had been 
cut off, and only the vaguest rumors from any point south of 
Dongola made their way to Cairo. At the eleventh hour there had 
been a pretense of opening the route from Suakim to Berber by 
sending a railway plant to Suakim. Desultory dispatches of the 
progress in its construction and of skirmishes with Osman Digna. 
were received during the summer ; but no one was surprised that 
the work was discontinued before autumn. This railway scheme- 
was perhaps less of a farce than the Khedive Ismail's projected 
railway from Wady Haifa south to Hanneck ; for Ismail left his 
plant to be covered by the sweeping sands of the Nubian desert,. 
Avhile the English carried theirs off to India. In order to divert 
attention from the Berber massacre the success of Admiral 
Hewett's mission to King John, of Abyssinia, the news of which 



— 99 — 

liad been received at about tlie same time, had been somewhat 
magnified. He secured by treaty access to a third route to Khar 
tum from Massowah through Abyssinia. The sequel has shown how 
valueless the concession was. But the attention of England had 
been very generally diverted from Egypt altogether. The Fran- 
chise Bill at home had been the absorbing topic during the early 
summer. There had, however, been many rumors afloat of an ex- 
pedition to be sent to the relief of General Gordon. But the 
weeks had drifted by, and July, the month first named for the dis- 
patch of the expedition, was past before any active preparations 
were made. These were begun in August by the vote of a credit 
of £300,000 to defray expenses. It seemed, finally, as if the con- 
science of the Government were quickened. 



CHAPTER X. 

Wolseley's Expedition. Conclusion. 

The command of the relief expedition was entrusted to Lord 
"Wolseley, the Sir Garnet Wolseley who had suppressed Arabi's 
Rebellion and thereby won for himself elevation to the peerage. 
At first Lord "Wolseley had been asked simply to draw up the 
plans of the expedition; but, as General Stephenson, the com- 
mander of the forces in Egypt had not approved the scheme, 
Wolseley was called upon to assume the command himself. At 
his suggestion the Government had decided upon the Nile route 
in opposition to the very generally expressed advice of the most 
competent authorities, among whom was General Stephenson. The 
latter favored the route from Suakim to Berber as the most direct 
and the shortest. If an advance of only ten miles a day were 
made, this journey could be accomplished within a month. The 
objections to this route were the lack of water and the certainty 
that Osman Digna would dispute every inch of the way. They 
were formidable objections certainly, but not insuperable. The 
route would have been far preferable to the one decided upon on 
account of the great saving in time. 
LofC. 



— 100 — 

There was still anotlier route than the one chosen that seems 
never to have been considered, although it has always been the 
beaten way from Cairo to Khartum. It coincides with the route 
Wolseley preferred, except that, instead of making the long jour- 
ney through the horse-shoe bend of the Nile, south of Wady Haifa, 
where the river is impassable to large craft on account of the cata- 
racts, it strikes oif across the Nubiandesert from Korosko to Abu 
Hamed, the points that represent the heel of the shoe. The desert 
journey is accomplished in about six days, the distance being two 
hundred and thirty miles, or somewhat less than the distance 
from Suakim to Berber. The route is not altogether pleasant, as 
the line of skeletons of men and beasts who have perished on the 
way testifies; but there is a wellat the midway station, and a flying 
column could have carried enough water along with it. In spite, 
however, of the greater disadvantages of the circuitous route, 
Wolseley decided to stick to the river. 

The commander arrived in Egypt on the 8th of September, 
and began to make elaborate and tedious preparations. His force 
was to consist of 10,000 men. To transport them he had deter- 
mined to employ Canadian boatmen, and to use small boats simi- 
lar to those he had used in a Canadian expedition which he had 
commanded on the Red River some years before. The boats and 
boatmen were not ready before the end of September, when more 
than a month of high water had already been lost. If the expedi- 
tion had started! in July, as originally suggested, even steamers of 
light draft might have been towed up the cataracts, which, it must 
be remembered, are nothing more than long stretches of whirl- 
pools and eddies that scarcely roar or rush as they wind in and out 
and around the thousand and one rocky islets. After the middle 
of August, when the Nile began to fall, every day passed was a 
precious day lost. 

An impulse was given to the work at the end of September. A 
voice from the desert was heard that had been stilled for months. 
It had all of its old ring. "lam awaiting the British forces," 
wrote Gordon, "in order to evacuate the Egyptian garrisons.'" 
His purpose had not changed since the day he started for the 
Sudan. On the 29th of September, Mr. Power's journal of events 
in Khartum, from the first of May to the end of July, was given in 
the London Times. It was a thrilling story. The indignation 



— 101 — 

that the following extract aroused was intense: "Since the dis- 
patch which arrived the day before yesterday [July 29th], all hope 
of relief by our Government is at an end; so when our provisions, 
which we have at a stretch for two months, are oaten, we must fall; 
nor is there any chance, with the soldiers we have, and the great 
crowd of women, children, etc., of oiu' being able to cut our way 
through the Arabs. We have not steamers for all, and it is only 
from the steamers we can meet the rebels." The two months were 
past : had the garrison already fallen ? Early in October further 
news was received contained in a series of dispatches sent by Gen- 
eral Gordon to Massowah. None of them, however, bore a later 
date than Power's message to the Times. In one of them (July 
31st) Gordon writes: " Reading over youi* telegram of the 5th 
May, 1884, you ask me to state cause and intention in staying at 
Khartum, knowing Government means to abandon Sudan, and in 
answer I say, I stay at Khartum because Arabs have shut us up, 
and will not let us out." Again and again Gordon referred in his 
journal to the impertinence of the above request: State your rea- 
sons 1 "The '■reasons' are those horribly plucky Arabs."* 

The immediate result of these dispatches was that all eyes 
were tiu'ned upon Lord Wolseley. The criticism of his move- 
ments was less than the impatience at his delays. In the Gov- 
ernment's letter of instructions, dated October 8th, he was in- 
formed that the primary object of his expedition was the rescue 
of General Gordonj and Colonel Stewart. He was not to go far- 
ther south than Dongola, unless it became actually necessary ; 
and, in no case, was he to proceed beyond Khartum, not even to 
relieve the garrison at Sennar. Such instructions were scarcely 
calculated to arouse Lord Wolseley to the activity that the pur- 
pose of his expedition required. Gordon had said that he could 
not leave Khartum, and yet the Government talked about rescu- 
ing him at a point midway between that city and Wady Haifa. 
The general who had stilled the cry of "Egypt for the Egyp- 

*" Journal." Page 53 (Sept. 19tli). 

tGordon's view of the relief expedition is interesting in ttis connection. He wrote in 
Ms journals (Sept. 24) : " I altogether decline the imputation that the projected expedition 
has come to relieve me. It has come to save our national HONOEi/i extricating the garrisons, 
etc., from a position in ivhich our action in Egypt has placed these qarrisons. I loas relief ex- 
pedition No. \. They are relief expedition No. "i,. ... I am not the resc ited tom&, and I 
will not be." (The italics are his.) 

7 



— 102 — 

tians" with a skill and promptness tliat called forth the applause 
of the world, seemed to have assumed now a character quite in 
keeping with the desires of his Government. They had been slow 
and irresolute in all their relations with the Sudan. Each step 
was taken only when the irresistible force of public opinion com- 
pelled. By keeping just behind the public demand and the ne- 
cessities of the moment, the Government had acted always just 
too late. General Gordon gives a good instance of this failing in 
his Journals :* " Take the Tokar business : had Baker been sup- 
ported, say, by 500 men, he would not have been defeated; yet, 
after he was defeated, you go and send a force to relieve the 
town. Had Baker been supported by these 500 men, he would, 
in all probability, have been victorious, and would have pushed on 
to Berber ; and, once there, Berber would not have fallen. "What 
was right to do in March, was right to do in February. We sent 
an expedition in March, so we ought to have sent it in February ; 
and then, the worst of it was that Baker, having been defeated, 
when you did send your expedition to Tokar, Baker's force no 
longer existed, and his guns resist me at Berber. It is truly de- 
plorable, the waste of men and money, on account of our inde- 
cision." 

The advance of the Nile force was lamentably slow. By the 
20th of November there were only 3,000 troops out of some 16,- 
000 in Egypt that had passed Wady Haifa. Within the next three 
weeks, however the 10,000 troops composing the expeditionary 
force were all south of Korosko. It seemed as though Lord 
Wolseley were preparing to write a book on " My Winter on the 
Nile." He would have had the advantage of the thousand and 
one tourists who have written under the above title, in that he 
pushed beyond the usual limit at the first cataract, and main- 
tained a progress that all might envy, who have enjoyed the mo- 
tionlessness of the dahabieh. A description of a Nile journey 
is nothing unless it dwells upon the laziness, the idleness, the do- 
nothingness of the life. 

In the meantime the news of another horror had been received 
from the Siidan. On the 10th of September General Gordon had 
sent Colonel Stewart down the Nile in command of an expedition 
against Berber. He considered it important that the rebel forti- 

*Page 151 (Oct. 8th), 



— 103 — 

fications there should be destroyed, thus enabling Stewart to open 
communication with the expedition of relief, concerning whose 
movements Gordon was very much in the dark. It is also hinted* 
that Gordon wished, by this method, to save the life of his brave 
lieutenant. Before the fall of Berber he had sent down into 
Egypt more than 600 soldiers and 2,000 people ; but this was the 
first attempt since then to add to the number. Stewart succeeded 
in demolishing the Berber fortifications, and then, with Power, 
the Times correspondent, and about forty others, he parted from 
the main force, which returned to Khartum, and steamed on 
toward Dongola. After passing Abu Hamed — where he might 
have met a flying column from Korosko if that route had only 
been selected — his steamer struck a rock and could not be shoved 
ojBf. He and his companions were now induced by promises of peace 
to accept the hospitality of Suleiman Wad Gamr, in whose country 
they were. Unarmed, they met him at the house of a blind man 
to negotiate for the purchase of camels to take them to Dongola; 
but, while there, they were basely set upon and murdered. The 
bodies of Stewart and Power, the only Englishmen besides Gor- 
don south of Dongola, were thrown into the river as food for the 
crocodiles. The valuable journals of Gordon and Stewart fell into 
the hands of the rebels. Hussein, the stoker of the steamer, es- 
caped death, and after a servitude of four months gave the first 
authoritative report of the massacre. Undoubted rumors, how- 
ever, had reached the force advancing up the Nile early in October. 
The news added fresh fuel to the fire of English indignation. The 
Government that had shielded itself from the responsibility of 
Hicks's death could find no way of escape from the blame that now 
attached to it. Stewart had been appointed Gordon's first lieu- 
tenant, had been sent to the Sudan for a specific purpose, and had 
then been abandoned to the fate that befell him. Those who had 
been wondering if the last act of the play were to be comedy or 
tragedy, questioned no longer. Alarming rumors were now cir- 
culated regarding Gordon. It was said that he had been captured 
by the Mahdi ; then that Khartum had fallen ; and again that the 
mines had been exploded and had blown Gordon into the air. On 
the 14th of November, however, Wolseley received from Gordon a 
set of cipher dispatches, dated November 4th. Gordon lived ; 

•" The Story of CMnese Gordon," by A. Egmont Hake, p. ISO. 



— 104 — 

but lie was in imminent danger. The Mahdi was within eight 
hours of Khartum, which had provisions for about forty days. 
Five steamers had gone from Khartum to Metemneh to await 
the expected relief. These facts were kept from the public, which 
only knew that Gordon was alive. 

The beginning of the new year found LordWolseley still work- 
ing his tedious way up the Nile. The apathy that had followed 
long-continued impatience in England was, however, dispelled, 
early in January, by a very explicit telegram from Lord Wolseley 
to the Prince of Wales. His lordship announced, with something 
of a theatrical air, that he would enter Khartum on the 24th of 
January. The public confidence in Wolseley's promises was 
great ; for he had always had a way of announcing what he pro- 
posed to accomplish on a certain day, and of proceeding forthwith 
to carry out his undertaking to the letter. Since the battle of Tel 
el Kebir, however, the public had been deluded by so many vain 
plans, never carried to their execution, that almost any promise 
must need go begging for confidence. Still the general public was 
willing to trust for a last time, and the recent article in the Lon- 
don Times* was forgotten, that called upon Mr. Gladstone to re- 
sign " in order to enable a new ministry, not crippled by personal 
engagements injurious to the true interests of England, to adopt 
a vigorous policy in Egypt, the colonies, and foreign affairs gen- 
erally." 

While Wolaeley was hurrying his troops forward to Korti, 
which he had determined to make his base of operations, there 
were perplexing rumors afloat concerning the re-entrance of the 
Sublime Porte as an active factor in the Egyptian question. The 
announcement soon followed that the Sultan was preparing to 
dispatch troops to Suakim in order to overcome Osman Digna, 
who was still zealously serving the Mahdi in that locality. Her 
Majesty's Government at once resolved that Turkish troops should 
not be landed on the Ked Sea littoral. But on what ground could 
England prevent it ? It had never claimed the power of a protec- 
torate ; how, then, could it exercise such power? The answer 
was easily found in the history of the preceding years. The Brit- 
ish Government had never hesitated to act as the dominant power ; 
it had only hesitated to assume the responsibility that must neces- 

*Jaliuary 5tli, 1885. 



— 105 — 

sarily be associated with that power. It seemed now as if England 
would be forced finally to acknowledge herself the positive pro- 
tector of Egypt, when suddenly the attention of the Government 
and the people was diverted from diplomacy to the war operations 
in the Sudan. 

Having concentrated his forces at Korti, Lord Wolseley, on the 
4th of January, had ordered General Earle, with a force of about 
2,500 men, to proceed to Berber, by way of the long bend in the 
Nile. He was to get possession of Abu Hamed and Berber, in order 
that the desert routes from those points might be made use of in 
case of evacuation. On the 8th of January, General Stewart, 
with a picked force of about 1,500 men, was dispatched from 
Korti straight across the desert to Metemneh, there to meet the 
steamers that General Gordon had sent out from Khartum. This 
desert route was only about thirty miles shorter than the one from 
Korosko to Abu Hamed, which might have been taken in Septem- 
ber. Four precious months would thus have been saved. All 
went well with General Stewart's desert journey, till he neared 
the wells of Abu Klea, less than twenty -five miles from Metemneh. 
He encamped near them on the 16th of January, and on the 17th 
his force was attacked by 10,000 rebels. His troops fought as 
Englishmen always fight, and the rebels, with all their superiority 
of numbers, were repulsed. The English loss was sixty-five killed 
and nearly a hundred wounded. Among the former was the 
famous Colonel Burnaby, who made the wonderful "Ride to Khiva." 
He is said to have died "like a true British bull-dog, with his right 
hand clenched in death about the throat of the Arab whose spear 
was thrust through the Colonel's neck." On the 19th, a still more 
formidable force was encountered ; but again the rebels were 
repulsed. General Stewart had received a wound which he would 
not admit was serious, but pushed on to Gubat on the Nile, not 
attempting to force Metemneh, which was in the hands of the rebels. 
At Gubat were Gordon's steamers and the inspiring message : 
"All right at Khartum. Can hold out for years." It seemed as if 
fortune served the will of England. The enthusiasm that greeted 
the news of Stewart's victories, and of Gordon's message was 
boundless. A confidence was begotten that made final success 
seem already within England's grasp. The world did not know 
then, as we do now, that the message was written for the enemy,* 

*"Story of Chinese Gordon," p. 200. By A. Egmont Hake. 



— 106 — 

and that Gordon had sent word to "Wolseley nearly two months 
before that he had provisions enough for about forty days. The 
Commander-in-Chief had received a later dispatch, dated December 
14th, in which Gordon said : "Our troops in Khartum are suffering 
from lack of provisions. . . . We want you to come quickly." 
But Wolseley had kept Gordon's peril a secret, only using the 
utmost haste — at the eleventh hour — to secure his release. The 
world, therefore, rejoiced at the news. 

Several days were now fatally misspent. It was not till the 
24th of January that Sir Charles Wilson started on Gordon's 
steamers for Khartiim. On the 28th, after having been assailed all 
along his journey by armed Arabs on the banks of the river. Col- 
onel Wilson appeared in sight of Khartum. Instead of the eager 
welcome he expected, he was met with a furious fusilade from all 
sides, and before him on the Government house floated the Mahdi's 
colors. Khartum had fallen, and Gordon was captured or killed. 
Assured of the terrible disaster, Wilson hastily beat a retreat. He 
lost both his steamers at the Sixth cataract, and only reached 
Gubat after a most perilous adventure, from which he was rescued 
by Lord Charles Beresford. But on the way down he had learned 
from the natives that Khartum had fallen on the 26th. Gordon 
had been lost by two days. With fateful instinct he had written,* 
October 13th : "It is, of course, on the cards that Khartum is taken 
under the nose of the expeditionary force, vrhich will be just too 
latey It probably never will be known just how he died; and it 
matters little which story we believe. All agree that Faraz Pasha 
treacherously betrayed the city, and that the martyr died like a 
hero. 

To the western world the news of the fall of Khartum was like 
a thunderbolt from a clear sky. At the very moment of rejoicing, 
fortune and faith were crushed. The calamity marked an epoch. 
The press and the people demanded that from that day the great 
statesman, whose policy had always been peace, should bear the 
arms he^was loath to assume and slow to use in a strong and 
swift campaign of revenge, or make way for a ministry of war. 
The public patience and forbearance were strained beyond their 
utmost tension. The final catastrophe was the natural outcome 
of all the mistakes of England in Egypt. Since the suppression 

■"'Journals," Page 178. 



— 107 — 

of Arabi's Kebellion there had been little to admire in the British 
policy. Forced to remain and protect her own interests, and 
guard with jealous care the water-way to India, England hesitated 
to accept, and endeavored to shirk at every step, the responsibility 
that her power and position had forced upon her. It may be true 
that the British interference in Egypt was not of Mr. Gladstone's 
choosing ; but, when he accepted the control of the Government, 
he accepted the situation in Egypt as it was, and not as he might 
wish it to be. Since his accession in 1880, it had never been possi- 
ble or desu-able for England to withdraw her influence from 
Egypt ; but Mr. Gladstone could not look that fact in the face. 
After Arabi's downfall, in 1882, the British Parliament, press, and 
public urged their Government to declare its policy or intentions 
in Egypt ; but they iirged in vain. Nothing was ever decided till 
the exigencies or the disasters of the moment rendered action ab- 
solutely imperative. This halting policy had resulted in disaster, 
slaughter, and the final tragedy. 

Scarcely had the world recovered from the first great shock of 
Gordon's death, when it was announced that General Earle had 
been killed in an engagement with the rebels on February 9th, 
while pressing toward Abu Hamed ; and then came the sad news 
that General Stewart's wound had proved fatal on February 16th. 
Perhaps Wolseley began to have some concern for his own life 
At all events, he lost no time in gathering together the outlying 
portions of his army. The perilous desert journey from Gubat to 
Korti was safely made; and the river expedition that Genera 
Earle had commanded, was recalled. With all possible expedition 
the army retreated to Dongola, where it took up its quarters for 
the summer. Such was the end of the lamentable failiire to res- 
cue Gordon. 

The cry for vengeance with which England was still ringing 
had to be recognized in some way. To counteract the humiliation 
of Wolseley's retreat, active operations had been undertaken on 
the Red Sea littoral. Troops were personally reviewed by the 
Queen, and then ordered to the seat of war in the eastern Sudan. 
It was declared that the Government had determined to open the 
route to Berber and then to "smash" the Mahdi. But the most 
barren, desolate and difficult of desert routes was still guarded by 
Osman Digna, the lieutenant of the Mahdi, whose forces had more 



— 108 — 

than once carried destruction into the English camp. It was a 
difficult task the Government set the English soldiers, to accom- 
plish that journey of two hundred and fifty miles amid all the 
natural perils of the desert and with hostile hordes ready to s wooip 
dov/n upon them from every mountain along the way. But the 
accomplishment was heyond the intention of the Government. A 
show of activity was made at Suakim with soldiers and railway 
plant until Mr. Gladstone had recovered from the effect of the vote 
of censure that so nearly* cost him his government when Parlia- 
ment reassembled at the end of February. The beleaguered 
garrison of Kassala was sending piteous appeals for help that were 
like the old cries from Khartum. But aside from this the call for 
war was still inspired of vengeance only. Vengeance, however, is 
a quality that Mr. Gladstone's character — to his honor be it said — 
has never known. Supported by a narrow majority, he turned his 
thoughts from the stinging failures of his policy abroad to the grand 
purposes of his life-work at home. The cry for vengeance never 
found an echo in the sand hills of the desert, while at home it had 
dwindled, within two months, to the murmur of a jeering and de- 
riding opposition. The epilogue of the tragedy, however, might 
better have been spoken after a farce. All the irony of an eigh- 
teenth century comedy was contained in Lord Wolseley's farewell 
address, in which he announced the withdrawal of the British 
troops from the Sudan and highly praised " the conduct of all the 
departments of the service during the campaign." One asks to 
whom and to what he issued the farewell. Was it to the shades of 
Hicks Pasha, of the Stewarts, of Earle, of Gordon, and of the brave 
British soldiers whose whitening bones would make the desert 
paths plainer to the caravans of war or peace that should there- 
after wind across the sands of the Sudan ? Or, was it to the rival 
Mahdis — ^for since the death of Gordon the glory of Mehemet 
Ahmed had been dimmed by the claims of a Falser Prophet than 
himself— who were threatening a greater destruction among be- 
lievers than had been accomplished by the trained troops of a 
superior civilization '? Perhaps Osman Digna heard the address or, 
from the hills about Suakim where he and his band had so success- 
fully harassed and hindered the invaders, watched the withdrawal. 

* The vote was carried in the Upper House by a large majority, but lost in the Lower 
House by the narrow majority of fourteen. 



— 109 — 

He must have smiled — for he was a European, and cannot be sup- 
posed to have acquired the disposition of the Mussulmans with 
their faith — as he looked down upon the few miles of the incom- 
plete and deserted railway. 

And yet the withdrawal from the Stidan in May, 1885, was the 
wisest act of Mr. Gladstone's Sudanese policy. Gordon himself 
had said :* " If Khartum falls, then go quietly back to Cairo, for you 
will only lose men and spend money uselessly in carrying on the 
campaign." The troops could not go as far as Cairo, however, for 
the Egyptian boundary needed to be guarded. The frontier gar- 
rison was placed at Wady Haifa. This was the proper limit ; 
for it brought Korosko, the terminus of the desert route, under 
the protection of the Nile patrol of steamers, while being itself 
within easy reach of reinforcements from Assuan. The natural 
barriers of protection, the long cataract south of Wady Haifa, and 
the six days' desert guarding Korosko, make the present Egyptian 
garrisons practically impregnable. And so the Sudan was left to 
its inherent anarchy. But first England offered naively to let 
Turkey set up a government there. Tiirkey declined with thanks. 
The Sudan pays no tribute. The Porte cares little for the mere 
honor of being acknowledged suzerain ; its solicitude is for some- 
thing more tangible. So long as there is no interference with her 
tribute prerogatives, Tiirkey will make no attempts to establish 
her claim of authority, by sending troops or treasure to Egypt or 
the Sudan. After Turkey refused to act the part of what seemed 
cat's-paw to England, Italy became clamorous for the distinction. 
But her ambition never has extended beyond the Red Sea littoral. 
The Sudanese have thus been left practically to themselves since 
May, 1885. They have begun to prepare their country for the 
ultimate reception of civilization much more effectually than an 
external force could have done. The Mahdi and Osman Digna are 
dead. Intestine strifes among different factions have so wasted 
the resources of the land that the misery of the people is as great, 
probably, or greater than in the days when an Egyptian Pasha 
was Governor-General. Perhaps the people already look back 
upon the time when Gordon first ruled among them as the period 
of their happiest prosperity. It is not an impossibility that the 
dreams of Sir Samuel Baker may yet come true, in which he 

* "Journals," page 1T9 (Oct. iStH). 



— 110 -^ 

pictures to himself the upper Nile region as freed frora the curse 
of the slave-traffic, as accessible to the outer world, and as bring- 
ing forth the bounties of tropical increase. Before this Utopian 
result is secured, however, the influence of the Anglo-Saxon will 
again be needed. 

We must now take a final look at Egypt proper. The Khe- 
dive's Government played a small part in the game that cost Eng- 
land so dearly. Their chief concern had been to keep their head 
above the ever-flowing, never-ebbing tide of debts. It cannot be 
said that they succeeded. It has been seen to what extremities 
Lord Northbrook was obliged to go in order to relieve the finan- 
cial embarrassments of 1884, and how the Powers were incensed 
at his action. By way of conciliation a financial scheme was 
drawn up, to which the Powers agreed, and which was presented 
to Parliament in March, 1885. It has, however, not yet become a 
law. The agreement guarantees a loan of £9,000,000, to be used 
in lifting the Egyptian debt. The loan is to be liquidated by the 
repayment of £325,000 annually ; and this sum is to be considered 
the first charge against the Egyptian revenues until the entire 
loan is lifted. The customary provision is included, which ex- 
tends taxation to all foreigners resident in Egypt. This provision 
has often enough been indorsed ; it should now be executed. The 
Egyptians will then believe that the Giaours are not without a 
sense of honor. The agreement further provides for reductions 
in interest — ^wBich, though absolutely necessary, partake some- 
what of the spirit of repudiation — and, as always, for an "exhaus- 
tive investigation into the revenue earning capacity of Egypt." 
The agreement seems to have been drawn up in the interest of 
Egypt. This rare quality may have something to do with the de- 
lay in its adoption. In the meantime, the discovery o'f petroleum 
within the boundaries of Egypt suggests a possible solution of the 
financial problem more satisfactory than the agreements and in- 
vestigations of European Powers can ever secure. 

There is one step remaining to be taken in Egypt that will do 
more than anything else toward securing the final settlement of 
the conflict between the East and West. England must assume 
the burdens of her authority. She can never loose her hold of the 
country that guards the water-way to India. She is jealous of her 
power. When her attention was concentrated on the Afghan im- 



— Ill — 

broglio last May, France thought it an opportune moment to re- 
gain her lost prestige in Egypt. But if England's attention were 
-diverted for the moment, her representatives were not without 
power in Egypt. M. de Freycinet failed as utterly then as he had 
■in the day of Arabi. England has the single-handed control, and 
she means to maintain it. The welfare of Egypt rests en this 
resolution. Many people, who claim the divine right of judging 
the motives of an action, and who fail to see so far as its results, 
^irge that England is actuated solely by selfishness and the greed 
of power in asserting her control in Egypt, and that she is merely 
fortifying herself against that certain day when some groping arm 
of Russian territory shall reach a southern sea. They say she 
makes the interest of Egypt secondary to her own ; therefore, the 
power of England in Egypt must be resisted. Granting even that 
these are England's motives, cannot the same wind blow good to 
both countries ? Is it a sound principle that what benefits one 
•country must injure another? The fact is, that the exten- 
sion of the dominion of Great Britain, while bringing glory to 
ihe nation itself, is for the interest of the civilized world. 
The Anglo-Saxon influences of Christianity and civilization 
are the best known. As opposed to Eassian influences they are 
iconoclastic and creative. The Russian Empire extends its domin- 
ion, and there appears no sign of assimilation ; the . subjugated 
people pays its tribute and its homage, but retains its language, 
its religion, and its customs. England, on the other hand, makes 
ber furthermost territory British in reality as well as in name ; ig- 
norance, superstition, and savagery melt away under contact with 
the Anglo Saxon influence. That England, in spite of all her mis- 
takes, has had a beneficent influence upon Egypt, no one can doubt 
who compares the civilization under Mehemet Ali with that of to- 
day. This would be the trite assertion of an accepted fact, were 
it not for the stupendous financial follies of Ismail. The storm 
raged in his day ; and the gloom still hangs over Egypt. It can 
only be pierced by the protecting arm of England. She has 
shrunk all along from the final step of annexation ; but she re- 
mains the virtual suzerain of Egypt. A truly anomalous condition 
of affairs is presented to view. England has the control ; Egypt 
bears the burdens ; and Turkey reaps the profit. The role of 
Turkey is quite superfluous. She has never yielded to Egjpt the 



— 112 — 

sligMest return for the tribute she has regularly exacted and the 
troops she has occasionally employed. It is true that she granted 
Ismail the title of Khedive for an enormous consideration ; but if 
Mehemet Ali had been supported in his just struggle for independ- 
ence in 1842, the ruler in Egypt might call himself Khedive, Em- 
peroi", or Mikado, without the expenditure of a single piaster. It 
is not yet too late for severance. The vast sum of money paid by^ 
way of tribute to the Porte, may be considered duly to have pur- 
chased for Egypt her independence of Turkey. This violation of 
contract could not be effected without a struggle. But with Eng- 
land's support it could result only one way. Once accomplished, 
Egypt might yet shake off the shackles of debt, and the relations 
of the great Power of the West to Egypt in the East might b& 
settled without conflict. 



THE "END. 



BOOKS AND PERIODICALS CONSULTED 



^'Annual Cyclopaedia" — Appleton. . 

^'Belgium of the East, The." By the author of "Egypt Under Ismail 
Pasha." Edited by Blanchard Jerrold. 

^'British JSTaval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1883, Report of The." 
By Lieutenant-Commander Casper F. Goodrich, U. y. Navy. 

** British Quarterly Review, " Files of. 

■"Chinese Gordon. Succinct Record of His Life." By Archibald Forbes. 

" Chinese Gordon, The Life of." By Charles H. Allen, F. R. G. S. 

"" Chinese Gordon, The Story of." By A. Egmont Hake. 

■" Confederate Soldier in Egypt, A." By W. W. Loring. 

■" Contemporary Review," Files of. 

"Diary of an American Girl in Cairo during the War of 1883." {Century, 
June, 1884.) Fanny Stone. 

■"■ Edinburgh Review," Files of. 

■"England in Egypt." By George Makepeace Towle. 

■" England Under Gladstone, 1880—1885." By Justin H. McCarthy, M. P. 

"'Egypt and the Egyptian Question." By D. Mackenzie Wallace. 

"Egypt and the SCdan." Speech by W. E. Gladstone. 

"' Egypt As It Is." By J. C. McCoan. 

" Egypt For the Egyptians. A Retrospect and a Prospect." (Anonymous.) 

"Egypt Under Ismail Pasha." Edited by Blanchard Jerrold. 



— 114 — 

"Fellah, The." By Edmond About. 

" Fortnightly Review," Files of. 

" General Gordon's Journals at Khartum." 

" History of the East India Company." By Robert Grant. 

'History of the Egyptian Revolution to Death of Mehemet Ali, A." B^. 
A. A. Patton, F. R. G. S. 

" How We Defended Arabi." C. M. Broadley. 

"Independent," Files of. 

"Ismailia" By Sir Samuel W. Baker. 

' ' Khedive's Egypt, The. " By Edward De Leon. 

" London Times," Files of. 

"Modern History and Condition of Egypt, The. 1801 to 1843." By Wnt. 
Holt Yates, M.D. 

"Morning Land, The." By Edward Dicey. 

''Nineteenth Century," Files of. 

"Plain Words on the Egyptian Question." (Anonymous.) 

" Quarterly Review," Files of. 

" Shall We Annex Egypt ?" By William Stone, M. A., F. L. S. 

"Spoiling the Egyptians." A Tale of Shame Told from the British Blue- 
Books. By J, Seymour Heay. 

" Suez Canal, The." By J. H. Pepper. (In "Discoveries and Inventions, 
of the Nineteenth Century," by Robt. Routledge.) 

"Suez Canal, The." Letters and Documents Descriptive of its Rise and 
Progress in 1854 — 1856. By Ferdinand De Lesseps. 

"Three Prophets, The : Chinese Gordon, Mahemet Ahmed, Arabi Pasha." 
By Colonel C. Chaille Long. 

" Uganda and the Egyptian Sfidan." By C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin.- 



THE CONFLICT / 



OF THE EAST AND WEST 



IN 



EGYPT, 



'< DISSERTATION IN PAET FULFILLMENT OF THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY 

FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE DEGREE OF 

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHr," IN 

THE SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 

COLUMBIA COLLEGE. 



— BY — 

T JOHN ELIOT BOWEN, B. A., Ph. B. 
78 ■>■ 



NEW YORK: 
THE INDEPBNDBNT PRESS, 21 & 23 ROSE STREET. 

1886. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



029 958 379 A 



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